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Naïve Realism and the Causal Argument.

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

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

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À minha avó, Maria Dóris Ibiapina (*in memoriam*),
certamente a pessoa mais interessada por esta tese.

RESUMO

O Realismo Ingênuo é uma abordagem destacada na Filosofia da Percepção devido às suas supostas vantagens teóricas em relação a abordagens concorrentes. Esta tese tem como objetivo abordar questões centrais do Realismo Ingênuo, bem como um desafio frequentemente apontado como sua ameaça mais significativa em contexto contemporâneo: o Argumento da Causalidade. Levando em consideração uma distinção mais ampla dentro do âmbito do Realismo Ingênuo, introduzida por Raineri (2021), que diz respeito aos seus dois possíveis assuntos (ou seja, se eles tratam da natureza da percepção ou sobre a explicação de seus aspectos fenomenais), esses capítulos iniciais abordarão cada versão do Realismo Ingênuo separadamente. O Capítulo 1 estabelece uma pesquisa básica para a primeira versão, denominada "Realismo Ingênuo Ontológico", fornecendo, de maneira nova, uma caracterização abrangente de sua tese mínima e uma classificação/taxonomia relativa. Além disso, uma análise aprofundada da relação de *acquaintance* revelou, também de modo inédito, uma diversidade de relações e predicados correspondentes. No Capítulo 2, adota-se uma perspectiva mais avaliativa e crítica em relação à segunda forma significativa do Realismo Ingênuo. Apresentam-se argumentos originais contrários a uma versão específica do Realismo Ingênuo Fenomenal, chamada "Objetivismo", com base em fenomenologia relacionada a partes do corpo e casos de inversão de espectros, que raramente são abordados em discussões sobre tais formas de Realismo Ingênuo. Esses argumentos, se corretos, rejeitaram de forma decisiva essa perspectiva, favorecendo o concorrente principal dentro do Realismo Ingênuo Fenomenal, denominado "Subjetivismo". Os dois últimos capítulos concentram-se no Argumento da Causalidade, explorando caminhos plausíveis para os Realistas Ingênuos contestarem esse argumento. O Capítulo 3 aborda especificamente a versão proposta por Howard Robinson, avaliando o princípio causal introduzido por ele ("Mesmas causas, mesmos efeitos"), ponderando, de maneira inédita, se haveria alguma interpretação de "mesmos efeitos" que, ao mesmo tempo, o tornasse um princípio causal geral válido e mantivesse sua função no argumento de Robinson. A resposta obtida foi negativa. O Capítulo 4 explorou uma versão modificada do argumento de Robinson, apresentada por Michael Martin. Nele, considerei que contornar tal argumento com base na rejeição de sua parte conhecida como "screening off" (que foi o alvo preferencial de realistas ingênuos tentando lidar com o argumento) potencialmente traz alguns riscos. Com base nisto, foquei em suas premissas que o fazem atuar como um "argumento da alucinação", que "espalha" para percepções a propriedade fundamental das alucinações. A premissa geral defendida como preferencial para tal rejeição foi um princípio conhecido como "Superveniência Local para Alucinações". Tal princípio foi mostrado como dependendo de duas ideias anteriores, a saber, que a causação corpo-mente é sempre interna e que alucinações são apenas causalmente determinadas. Depois de mostrada as motivações tradicionais para cada uma dessas ideias, mostrei, também de maneira potencialmente inédita, algumas formas disponíveis para realistas ingênuos em contrapô-las.

Palavras-chave: Realismo Ingênuo; Disjuntivismo; Argumento Causal.

ABSTRACT

Naive Realism is a prominent approach in the Philosophy of Perception due to its supposed theoretical advantages over competing approaches. This dissertation aims to address central issues of Naive Realism, as well as a challenge often identified as its most significant threat in a contemporary context: the Causal Argument. Taking into account a broader distinction within the scope of Naive Realism, introduced by Raineri (2021), which concerns its two possible subject-matters (i.e. whether they deal with the nature of perception or with the explanation of its phenomenal aspects), these opening chapters will cover each version of Naive Realism separately. Chapter 1 sets out a groundwork research for the first version, called "Ontological Naive Realism", providing, in a new way, a comprehensive characterization of its minimal thesis and a relative classification/taxonomy. In addition, an in-depth analysis of the acquaintance relation revealed, also in an unprecedented way, a diversity of relations and corresponding predicates. In Chapter 2, a more evaluative and critical perspective is adopted in relation to the second significant form of Naive Realism. Original arguments are presented against a specific version of Phenomenal Naive Realism, called "Objectivism", based on phenomenology related to body parts and cases of spectrum inversion, which are rarely addressed in discussions about such forms of Naive Realism. These arguments, if correct, decisively rejected this perspective, favoring the main competitor within Phenomenal Naive Realism, called "Subjectivism". The two final chapters focus on the Causal Argument, exploring plausible ways for Naive Realists to challenge it. Chapter 3 specifically addresses the version proposed by Howard Robinson, evaluating the causal principle introduced by him ("Same causes, same effects"), pondering, in an unprecedented way, whether there would be any interpretation of "same effects" that, at the same time, make it a valid general causal principle and maintain its function in Robinson's original argument. The obtained response was negative. Chapter 4 explored a modified version of Robinson's argument, presented by Michael Martin. There, I considered that circumventing such an argument on the basis of rejecting its part known as "screening off" (which is the preferred target of naïve realists trying to deal with the argument) potentially carries some risks. Based on this, I focused on the premises that make it act as an argument from hallucination, i.e., as "spreading" to perceptions of the fundamental property of hallucinations. The general premise defended as preferred for such a rejection was a principle known as "Local Supervenience for Hallucinations". Such a principle has been shown to depend on two earlier ideas, namely, that mind-body causation is always internal and that hallucinations are only causally determined. After showing the motivations for each of these ideas, as presented in this argument, I showed, also in a potentially unprecedented way, some ways available to naive realists to oppose them.

Keywords: Naïve Realism; Disjunctivism; Causal Argument.

RESUMO EXPANDIDO

Introdução

O Realismo Ingênuo é uma abordagem na Filosofia da Percepção conhecida por suas vantagens teóricas que não são alcançadas por seus concorrentes. Essas vantagens incluem a compatibilidade com nossas intuições e introspecções cotidianas sobre a percepção, a capacidade de explicar o conhecimento perceptivo e o uso de termos demonstrativos, entre outros aspectos, justificando assim seu estudo e, quando aplicável, sua defesa. Esta pesquisa se concentra nos temas do Realismo Ingênuo na Filosofia da Percepção, especialmente em relação ao que é considerado seu principal desafio atual, o Argumento da Causalidade. A Tese explorou questões específicas relacionadas ao Realismo Ingênuo como uma teoria filosófica da percepção em cada um de seus capítulos. Os dois primeiros capítulos abordaram, de maneira inédita, questões específicas relacionadas ao Realismo Ingênuo enquanto proponente de uma abordagem filosófica da percepção. Levando em consideração a distinção mais ampla dentro do âmbito do Realismo Ingênuo, conforme introduzida por Raineri (2021), que se refere a uma divisão interna de teorias realistas-ingênuos segundo possíveis "subjet-matters" – ou seja, a natureza da percepção e a explicação de seus aspectos fenomenais – esses capítulos iniciais exploraram cada uma dessas versões do Realismo Ingênuo separadamente. O Capítulo 1 estabeleceu as bases para a primeira versão do Realismo Ingênuo, conhecida como "Realismo Ingênuo Ontológico", fornecendo uma caracterização abrangente de sua tese mínima e distintiva, bem como uma classificação e taxonomia relativa. No Capítulo 2, uma perspectiva mais avaliativa e crítica foi adotada em relação à segunda forma significativa do Realismo Ingênuo, abordando argumentos originais contra uma versão específica do Realismo Ingênuo Fenomenal conhecida como "Objetivismo". Os dois últimos capítulos concentraram-se no argumento causal enquanto um desafio relevante para o Realismo Ingênuo. O Capítulo 3 abordou a versão do argumento causal proposta por Howard Robinson, que desempenhou um papel crucial ao mostrar, dentro do cenário filosófico atual, o poder de considerações causais em minar o Realismo Ingênuo. O Capítulo 4 tratou de uma versão modificada do argumento de Robinson, conforme apresentada por Michael Martin, representando a forma principal do argumento causal discutido nos debates atuais sobre realismo ingênuo e disjuntivismo.

Objetivos.

Como indicado, o objetivo geral deste trabalho foi abordar, de forma inédita, alguns tópicos relacionados ao Realismo Ingênuo em relação ao Argumento Causal. No primeiro capítulo, buscou-se, primariamente, discutir a forma de Realismo Ingênuo, seguindo a distinção proposta por Raineri, conhecida como "Realismo Ingênuo Ontológico", apresentando sua versão distintamente mínima. Com base nisso, pretendeu-se propor uma classificação e taxonomia das várias formas de Realismo Ingênuo Ontológico, distinguindo-as com base em características distintas relevantes que as diferentes versões desse tipo de Realismo Ingênuo podem possuir. Já o segundo capítulo, numa toada mais crítica, abordou a segunda versão do Realismo Ingênuo como um todo, conhecida como "Realismo Ingênuo Fenomenal", que, por sua vez, visa explicar a fenomenologia perceptiva. Mais especificamente, dentro deste tipo geral de Realismo Ingênuo, identificou-se um tipo de versão que tentava explicar a fenomenologia sensorial apenas por referência a propriedades do objeto que é apresentado perceptivamente ao sujeito. Este capítulo analisou criticamente essa abordagem para avaliar se ela era a melhor forma de Realismo Ingênuo de tal tipo de vertente fenomenal que poderíamos obter. O objetivo do Capítulo 3 foi examinar de perto a exposição inicial do argumento causal, conforme

discutido extensivamente no contexto analítico contemporâneo, especificamente no terceiro capítulo do livro “Perception” de Howard Robinson. Exploramos as possíveis respostas que Realistas Ingênuos poderiam dar para evitar as conclusões que esse argumento traz. Por sua vez, o principal objetivo do Capítulo 4 foi fornecer uma análise abrangente do Argumento da Causalidade em sua forma mais conhecida atualmente, presente em “The Limits of Self-Awareness”, de Michael Martin. O foco foi na exploração de estratégias potenciais que os realistas ingênuos poderiam ter empregado em resposta a esse argumento.

Metodologia

A Tese utilizou algumas metodologias distintas para o cumprimento de tais metas. Em primeiro lugar, utilizou amplamente a pesquisa bibliográfica, a fim de identificar criticamente os principais avanços desenvolvidos nas temáticas trabalhadas e possibilitar, com tal consideração, a implementação conscienciosa de resultados relevantes e inéditos. Além disso, algumas metodologias especificamente filosóficas, tais como análise conceitual, argumentação lógica, argumentação por contraexemplo e intuitividade, foram empregadas para abordar criticamente teses já academicamente estabelecidas e propor ou defender posições.

Resultados/Discussão

No capítulo 1, a fim de alcançar o objetivo de delimitar o Realismo Ingênuo Ontológico, propus uma versão sua distintamente mínima. Sugeri que essa abordagem, em geral, responde à questão sobre a natureza das percepções, alegando que ela envolve uma relação de "acquaintance" com entidades independentes da mente. No entanto, logo se percebeu que, ao considerar uma caracterização detalhada da relação de "acquaintance", há uma multiplicidade de significados que esse termo assume em diferentes formas de Realismo Ingênuo Ontológico. Isso foi decisivo para a conclusão de que a tese mínima para tal forma de realismo deveria envolver, antes, um predicado disjuntivo dos membros classe de “predicados de acquaintance”, especificado através da noção wittgensteiniana de semelhança de família. Com base nessa definição, também propus uma classificação e taxonomia inovadoras das formas relevantes de Realismo Ingênuo Ontológico, com base na extensão da atribuição de características ingênuo-realistas e se se identifica ou não percepções/ilusões às instanciações da relação de acquaintance. O segundo capítulo discute a versão fenomenal do Realismo Ingênuo “objetivista”, apresentada acima, com especial foco numa modificação sua, o seletivismo, destinado a superar alguns tipos tradicionais de objeções. Ao reconhecer a capacidade do seletivismo em lidar com boa parte das objeções ao objetivismo, tenta-se apresentar novos argumentos que conseguiriam refutá-lo. Neste sentido, apresenta-se um argumento que se atém ao fato de que percepções sobre as mesmas coisas ambientais podem ter fenomenologias relativas ao corpo do indivíduo distintas, mostrando a falsidade do seletivismo conforme ele tem sido apresentado na literatura. No entanto, é proposta uma versão modificada do objetivismo, inédita dentro da discussão sobre realismo ingênuo até então (pois postula que as percepções envolvem acquaintance de fatos relativos aos órgãos sensoriais), que poderia despistar esse argumento, embora ainda enfrente alguns desafios não definitivos. Em contraste, propõe-se outro argumento que refuta positivamente o objetivismo, o qual não pode ser salvo por nenhuma modificação. Defende-se, neste sentido, que o seletivismo carece de recursos para lidar com casos de espectro invertido. No capítulo 3, foi destacado o fato de que o argumento da causalidade de Howard Robinson se utiliza de um princípio chamado “mesmas causas, mesmos efeitos”, mostrando que, para sua prossecução, ele deve, em primeiro lugar, definir “mesmas causas” em termos de

subsunção de dois ou mais eventos a uma mesma lei causal, ao passo que “mesmos efeitos” devem ser tais que percepções, entendidas como envolvendo acquaintance com entidades independentes de mente, e alucinações, entendidas de maneira alternativa (já que tal caracterização das percepções, sendo isso que caracteriza a alternativa realista-ingênuo como disjuntivista, não pode ocorrer em alucinações, que podem ocorrer na ausência de objetos adequados), devem ser consideradas “mesmos efeitos”. Disto, do fato de que percepções e alucinações de exatamente os mesmos antecedentes neurológicos são subsumidas a uma mesma lei (uma sobre suas fenomenologias), então se teria que eles são “os mesmos” naquele sentido antidisjuntivista. Sendo assim, foi necessária a análise de uma interpretação de “mesmos efeitos” que mantivesse sua função no argumento, ao mesmo tempo que pudesse ser um princípio causal geral plausível, como pretendido por Robinson. No entanto, mostrou-se, com base em todos os subsídios deixados por Robinson para entender “mesmos efeitos”, que tal interpretação deixaria "mesmas causas, mesmos efeitos" um princípio causal geral implausível, uma vez que, dentre outras razões, ele impediria a possibilidade de leis causais sobrepostas e diferentes poderes causais em efeitos advindos de uma mesma lei causal. Finalmente, no quarto capítulo, foram apresentadas duas premissas gerais nas quais o argumento de Martin se baseia e que os realistas ingênuos poderiam resistir para evitar sua conclusão. A primeira é a ideia de que eventos mentais são sempre, do ponto de vista causal, exclusivamente determinados por processos neurológicos. A segunda é que alucinações são apenas causalmente determinadas (não deixando espaço para determinação não-causal). Em relação à primeira premissa, mostrou-se que os realistas ingênuos poderiam argumentar que, levando em conta as observações empíricas (ou até mesmo as idealmente possíveis), podem propor modelos causais paralelos compatíveis, justificadamente, que neguem tal exclusividade causal. Quanto à segunda premissa, demonstrou-se que, quando combinada com a primeira, ela leva à negação de algumas concepções intuitivas sobre alucinação (conhecida como "visão negativa das alucinações"), sendo, portanto, facilmente resistida pelos realistas ingênuos.

Considerações Finais

A pesquisa revelou alguns aspectos interessantes sobre o realismo ingênuo e sua relação com o argumento da causalidade. O primeiro capítulo delineou o realismo ingênuo ontológico, destacando suas variedades relevantes. O segundo capítulo evidenciou que o realismo ingênuo fenomenal-explicativo não pode ser objetivista, nem mesmo seletivista, concluindo que deve abranger, além dos aspectos do objeto-alvo da relação de “acquaintance”, também as propriedades do sujeito dessa relação. O terceiro capítulo demonstrou que os realistas ingênuos podem resistir ao argumento causal de Robinson ao questionar a plausibilidade de seu princípio causal geral, conforme exposto. Finalmente, o quarto capítulo indicou que o argumento causal de Martin também pode ser contestado ao se questionar duas premissas.

Palavras-chave: Realismo Ingênuo; Disjuntivismo; Argumento Causal.

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General Introduction – NAÏVE REALISM AND ITS MOTIVATIONS.

Naïve Realism[1] is renowned for purportedly offering significant theoretical advantages. In addition to addressing the fundamental aspects that philosophical accounts of perception traditionally aim to explain, such as the nature of perceptions and their phenomenology, naïve realists assert that their approach possesses unique advantages that are absent in competing theories.

One of the most emblematic advantages attributed to Naïve Realism, which is often seen as the source of its "Naïve" label, is its alignment to "pre-theoretical intuitions concerning perception or, in other words, to the view of the common man" (Fish, 2009, p. 5). In other words, it "correctly captures the common-sense conception of perception" (Martin, 2006, p. 356). More specifically, the "pre-theoretical conception of perception is that of a relation to a mind-independent object" (Crane, 2006, p. 133). Consequently, by adhering to this pre-theoretical understanding, Naïve Realism we avoid the unpleasant position of positing "some kind of error in our naïve or common sense judgments about perception" (Martin, 2002, p. 420). Therefore, Naïve Realism presents at least one prima facie reason for its adoption.

Another distinct and commonly considered advantage of Naïve Realism, which has been correctly distinguished by Raineri (2021) from the previous advantage, is its relationship to the introspective data we have during perception. Crane (2006, p. 247), for instance, argues that there is evidence supporting Naïve Realism when we engage in introspection or reflection on our experiences. In this sense, "when we introspect a visual experiential episode, it seems that we are related to some mind-independent object or feature that is present and is a part, or a constituent, of the experience" (Nudds, 2009, p.334). The proposition is that the way things appear to us in reflection during perception aligns with what naïve-realistic accounts describe as being involved in perception. Based on an inferential principle that allows us to take appearances seriously (in the absence of

[1] Chapter 1 and 2 primarily focus on providing a comprehensive characterization of Naïve Realism. If the reader is unfamiliar with Naïve Realism/Disjunctivism, it is recommended to read these chapters before proceeding further. Otherwise, it may be challenging to grasp the motivations and arguments presented in the General Introduction.

contrary reasons) (Huemer, 2001), Naïve Realism becomes a compelling choice over alternative accounts[2-3].

There are also notable epistemological and cognitive motivations that support Naïve Realism. Let us first consider the epistemological aspect. Certain perspectives, particularly those that address Cartesian skeptical arguments, propose that perceptual evidence, rational support, and knowledge necessitate accepting perceptions in line with the tenets of Naïve Realism. Epistemological Disjunctivism serves as a prominent example in this regard. It suggests that there can be epistemological distinctions between perceptual and non-perceptual experiences (considered "good" and "bad" cases) due, at least in part, to the inherent nature of the experiences themselves, where the presentational character of veridical perceptions accounts for its obvious epistemically-enabling aspect. In this sense,

> perceptual appearances are either objective *states of affairs making themselves manifest to subjects*, or situations in which it is as if an objective state of affairs is making itself manifest to a subject, although that is not how things are. Experiences of the first kind have an epistemic significance that experiences of the second kind do not have. They afford opportunities for knowledge of objective states of affairs. (McDowell, 2008, pp. 380-1, my italics)

One could argue that the epistemological rationale behind the necessity of this association stems from the fact that many epistemological disjunctivists, including figures like John McDowell and Duncan Pritchard, also strive to align with internalistic intuitions regarding perceptual evidence and rational support.

> There is something gripping about the "internalism" that is expressed here. The root idea is that one's epistemic standing on some question cannot intelligibly be constituted, even in part, by matters blankly external to how it is with one subjectively. For how could such matters be other than beyond one's ken? And how could matters beyond one's ken make any difference to one's epistemic standing? […] But the disjunctive conception of appearances shows a way to detach this "internalist" intuition from the requirement of non-question-begging demonstration. When someone has a fact made manifest to him, the obtaining of the fact contributes to his epistemic standing on the question. But the obtaining of the fact is precisely not blankly external to his subjectivity, as it would be if the truth about that were exhausted by the highest common factor. (McDowell, 1982, p. 26-7)

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[2] Langsam (2017) presents a parallel line of reasoning based on the contention that the phenomenological character of perceptions can be described solely in terms of observational properties pertaining to mind-independent entities. According to Langsam, the instantiation of the phenomenological character is in some way directly formed by the instantiation of physical properties.

[3] Differently from what common factor theorists (who are also sense data theorists in McDowell's exposition) would suggest, which would also demand the obtaining of an external fact (like some kind of causal chain, as I show below).

As a result, epistemological disjunctivists aim to preserve the fundamental intuition of internalism, which asserts that rational support cannot be "external" to how things are subjectively. However, they are willing to relinquish epistemological inferentialism, which demands that rational support always furnishes a non-question-begging (and defeasible) demonstration for the proposition known. According to McDowell, the manifestation of states of affairs to an individual satisfies these criteria, along with non-defeasibility, thus completing his theory of perceptual rational support. All aspects involved in these facts, in an epistemologically significant sense, cannot be external or beyond the subject's "ken".

Pritchard (2012) shares a similar perspective and explicitly argues for perceptual epistemic support as reflectively accessible and factive. His aim is to uphold the internalist demands within the context of the Cartesian skeptical argument. In this case, Pritchard provides a neo-Moorean response to this skeptical challenge rather than advocating for an epistemically revisionist approach.

Moreover, the argument in favor of a naïve realistic view of perceptions extends beyond its alignment with internalistic requirements for perceptual evidence. It also stands out as one of the few options that successfully meet these requirements. Most other available epistemological perspectives on perceptions tend to rely on something subjectively external that would, at least partially, determine their role as evidence or rational support of the relevant kind.

For instance, sense-data theorists typically have to argue that veridical perceptions are epistemically valid for ordinary mundane propositions due to their causal relation to the objects or events that the propositions refer to (or based on some peculiar "similarity" between the perceived sense data and the relevant entities), which is external in any plausible epistemological sense (Goldman, 1967). This argument stems from their perspective that perceptions and matching hallucinations are inherently identical, while recognizing that hallucinations lack evidential support for ordinary mundane propositions.

For similar reasons, traditional intentionalists, such as proponents of classical Fregean descriptionism, who believe that the instantiation of the contents of experiences is exhaustively internally individuated (Silins, 2011), would face the challenge of accounting for perceptual evidence externally. Given that neurologically matching perceptions and hallucinations always have the same contents in their view, they would

need to look beyond the internal realm to explain how perceptual evidence can be justified and provide support for beliefs about the external world[4].

Certainly, there are alternative intentionalist approaches that embrace an externally-individuated understanding of perceptual contents. One such approach views perceptual content, particularly in contrast to hallucinatory content, as object-involving, akin to demonstrative thoughts (Peacocke, 1992; Tye, 2007). However, it is important to note that this alternative option may also face significant challenges when compared to naive realist positions. Specifically, due to its disjunctivist nature, it may be susceptible to the same causal concerns discussed in this dissertation, which represent a significant portion of the issues with naive realism, without offering the full range of advantages that naive realism provides.

As previously mentioned, Naïve Realists also emphasize cognitive motivations. One prominent aspect involves perceptual demonstratives, such as the use of "this" or "that" to refer to something currently perceived. Campbell's theory of demonstratives is a notable example (Campbell, 2002b, 2009, 2011). According to Campbell, a person's acquaintance with something, along with some attentional activations, determines their knowledge of what a demonstrative refers to, thus justifying their use of such terms.

These are the main reasons put forth by contemporary perceptual theorists in support of Naïve Realism. However, there are also some lesser-known reasons worth considering. One such reason is presented by Brewer (2011), who, following a Lockean perspective, argues that Naïve Realism can best account for why we have conceptions of mind-independent things. For, as Brewer (2011) argues, acquaintance with mind-independent things "provides us with an initial conception at least of what mind-independent physical objects are" (p. 38). It allows us to form "at least a very rough and provisional conception of them as something like persisting, unified, extended space occupants" (p. 37). Another lesser-known perspective is proposed by Martin (2002), who suggests that Naïve Realism, in addition to explaining perceptual phenomenology, can also provide an explanation for the phenomenology of sensory imagination.

As mentioned earlier, many of these purported advantages of Naïve Realism are not achievable by competing perceptual theories. For instance, the introspective data often cited to support Naïve Realism are not only seen as insufficient evidence for sense-data theory but are also considered to contradict it. When we attend to perceptions from

[4] An overview of Intentionalism is extensively discussed in various sections of this dissertation, particularly in Section 3.1 of Chapter 1.

an introspective perspective, we do not find any evidence of mental images as described by sense-data theorists. Instead, we encounter familiar and ordinary objects such as tables and laptops (Hill, 2009, pp. 143-4).

Additionally, as we have observed, Naïve Realism also faces the challenge of not aligning with internalistic intuitions when it comes to explaining perceptual knowledge. Furthermore, it would be difficult to account for our ability to understand concepts related to ordinary mind-independent objects, given that we would be confined within the limitations of our own minds and unable to directly access those objects (commonly referred to as the "veil of perception").

As indicated, Naïve Realism's advantages also do not fully apply to Representationalism. For example, our common-sense understanding of perceptions does not typically involve the attribution of contents, as we would with beliefs. Instead, perceptions are often understood as a direct, non-representational presentation of the external world, distinct from the realm of imagination or thought.

Representationism faces another challenge that Naïve Realism appears to handle more effectively, namely its candidacy as the best philosophical account of perception. As discussed earlier, contemporary philosophical accounts of perception are expected to address two main tasks: providing an account of the nature of perceptual episodes and explaining their phenomenology. However, relying solely on representational factors to explain perceptual phenomenology may be inadequate compared to approaches that emphasize presentational aspects, such as Naïve Realism and Sense Data Theory.

One specific concern relates to the "Problem of Common Content", which arises when there are cognitive experiences that plausibly share the same content as sensory perceptions (Byrne, 2001). Despite their shared content, these experiences are phenomenologically distinct. Representationists usually address this issue by proposing that the general realm of contents encompasses multiple distinct modes of representation (Chalmers, 2004). For instance, the difference in phenomenology between a perception with the content specified by "there is a black laptop in front of me" and believing the same proposition can be explained by the use of different modes of representation. In the case of perception, things are represented under a mode specific to sensory experiences, while in the case of belief, they are represented under another mode exclusive to beliefs.

However, there is an inherent problem when it comes to explaining phenomenology in this manner. Representationists propose that sensory phenomenology can be explained by referring to a factor such as "x is represented as being F (where x is

presented under mode S" (Egan, 2006, p.499). However, the issue arises when we ask representationists about the exact nature is this mode S (as opposed to other available modes of presentation). It appears that all they can assert is "S is the mode of presentation exclusive and necessary to the way sensory perceptions represent". In doing so, they fail to precisely specify the distinguishing characteristics of this mode in comparison to other modes of presentation, apart from the initial distinction that they pertain to different classes of mental phenomena. Chapter 2 of this dissertation will demonstrate how presentational accounts of sensory phenomenology, such as Explanatory-Phenomenal Naïve Realism, are capable of precisely specifying all the objective and subjective factors that contribute to determining a particular sensory phenomenology. Therefore, these presentational accounts should be considered dialectically superior to the representational strategy.

Due to these numerous alleged advantages, Naïve Realism holds a strong position in the contemporary landscape as a viable contender for central theses in a plausible Theory of Experience. This in itself provides a broad justification for addressing the first part of the subject matter in this dissertation, as indicated by the first conjunct of the dissertation's title. (However, the specific motivations for each chapter dedicated to the exploration of Naïve Realism (Chapters 1 and 2) are discussed in their respective Introductions).

Based on these observations, one can also discern the motivations for exploring the second conjunct in the dissertation's title. It is widely acknowledged by numerous authors that the causal argument poses a significant challenge to Naïve Realism, often considered its most formidable threat (Soteriou 2016, 2020; Fish, 2021; Tim & French, 2021). Consequently, undertaking the task of outlining lines of defense against this argument, as the present dissertation endeavors to do, is an important undertaking for the preservation of Naïve Realism and its associated advantages.

As stated in the title of the dissertation, the focus of this work revolves around Naïve Realism and its significant challenge, the causal argument. The following is a general outline of the structure of this dissertation.

The first two chapters delve into specific issues related to Naïve Realism as a philosophical theory of perception. Taking into account a broader distinction within the realm of Naïve Realism, as introduced by Raineri (2021), concerning its two potential subject matters (i.e., the nature of perception and the explanation of its phenomenal aspects), these initial chapters will address each version of Naïve Realism separately.

Chapter 1 will lay the groundwork for the first version, known as “Ontological Naïve Realism”, providing a comprehensive characterization of its minimal and distinctive thesis, as well as a relative classification and taxonomy. In Chapter 2, a more evaluative and critical perspective will be adopted towards the second significant form of Naïve Realism. This chapter presents original arguments against a specific version of Phenomenal Naïve Realism known as “Objectivism”. If these arguments hold true, they decisively reject this perspective, favoring its main contender within the realm of Phenomenal Naïve Realism referred to as “Subjectivism”.

As previously mentioned, the two concluding chapters will center around the causal argument, which, in its contemporary formulation, is a significant challenge to Naïve Realism. Chapter 3 will specifically address Howard Robinson's version of the causal argument, which has played a crucial role in showing to the contemporary philosophical discussion the power of causal considerations in undermining naïve realism. Chapter 4 will delve into a modified version of Robinson’s argument, as presented by Michael Martin, which represents the primary form of the causal argument discussed in current debates concerning naïve realism and disjunctivism.

In both cases, this dissertation will involve analytical work to specify and reconstruct both arguments, as well as to elucidate their respective evidences, underlying principles, and assumptions. Furthermore, novel resources of resistance, which can be employed by both disjunctivists and naïve realists, will be presented. However, the primary focus of these chapters will not be to exhaustively argue for the principles and ideas used to counter the causal argument. Instead, the aim is to explore potential paths that disjunctivists could take to avoid the conclusions of the causal argument, while acknowledging their prima facie plausibility.

Chapter 1 – WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE AN ONTOLOGICAL NAÏVE REALIST?[5]

1. INTRODUCTION

One thing that strikes anyone who reads many distinct papers (by distinct authors) on Naïve Realism is the diversity of propositions that are taken as "naïve-realistic". Although often considered a unitary thesis, in fact, "Naïve Realism" is a label that is put on distinct positions. While Naïve Realism may be suitably considered the view that entails that perceivers get acquainted with mind-independent (or physical, material, etc.) things, it may take on relevantly different theses, as I will clarify throughout the text. These differences go often unnoticed. Of course, situations like this are likely to bring serious hindrances to the progress of the corresponding academic discussion. First, as Haddock and Macpherson (2008) suggest, this intensifies the risk of unjust criticism among these distinct proposals. This is because of the risk that some evidence against some thesis is improperly taken as also against a relevantly distinct one under the same label (not to mention the risk of creating false dilemmas). Undue support "inherited" from a homonym thesis is an equally dangerous risk in this kind of situation. Considering that at least much of the philosophical work is to make choices, based on the total available evidence, between alternative positions, then of course the philosophical work in the Philosophy of Perception is importantly impaired by that kind of confusion.

Besides, a multitude of distinct propositions without being recognized as such "carries the danger of eliding important differences" (Haddock & Macpherson, 2008, p.1). As I will indicate in the Appendix to Chapter 1, even crucial aspects of these theses – as their subject matter (whether, for example, they deal with the nature of experiences or only some specific aspect of it, as their phenomenology) – are sometimes ignored. Arguably, the lack of clarity of the relevant difference between the theses that are in question in a certain academic discussion is by itself at odds with what we should expect the discussion of our best theories to be.

A secondary, but related, theoretical problem is that sometimes naïve-realistic theses are phrased with non-standard or not sufficiently clarified terminology. As Genone

[5] A version of this chapter has been published in Machado, Ícaro M. I. (forthcoming), "What Does it Mean to be an Ontological Naïve Realist?" in Philosophia, 1-29.

(2016, p.1) remarks "[o]ne of the greatest difficulties surrounding discussions of naïve realism, however, has been lack of clarity concerning exactly what affirming or denying it entails". This – apart from the immediate problem of lack of mutual understanding between peers it brings, which is at odds with what we would expect the discussion of our best theories to be – also has the effect of contributing to the problematic situation described in the previous paragraph. For not rarely, for example, the same naïve-realistic sentence, postulated by some author, is taken to be, by another different scholar discussing it, as a different proposition (although they might think that they are dealing with the same one). (Sometimes, new naïve-realistic theses were even generated from previously misinterpreted ones!)[6]

I think this is enough to show the relevance of efforts to mitigate these problems[7]. The main goal of the present study is to provide some groundwork that addresses those theoretical complications. Here is some information on how I will proceed:

Preliminarily, it is important to remark that I accept Raineri's (2021) general classification of Naïve Realism, which subdivides it into Ontological Naïve Realism (ONR) and Phenomenal Naïve Realism, based on their respective subject matters, i.e., the kind of question they aim to provide an answer. The former concerns the nature of veridical perceptions (and illusions) as a whole, and it is the focus of my account. The latter deals with issues related to the phenomenology of experiences, but it is beyond the scope of this chapter[8].

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[6] Concrete examples highlighting the issues discussed in this paragraph and the previous one are provided in the Appendix to Chapter 1.

[7] Especially if one considers the little amount of analytical literature that acknowledges the problem and directly tackles it and when they do, they are far from decisive. Actually, the only example that purports to focus on conceptual and definitional matters about "naïve realism" that I know of is Genone's (2016) "Recent Work on Naïve Realism". However, he actually spends a great amount of time making a general characterization about Direct Naïve Realism Representationalism. Then, he makes a very quick characterization (in less than two pages) of Naïve Realism (in terms of involvedness of acquaintance with mind-independent entities) and then he discusses whether Naïve Realism and Representationism are compatible. In the rest of the article (which is half of it), he discusses some arguments for and against naïve realism. So, Genone's paper does not substantially address the worries I described above.
Indeed, Raineri (2021) proposed the general classification I assume here, but he actually only introduces it, without any additional clarification. Haddock and Macpherson's (2008) work, on the other hand, is in a similar vein as the present one, but they only target Disjunctivism.

[8] As indicated in the previous Note, Raineri only introduced this kind of position without providing additional information. However, in my view, there are two types of phenomenological naïve-realistic positions. The first one ("A Phenomenological-Constitutive Naïve Realism") is a group of positions that see perceptions' phenomenology as individuated by (types of) mind-independent entities. (This kind of phenomenological externalism can be found in, e.g., Langsam (2017) and Kennedy (2013)). The second form of Phenomenological Naïve Realism is explanatory and sees phenomenological facts (states of affairs, instantiations, tropes, etc.) in perceptions as in virtue of instantiations of naïve-realistic properties. Smith (2002) is an example here.

Here is how I will proceed. In section 2, I will first discuss ONR, presenting its distinctively minimal version. In other words, I will propose a thesis that should be accepted by all and only proponents of this kind of account. This will naturally lead to a general characterization of ONR, which addresses the question posed in the title of this chapter. Based on this, in Section 3, I will propose a classification and taxonomy of the various forms of ONR, distinguishing them based on relevant distinct features that versions of ONR instantiate.

That discussion should tackle the theoretical problems described above in various ways. First, defining ONR will be useful for the acknowledgment of the relevant distinctions between the theses that are often overlooked by mainstream discussion of Naïve Realism. In particular, this should single out ONR, as a distinctive type within Naïve Realism in general, as opposed to other possible forms of Naïve Realism (with distinctive subject matters). As I noticed in the Appendix to Chapter 1, such a difference in subject matters was sometimes ignored. Defining ONR will also prepare the terrain for Section 3, where I introduce a new classification and taxonomy that is based on the significant differences that exist within ONR. Thus, the chapter addresses the concerns raised by Haddock and Macpherson about ONR both externally, by showing its relevance in contrast to other types of Naïve Realism, and internally, by demonstrating its relevant internal distinctions.

The second type of theoretical problem I charged present-day naïve-realistic discussion with (the terminological unclarity problem) is also tackled in this chapter. For, such a minimal thesis's constituting concepts will be defined in standard terms, along with some terminological discussion. Thus, what is necessary for the postulation of any form of ONR will be conceptually addressed there. Specifically, considerable attention has been dedicated to the acquaintance predicate, which will be argued as an indispensable element of ONRs. Despite its importance, this concept has received limited consideration in recent naive-realistic literature. To address this, I provide a summary of its crucial characteristics, including the ones underlying a distinction in the acquaintance relation(s) that has gone unnoticed. Besides, perhaps more importantly, in Section 3, the proposed taxonomy of ONR will give rise to schemata whose corresponding "filling" should give us the specimens of the relevant forms of ONR. As the invariant and variant terms of these schemata were previously clarified, then the corresponding "filled" theses must also be. Therefore, these schemata should form a matrix of the relevant possible specific versions of ONR that would not and so suggested as generating the standard

formulations of ONR. Thus, we prescribe to future ontological naïve realists the adoption of ONRs along these lines as an antidote against the clarity/non-standard terminological problem and its consequences.

2. MINIMAL ONTOLOGICAL NAÏVE REALISM.

As announced earlier, ONR is a thesis concerning the nature of perceptions. An adequate answer to the question about the nature of Fs question would minimally involve a property (or something that can be expressed as such) G such that $\Box (\forall x) (F(x) \rightarrow G(x))$, where being G is not conceptually entailed by being F. In this case, ontological naïve realists aim to answer "What is the nature of a veridical perception?". In what follows, I will try to capture a proposition that is distinctively neutral among naïve realists that aims to answer this question. My initial suggestion here is a proposition that simply represents veridical perceptions as necessitating a sui generis relation towards mind-independent things. It can be expressed, in semi-formal language, with the following words:

(MNR) It is necessary that for all mental events x and time t, if x is a veridical perception at t, then x's associated subject is acquainted with o at t[9].

Note that (MNR) as now formulated is really only about veridical perceptions and not what disjunctivists usually call "good cases", which may also include illusions. This is because, although Naïve Realism (in general) deals with veridical perceptions, it is a controversial issue among varieties of ONR whether illusions have the same nature as veridical perceptions (Snowdon (1980)) or not (Hinton, 1973; McDowell, 1982, Martin,

[9] There is a tangential issue, concerning whether people that accept (MNR) should also adopt Metaphysical Realism and, in particular, External Realism. (See, e.g., Searle (1998, ch .1). By "Metaphysical Realism", I understand the most general proposition about the admission of something (or some class of things) as mind-independent, whereas "External Realism" is concerned with the admission of concrete particulars, the external world components, as mind-independent. Therefore, External Realism entails Metaphysical Realism. Since, according to naïve realism, perceptions necessitate relations that, in turn, necessitate some mind-independent entity, if there are perceptions in the real world, then we conclude that, in fact, there are mind-independent concrete particulars and, therefore, external realism is true. However, naïve realists are not obliged to accept the actuality of perception instantiations. They can be, for example, of a kind of ontological (Berkeleyan) idealism and so deny that we (humans, in the actual world) perceive real entities, while they admit that there are possible worlds where perceptions (as naïve realists describe them) occurs. In this case, although they would admit that some merely possible perceiving subject S becomes acquainted with some mind-independent thing, this "mind-independence" (which is relative to S) would not be spelled out in terms that are relevant to define the "mind-independence" in the relevant external realistic thesis. Hence, contrary to what Smith (2002) thinks, naïve realists only are automatically obliged to take those forms of realism if they also believe that veridical perceptions are actual.

2004). Since (MNR) is intended to be minimal, it should stick simply to veridical perceptions.

Another question about (MRN) is about what "o" stands for. Again, there is considerable variation with regard to what type of things ONR should say that perceivers are acquainted with. Some examples are "physical" (Millar, 2015), "mind-independent" (Genone, 2016), "environmental"/"external" (Martin, 2004), "material" (Price, 1950), etc. Another variation in this regard is about the ontological category (objects, facts, etc.) of the things we become acquainted with (as I will show in Section 2.2). So, to keep up with the minimality intended, "o" should range over all these (and akin) classes.

Since the other conceptual elements (the notion of a subject and of time) seems unproblematic, the predicate "… is acquainted with …" is the last concept in (MNR) to be clarified. The first concern when discussing it departs from the fact that it seems that we have to take it primitively. Therefore, there is no available account of "…is acquainted with…" when it comes to showing composing concepts or predicates. Fumerton (2006, p. 63), for example, claims that it is "sui generis and unanalyzable". Actually, philosophers usually only appeal to ordinary language usage to do all the conceptual clarification needed for the thesis, so no analysis was ever provided. However, it is often said that English predicates like "…is manifested to…", "… appears to…", "… is confronted to …"[10], "…encounters with…" or "…is presented to…" are more or less close to the technical sense of "…is acquainted with…". In a less approximate fashion[11], "…is aware of…" or "… is conscious of …." can be seen as relatively close to "…is acquainted with…". These translations or quasi-translations are the best we can do when it comes to indicating the *meaning* ontological naïve realists have in mind when using acquaintance predicates.

2.1. Characterizing the acquaintance relation.

However, this is not all we can tell when it comes to clarifying the acquaintance predicate. By refraining from doing it, we may fall prey to worries of unclearness concerning the acquaintance relation postulation When philosophical theses propose

[10] As Raleigh (2020) suggests.

[11] For "… is aware of…" is also used to capture alternative psychological relations, such as straightforwardly epistemological ones (when we say, for example, that John is aware of the fact that 2+2=4) or reflexive ones (when we say, for example, that we are capable of becoming aware of our own mental episodes).

unanalyzable concepts, they (when lacking a conceptual account) must provide an additional explanation of these concepts, which is likely to pertain to the nature of the objects represented by them. In special, as Fish (2021, p.105) rightly remarks, "even if a philosophical analysis of acquaintance is not forthcoming, this does not entail that we can't say anything interesting about it". In special, there are lines of thought that question our own capacity to conceptually grasp this notion, as the one Coates (2007, p. 75) expresses. The author says that "it is totally unclear, from the standpoint of our subjective grasp of experience, what the metaphysical relation of intrinsic connectedness could be" (ibid). Therefore, we are likely to profit from a characterization of the acquaintance relation.

It is natural to think that the fact that the acquaintance predicate is unanalyzable brings as a consequence that the relation it represents is a non-complex one[12-13]. This feature of relations presupposes that some universal[14] can be numerically identical to a combination of two or more other universals. This seems undisputed, since, for example, it is plausible that the quality of being F&G is exactly the same as the set composed by the quality of being F and the quality of being G. In this case, the quality of being F is, literally, a *proper part* of the quality of being F&G[15]. Something analogous can also apply to relations[16]. If this kind of identity and parthood between universals is granted, then we can say that some universal U^1 contains (or is composed of) another universal U^2 iff U^2 is a part of some combination of universals that is numerically identical to U^1 (and so U^1

[12] For why would complex relation have its theoretically relevant corresponding concept/predicate one that does not represents it as having such-and-such parts (in such-and-such relation)?

[13] Campbell (2002b; 2009; 2011; 2016) famously argued for the simplicity of acquaintance relation. Fish (2009, p. 114) argues for its irreducibility.

[14] Hereafter, "universals" will stand for properties and relations.

[15] Armstrong (1978; 1983; 1991) is someone who clearly takes complex universals as not being over and above their components. Here someone knowing Armstrong's affiliation with realism about universals could question that fact that my exposition is not neutral about the metaphysical status of universals. In fact, if one is a specie of nominalist (see this option of Nominalism in, e.g., Lewis (1983)), one might think that universals are actually sets of particulars, which in turn can be composed of subsets, which in turn can be other universals. If so, then the acquaintance relation – a universal, as I am taking it here – would be arguably a set of ordered pairs (at least in its formulations with two relata). Consequently, the "universal" *acquaintance relation by a Norwegian* (which nominalists would naturally take as a "universal" like any other) would be a proper part of the acquaintance relation (simply put). So the characterization above is not free from metaphysical observations about the ontology of universals. However, we do not actually need to be realists about universals to posit the present classification. It could be actually read in conditional terms, i.e., as strictly saying that a universal is complex iff *if* universals are actual as realists take them, then they are composed of some other universal.

[16] For example, the relation sense data theorists think that, when we perceive, holds between mind-independent physical things and us is necessarily complex, since it is plausibly composed (although not exhaustedly, as the relation seems to be a structural universal) by acquaintance relation and some other relation (that must hold between mental images and physical things).

is reducible to other universals). Given it, we can define simple (non-complex) universals as the ones that are not composed of any other universal[17]. In this case, because of acquaintance's simplicity, no universal composes this relation.

We can also indicate some of the essential patterns of instantiation[18] that the acquaintance relation has. The first one can be seen as a consequence[19] of the just mentioned feature and entails that the acquaintance relation is an intrinsic one[20]. It means that, necessarily, whatever all its instantiations, and they alone, involve[21] is restricted to the corresponding relata (how things and their parts are and no other particular external to them)[22]. Hence, the acquaintance relation is not like, e.g., *the relation of being as popular as*, which may involve, in its very instantiations, the cognition of people who are distinct from the ones between which the relation strictly holds. Acquaintance instantiations only involve, as far as particulars are concerned, the corresponding subjects and objects.

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[17] A distinction that can be seen as relevant across the class of complex qualities and relations concerns the possibility that some of its members are partially identical to some other universal, but there is no simple set of universals that is numerically identical to them (but only partially identical to them). This is usually thought to divide the complex universal class into conjunctive (the ones from the examples I gave above) and structural qualities. So, strictly speaking, "combination of " as used to define simple universals must admit not only simple sets, but also organized ones. For our purposes, however, the simple requirement of non-partially identity should do the job of defining simplicity.

[18] I.e., how this relation is instantiated in all the possible worlds where it is instantiated (which covers necessary aspects of the instantiators, the instantiations themselves, and relevant relations between instantiators and instantiations).

[19] It is hard to imagine a simple universal that is not intrinsic in the present sense.

[20] For accounts of intrinsic relations that are close to the one I introduce, see, e.g., Marshall and Weatherson (2018, §1.3) or van Inwagen (1993, p. 33-4).

[21] The concept of "involvedness" that will be used for the rest of the present chapter is such that if x is involved in y, then y is not conceivable in abstraction from x. An emblematic example of this relation is between instantiation and the corresponding instantiator. For example, my laptop's being black is certainly not conceivable (through some corresponding singular thought) without a conception of the laptop itself. The involvedness relation is theoretically relevant because sometimes we need something more fine-grained than the ontological dependence relation, but less fine-grained than the parthood relation, to single out some metaphysically relevant aspects (as intrinsicness, as Ellis (2001, 2002) shows). For example, sometimes the ontological dependence between x and y can be "external" in the sense that it only happens because of true metaphysical law according to which things of a certain kind necessarily are accompanied by things of such-and-such another kind, but there is no mereological overlapping. For example, the *fact* that some polygon x is equilateral ontologically necessitates the fact that x is equiangular, but these facts are completely distinct (they are not like the fact that x is scarlet and x is red, which plausibly are partially identical). So, there is a relevant kind of "intrinsicness" that is not covered in traditional ontological dependence. At the same time, the metaphysical idea that we should not understand the relation between instantiation and instantiators in terms of parthood is a well-established one (See, e.g., Lowe (1998); Vallicella (2000); Künne (2003)). So, a plausible candidate for reading intrinsicness, as applied between properties and their instantiations, which does not have the drawbacks that parthood and ontological dependence do, is in terms of intrinsicness.
In this case, it is motivated to posit relations like "involvedness" to specify the "intrinsicness" relation.

[22] Here, and for the rest of this dissertation, besides the ordinary sense of "relatum" (as being the instantiators of a specific relation), I make a metonymical use of it, i.e., as designating the particulars involved in some relation's *instantiations*.

Another relevant aspect concerning the necessary patterns of instantiation relative to the acquaintance relation is that it always involves a subject as the first relata. In other words, it is always someone that is acquainted with something. The subjective relatum is the only one for which acquaintance imposes greater restrictions about which quality it must be instantiated. As we will see in further detail, we cannot establish a prior ontological category to the things that we can say that one can be acquainted with.

A related feature – that usually goes unnoticed when it comes to characterizing this relation itself – is that acquaintance instantiations *always* necessitate some phenomenology for the corresponding subjects[23]. In other words, a subject cannot be acquainted with something and there is nothing it is like to be acquainted with that thing. Actually, we can go as far as to say that the relevant phenomenal character instantiation is at least partially determined by the corresponding acquaintance instantiation.

Furthermore, the acquaintance relation can be characterized in terms of "classical" relations features. In this sense, it is asymmetrical[24], non-transitive, and non-reflexive. This is all because we cannot become acquainted with subjects.

Lastly, the acquaintance relation is factive, in the sense that the corresponding instantiations always necessitate the existence (or, according to the relevant ontological category, the occurrence, obtaining, etc.) of the respective relata (more importantly the non-subjective one). Intuitively, how could something be itself manifested to someone if there is nothing there to be manifested to her? Snowdon (1980 p.185-6), one of the first contemporary naïve realists to notice this aspect, stated that (for all o and S) if o looks to be S to be F (which is his predicate for the relation that is perceptually relevant), then o cannot be absent[25]. More recently, Martin (1997, p.93-5; 2002, p. 380-402; 2004, p.42-8) largely exposes this feature, which partially composes his Naïve Realist Theory of Perception, and relevantly contrasts it with one of its main rivals (Representational Theory of Experience). Later on, Martin (2001) labeled this aspect as "actualism".

The necessity of the "presence" of the things one is acquainted with can be understood in possible worlds terms. We can say in semi-formal language that for every

[23] Some event's phenomenology (or, equivalently, its phenomenal character) is exactly what is like to have such an event, as Chalmers (2006, p.50) takes it.
[24] As MacBride (2020) remarks, R is asymmetric iff whenever x bears R to y then y does not bear R to x.
[25] In Snowdon's context, such a modal claim is mainly intended to exclude from the perceptual scope hallucinatory cases ("U-cases", in his words, or Grice's "veridical hallucinations") in which there are objects of experience in the neighborhood of the subjects – perhaps even in an adequate spatial position in relation to the subject – that matches the events phenomenology, but without using a causal criterion. In such cases, oppositely from perceptual ones, "what actually went on would have gone on whether the objects were present or not" (Snowdon, 1981, p.185)

subject S, possible world w and physical entity o, if S is acquainted with o in w, then o exists in w. As Martin notes, this is a useful way to distinguish Naïve Realism from Representationalism, since the latter maintains that the relation between perceivers and perceived objects does not require the actual existence of the object. According to representationalists, it is possible to represent a non-existent thing, which is why hallucinatory experiences may involve the representation of a pink unicorn. However, the acquaintance relation, due to its facticity, cannot allow for this possibility[26].

2.2 A single acquaintance relation?

So far, so good. Things start to get complicated for someone desiring a unitary (or at least non-disjunctive) account of the acquaintance relation when we look at the entities (or, more precisely, their ontological category) that creatures like[27] us can be acquainted with. Are they objects (Campbell 2002, 2009), objects parts (e.g., their surfaces) (Broad, 1925; Price, 1950; Moore, 1993), events (Clarke & Anaya, 2019; Soteriou, 2010), instantiations (Fish, 2009)[28], scenes (Christy, 2019), and even properties (Johnston, 2004)? All of these options have already been chosen as good candidates by ontological naïve realists.

As it will become clearer below, restricting the objective relata in one of those specific fashions yields, at least sometimes, essentially distinct relations. So, what option should we choose for (MNR)? Given the diversity of ways ontological naïve realists may conceive "the" acquaintance relation, our intentions of providing a distinctively minimal account of ONR would go down the drain. Before addressing such a general problem for

[26] In Martin's discussion of fundamental properties of sensory experiences, he implicitly suggests that proposals about veridical perception or perceptual experience can be categorized based on two types of elements that they consider experiences as necessarily having. These elements are "objects of awareness" and "manner of awareness". "Objects of awareness" can either be purely mental (as in Sense Data Theories) or external things (as the naïve realist and the intentionalist claim), and the experiencer can be "aware" of them in either a relational way (i.e., through the acquaintance relation) or in a quasi-relational way (i.e., representational). Thus, the author does not consider the kind of mental nexus introduced by Brentano (1973) a full-fledged relation, at least not in the contemporary scenario. This is because the author assumes that all relations instantiations necessitate the existence of the corresponding relata, which does not hold for quasi-relations.

[27] This restriction is not superfluous. Someone could argue, for example, that some "superpercepient" creature could be acquainted-f (that relation that does not admit "occult parts", as I will show) with some whole object in the same way as we would do exclusively with surfaces and we would still have distinct relation than acquaintance-o, as I will argue.

[28] Here, it take "instantiations" as disjunctively referring to also state of affairs, facts, tropes, etc. While there are philosophical distinctions between these concepts, none of them directly apply to the concerns involving Naïve Realism.

anyone purporting to grasp a minimal naïve-realistic account, I will demonstrate why choosing a specific ontological category for non-subjective relata has essential impacts on what is the very relation we are talking about.

Take, for example, the acquaintance relation that, in addition to all the features I have described in the last subsection, has as a consequence that creatures like us (whose vision system functions based on light impressions) only can be acquainted with objects' surfaces and the like (hereafter "acquaintance-f"). Suppose, for example, that you are reading the present text on your laptop. In this case, you are having a veridical perception and thus an ontological naïve realist who uses "acquaintance-f" would say that you are acquainted with the (superficial part of) screen of your laptop[29]. Also, in this case, she could say that, in that perception, you are not acquainted with the laptop as a whole (this tridimensional solid object).

Consider, on the other hand, again someone who introduces the acquaintance relation as – in addition to having all the features I showed in the previous subsection – always applying (when it comes to creatures like us) to entire ordinary physical objects (things like trees, tables, etc.). The naïve realists' verdict would be, as far as the same situation is concerned, that you are acquainted with your laptop as a whole. Call this relation "acquaintance-o".

Now, acquaintance-o and acquaintance-f have to be essentially distinct relations. To see why, return to the reading situation I just invoked and to how naïve realists positing acquaintance-o would construe it. They would say that you became acquainted-o with the whole of your laptop. It is evident, however, that not all parts of your laptop participate equitably here. In this very acquaintance-o instantiation, "occult parts" (like the back of the screen of your laptop or its inside) seem to be not "subjectified" in some sense that applies to "non-occult" ones (the surface of the screen, e.g.). So, in this case, there is no (organized) set (which is identical to the objective relatum) whose members are subjectively contacted in that relevant same way by the subject. In other words, in the acquaintance-o situation, there is some way in which what is "brought" (or "given", as early proponents of acquaintance-f liked to put it) from the objective relatum to the subject (in that sense) does not cover the whole of the corresponding objective relata.

[29] Of course, there is a possibility for such a naïve realist to say that you have a perception of your laptop, but, in this case, she would have to analyze "perception of some object x" using acquaintance-f and a supplementary relation (plausibly, a mereological or intentional one). In fact, this is standard position for ONR that posits acquaintance-f (Broad, 1925).

The same thing does not happen if the situation involves acquaintance-f. Note that, as far as acquaintance-f instantiations (whatever they are exactly) are concerned, no parallel kind of subjective heterogeneity seems to be found. For, consider again the reading situation I described above. Ontological naïve realists positing acquaintance-f would say that you have become acquainted-f exclusively with the superficial part of your laptop's screen. In this case, there does not seem to be the same kind (as that one in the acquaintance-o case) of instantiation that does not cover the entire objective relatum. Actually, as far as the corresponding acquaintance-f instantiation is concerned, what subjective property or relation could be instantiated by, say, the upper part of the screen of your laptop, but not by the lower one? No same-level parts of the objective relatum are "subjectfied" in distinct ways. Acquaintance-f is not discriminative like that. *If* there is some distinctive "subjectification" among parts of the acquaintance-f relatum, it must apply to exhaustive parts of it. If it applies to the upper part of your laptop screen, it also would have to apply to the lower one, and so on (until one completes the entire laptop surface). In other words, a similar kind of sub-instantiation must (if it obtains at all in the situation) "cover"[30] the entire acquainted thing. So acquaintance-f does not seem to admit that kind of subjective "privilege" for only some of its parts, which acquaintance-o does.

So, it is evident that that acquaintance-f-instantiation and that acquaintance-o-instantiation have distinct parts[31] and so[32] they are not identical. Given that for all universals U^1 and U^2, if U^1 and U^2 have distinct instantiations in a situation/world w and time t, then $U^1 \neq U^2$, we conclude that acquaintance-o and acquaintance-f are distinct relations.

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[30] In the sense that if it applies to some part of the original relatum, then there is a (organized) set, which is identical to that relatum, whose members are subjectively contacted in that relevant way by the subject. As I showed, if this kind of "subjectification" applies to some part of the screen of the laptop (e.g., its upper part), then it would have to apply to other ones until it completes the entire original non-subjective relatum.

[31] Here one might introduce the possibility that the subjective instantiation that happens in the acquaintance-o instantiation is actually identical to the corresponding acquaintance-f instantiation. In this case, one would continue, they can have the same parts. Of course, here we may dismiss this suggestion. For acquaintance-o has to have some other instantiation which would account for the fact that the instantiation involves the whole of my laptop (and so not only the surface of its screen). This does not happen in the case of acquaintance-f instantiation, for which that remaining part of my laptop is irrelevant. So, although both acquaintance-f and acquaintance-o may share some parts (and even one of them can be a proper part of the other), there must be some supplementary part that only acquaintance-o have.

[32] Here someone might recall that there is at least one sense of "identity" that is mereologically flexible. For example, we can say, e.g., that I am the very same organism since the day of my birth, although I share no proper part with that baby. However, similar senses of "identity" seem only to hold in situations of identity over time or possible worlds. In a same time and in a same world (as in the laptop-seeing case), there cannot be an identical thing that has distinct proper parts.

A parallel reasoning entailing the same conclusion stems from the fact that there is a difference in phenomenological participation between the relatum in acquaintance-o-instantiations and the one in acquaintance-f-instantiations. For, notice that when something is acquainted-f, there is a (organized) set, which is identical to that objective relatum, whose members correspond to some part of the experience's phenomenology. In particular, there is no parcel of the relatum that does not appear (in some way) to the subject. For example, in that laptop perception, the upper part of the screen of your laptop appears to be a certain way to the subject, as well as the lower one and so on.

Acquaintance-o, in turn, is not such that, for all of its instantiations, there is some (organized) set that is only composed of some of its objective relatum that has only some of its members as subjectively participating. For, necessarily, the parts that correspond to the occult parcel in the objective relatum do not correlate to any part of the experience's phenomenology. They are literally non-apparent. This difference in their "phenomenological participation politics" is another evidence of the essential distinction between acquaintance-o and acquaintance-f.

2.3 Towards a minimal Ontological Naïve Realism.

The natural conclusion from these observations is that there is a variation in what the term "acquainted with" refers to when considering different possible ontological naïve realists. An anonymous reviewer at Philosophia correctly pointed out to me that this may not follow because there is still the possibility that the distinction of properties that I showed is not in virtue of a difference in what the predicates refer to. More specifically, it could be due to some later disagreement (between two ontological naïve realists representing the same relation[33]) about the properties that the relation represented would have. However, in this case, we plausibly have to suppose these two subjects that infer different things from the fact that the relation is such-and-such (which is included in their supposedly common conceptual representation). Moreover, this scenario must be *necessary* for any pair of postulations (by two naïve realists) of acquaintance-o and acquaintance-f. Otherwise, the difference between the postulations would have to be plausibly accounted for by the natural difference in the referent. Many reasons that show that this is not necessarily the case whenever two ontological naïve realists, respectively,

[33] If they merely referred to the same relation (without having the same representation of it), then we could arrive at the conclusion that we are dealing with distinct meaning, which is my final point.

think that perceivers are acquaintance-f and acquaintance-o with external things. First, we plausibly lack any principle that could lead one from the supposition that the acquaintance relation is such-and-such to the idea that it has those properties that I showed as distinct between acquaintance-o and acquaintance-f. Second, we can imagine two ontological naïve realists, each holding a single belief. One exclusively believes that perceivers always get acquainted-f with material things, while the other believes that perceivers always get acquainted-o with material things. In this scenario, neither would need to make any inferences or hold background beliefs that could fulfill a relevant inferential role.

So, by inference to the best explanation, we can say that acquaintance predicates used in distinct ONR may refer to different relations. In cases where two naïve realists have different accounts of the nature of acquaintance (as in the case of acquaintance-o and acquaintance-f where the respective naïve realists do not infer different things about the acquaintance relation), it is likely due to a difference in the objects of reference themselves.

Consequently[34], there is some variation in the meaning of "… acquainted with…" across distinct possible ONRs. So, although ontological naïve realists usually use the same predicate (taken as a linguistic token) to denote the relation they posit as necessary between subjects and physical objects when there is a perception, their corresponding meanings cannot be the same. For, the relation they refer to can be essentially distinct.

Therefore, we cannot choose one option of acquaintance relation over another to fill in "… is acquainted with…" in (MNR) as originally stated, considering that it is designed to be a distinctively minimal version of ONR. Given this situation, one could ask oneself about what is the interpretation of that predicate that could make (MNR) fulfill its purpose.

Here, someone might want to take advantage of the fact that there are some properties of universals that can be used to introduce a distinctively minimal characterization of "acquaintance relations". Features like intrinsicness, facticity, necessary subjective involvedness, phenomenal necessitation, asymmetry, non-transitiveness, and non-reflexivity[35] are arguably instantiated by all, and only, the

[34] For there are no necessary pragmatic differences (or differences regarding the (centered) world of the corresponding utterances) that could account for that distinction in referents. So, the best (and only available) explanation is supposing a distinction of meanings.

[35] It is relatively common to consider – as Zięba (2021) and Raleigh (2020) did – that acquaintance relation necessitates some epistemic or cognitive relation (towards the acquainted things). Zięba (2021, p.2046), for

relations that are referred to by the relevant kind of acquaintance predicates. They are, for example, instantiated by acquaintance-o and acquaintance-f, despite their specific differences. For this reason, they are arguably distinctively minimal for "acquaintance relations".

The previous paragraph, however, talked exclusively about acquaintance *relations* (which, for naïve realists, hold between subjects and mind-independent things). Recall, nonetheless, that our present quest is for a *proposition* that must be accepted by any ontological naïve realist, irrespective of her specificities. (MRN), as postulated, provided an interesting starting point in this direction, but we still have the issue of how to understand the linguistic token "…is acquainted with…" that composes it.

The most straightforward candidate – which is taking "… is acquainted with …" in that sentence as representing a(n) (arbitrary) relation as having every minimal feature I set up above (and being silent about features that the specific characterization is about) – for that "neutral" job should not do the trick[36]. The reason for this is plausibly the same as the reason why someone that believes, "it is necessary that for all mental events x, if x is a veridical perception, at t, then the corresponding subject is in the mental relation that Bertrand Russell is famous for towards some mind-independent physical entity at t" might not be a naïve realist about the nature of perceptions, even though the relation it represents is actually acquaintance-f. This would happen if, for example, she ignores facts about the founder of Analytic Philosophy and so does not know that Russell is famous for the acquaintance-f relation[37]. So, according to this intuition, ontological naïve realists are not merely someone who puts forth a proposition that represents all veridical perceptions as, necessarily, having its corresponding subject in some specific relation towards some mind-independent entity, and what this predicate refers to is some acquaintance relation.

But what else could be required from an ontological naïve realist? It seems that there is a restriction in the meaning of the predicate one uses to represent subjects as being

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example, thinks naïve realists' "perceptual relation provides some cognitive import for the subject, which normally consists in creating an opportunity to gain knowledge about mind-independent reality". However, to do this, it is necessary to have the burden of adopting an underlying Theory of Knowledge. The characterization of a minimal acquaintance relation above, nonetheless, is arguably capable of performing the relevant characterizing job without such kind of commitments and so, additionally, is more in tune with our goal of providing a minimal version of naïve realism.

[36] Actually, there are many options for substitutes of "is acquainted for" that could make (MNR) perform the desired minimal distinctive role, according to that rationale. For example, a disjunctive predicate (disjointing all members of the class of the acquaintance predicate (to be defined in the last section of the present part)) also would make (MNR) do the relevant job.

[37] But, for some reason, she thinks that being something Russell is famous for is a good indicator of the relation we keep with mind-independent things when we perceive.

in that kind of relation towards mind-independent things. In other words, the relevant acquaintance predicates should have a specific kind of meaning and so it is not enough that the relation they represent really is the acquaintance relation. The corresponding intuition is responsible for making us view that subject as a non-naïve-realist. This is, as I suggested, the same intuition as the one indicating that that "neutral" predicate could not do the relevant minimality job.

I propose that the best candidate for this kind of meaning is the one in the natural language predicates I showed at the beginning of Section 2 ("…is manifested to…", "… appearing…", "… is confronted to …", "…encounters with…", "…is presented to…", etc.). In fact, there may be some variation among these usages (even though ordinary usage is clueless about it), so much so they can refer to distinct relations, as indicated. However, we can grasp a class that embraces all, and exclusively, the corresponding meanings.

Here, as with Wittgenstein's (2009, §66) characterization of games, it would be difficult (if not impossible) to precisely define the features of a predicate that falls within the relevant class. Wittgenstein rejected the necessity of definitions based on sufficient and necessary conditions when approaching the use of a term. In particular, he suggests that "family resemblance" is a more fitting comparison for how to link different usages of the same word. Rather than persistently searching for a single, fundamental essence in which the meaning of a word resides we should explore the various uses of the word across a convoluted web of similarities that intersect and overlap with each other. These similarities are graspable in the same way as when we judge that members of a certain family resemble each other. Of course, we are not able to pinpoint exactly what features make these people look alike. For, "the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way" (ibid, §67). Nonetheless, we unproblematically know that this similarity exists and when it is instantiated. In the same way, we can posit the acquaintance meanings as a class. So, we can intuitively posit a class of acquaintance meaning from the meanings that show a certain resemblance to those predicates as ordinarily interpreted.

As I showed above, being a naïve realist seems not to be merely a matter of stating that perceiving subjects always are in a relation R with o, and "R" effectively refers to some acquaintance relation. My suggestion was that, more strongly, the relevant relation should be presented in a certain specific kind of mode (i.e., through .a specific type of meaning). For, arguably, there is a sense in "coming across", "encountering", etc. that

naïve realists should attribute as holding between the subject and the object. The acquaintance family of meanings seems to be the adequate choice to do justice to this requirement.

Therefore, given that there are distinct possible meanings that the acquaintance predicate can take, (MRN), considering its main purpose, must be disjunctive. One possible approach is to use the same structure as (MRN) provided at the beginning of the section and substitute "…becomes acquainted with…" with a disjunctive predicate that disjointly captures all members of the acquaintance meanings family. Alternatively, (MRN) can be a disjunction of sentences with that structure, but each with the acquaintance predicate with a distinctive acquaintance meaning. In this case, (MNR) would take the form $\Box [(\forall x,t) (P(x),t \rightarrow (\exists o) (Aq^1(S_x,o),t)]] \vee \Box [(\forall x,t) (P(x),t \rightarrow (\exists o) (Aq^2(S_x,o),t)]] ... \vee \Box [(\forall x,t) (P(x),t \rightarrow (\exists o) (Aq^n(S_x,o),t)]]$, where "$Aq^1$", "$Aq^2$", …, "$Aq^n$" are interpreted, respectively, with a member of the family of acquaintance meanings and "p,t" means "p is valid at t". Ontological naïve realists should accept both options. For they all agree that whenever veridical perceptions occur, there is "an acquaintance" by the corresponding subject with some mind-independent, while they may differ with respect to how exactly understand such an acquaintance predicate[38].

On this basis, we also get a general categorization of ONR. A theory or thesis that is intended to address the question about the nature of perceptions is an ONR iff it contains/is one of these latter disjuncts or is/contains a proposition for which one of those propositions is an immediate consequence[39-40].

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[38] Notice how the "immediate consequence" clause also promotes the inclusion of formulations of naïve realism in terms of perceptions' having properties whose instantiations necessitate acquaintance with mind-independent things. As I showed in Note 22, Martin's (2004, 2006), for example, thinks that the issue between naïve realism and its rivals is about the fundamental properties of perceptions. According to him, naive realism advocates that the instantiations of the fundamental properties of veridical perceptions involve acquaintance with such-and-such mind-independent things.

[39] As I will show in the next section, there are kinds of ontological naïve realism that *identifies* veridical perceptions to acquaintance instantiations and so could not explicitly state anything like (MRN). However, there is a clear sense of "immediate consequence" according to which the sentences by these naïve realists have as an immediate consequence the sentence that only assigns the corresponding particular(s) as instantiating the corresponding universal. When it comes to singular propositions, "immediate consequence" can apply between two sentences, one deducible from the other. Similarly, we can say that a proposition p is an immediate consequence of a theory th when there are one or more propositions in th that from which one deduces p, according to th's intrinsic syntax. Additionally, we may stipulate that these deductions can rely on trivial principles (that could not explicitly be in th). For example, that kind of "identity" ONR has (MRN) as consequence, when we admit 1) the trivial principle that (for all x) if x is a veridical perception at t, then x occurs at t and 2) the trivial principle (for all F and x) if a state of affairs of x's being F obtains at t, then F(x), at t. (INR). *With* these trivial principles, this particular type of ONR infers (MRN) through hypothetical syllogism, thereby making it an immediate consequence of (MRN).

[40] As mentioned before, some naïve realists are concerned with not only veridical perceptions, but also with illusions. These theorists would explain the nature of illusions in a similar way to how they explain that of

3. ONTOLOGICAL NAÏVE REALISMS STRONGER THAN (MNR).

The discussion about (MNR) presented us with a distinctively minimal aspect among ontological naïve realists. They all think that there is a relation between the perceiving subject and mind-independent physical things, expressing it with some member of the family of meanings indicated above. Although the present categorization is capable of delimitating the class corresponding to this kind of approach, it does not fulfill the second task established in the introduction, i.e., to provide relevant "internal" differentiations within ONR and so a corresponding classification. Here I introduce two distinct classifications, which together will generate a comprehensive taxonomy of ONR.

As I indicated in the Introduction, this enterprise has the merit of exposing relevant differences that distinct forms of ONR may have, which are not presently evident in the mainstream discussion. To show that the distinctions are indeed relevant, I also list some of the main reasons for adopting one or the other.

3.1. Property Attribution Naïve Realism.

The first classification of ONR pertains to the scope of acquaintance attribution in question. As discussed earlier, all forms of ONR attribute acquaintance with mind-independent objects to all perceivers. However, as it will become clearer, we can further differentiate ONR into two exclusive and exhaustive (for the class of ONR) categories based on the extent of this attribution.

The first category pertains to the theses that only consider the relevant kind of acquaintance to be necessary for perceptions, but not sufficient. They have immediate consequences in the form of propositions such as: $\Box [(\forall x,t) (P(x),t \rightarrow (\exists o) (Aq(Sx,o),t)]]$, where "Aq" may interpreted with any member of the family of acquaintance meanings, and "Sx" stands for "x's associated subject". To create a comprehensive taxonomy along with the next category, it should be added that theories or propositions in this subclass do not have sentences specifying NSNR (see below) as immediate consequences. The

perceptions. Of course, the corresponding theories are also ONR. The definitions above can accommodate them insofar as they have (MNR) as an immediate consequence.

present kind of ONR can be appropriately called “Necessity Ontological Naïve Realism” (or NNR)[41].

The alternative category is the one that includes theories or theses that attribute sufficiency to the relevant kind of acquaintance for perceptual episodes, in addition to its necessity. This class of ontological naïve realistic theories is stronger than the corresponding NNRs and has sentences of the form □ [(∀x,t) (P(x),t ↔ (∃o) (Aq(Sx,o),t)][42] as an immediate consequence. This kind of thesis is called "Necessity and Sufficiency Ontological Naïve Realism”, NSNR.

Having said that, we can move on to the respective and exclusive advantages of both NNR and NSNR, which shows the relevance of (acknowledging) these characteristics in ONRs. Of course, the initial advantage is on NSNRs’ side, as they are not only more informative than corresponding NNRs (they also speak about what it takes to be a perception/illusion) but also provide a more thorough answer to the question about the nature of veridical perceptions (and illusions, if applicable). However, there are some reasons why someone could adopt the weaker kind of propositions/theories.

The main one, in my view, is the possibly justified need to adopt a hybrid theory about the nature of perceptions/illusions. More specifically, an ontological naïve realist can admit the motivations specific to ONR while also acknowledging independent (and non-conflicting) motivations for another parallel account of the nature of perceptions. For instance, a theorist may believe that perceptions plausibly require some causal aspect in addition to the naïve-realistic fact, which would amount to adopting a causal theory of perception (Moran, 2019, 2022). Roughly, this kind of theorist tries to (at least partially) answer the question about the nature of perceptions/illusions by claiming it involves being caused in a such-and-such specific fashion, often indicating that their corresponding causal chain must include the very object of perception and some sense organ. Therefore, the corresponding ontological naïve realist would argue that an essential feature of perceptions – apart from the naïve-realistic relation – is being caused

[41] While ONR is typically posited as NSNR in more recent years, the dominant view in the last century was what we can call "Classical Naïve Realism." According to this theory, 1) perceptions necessarily involve acquaintance with something (which it shares with its opponent, Sense Data Theories), and 2) the objects of acquaintance in perception are actually material objects (which diverges from its rival, which considers the objects of acquaintance to be mental images). Therefore, classical naïve realists simply assert that perceptions involve acquaintance with material things without making claims about sufficiency or identity to instantiations. This classical approach can be found in the works of Broad (1925), Price (1950), Moore (1993), and, more recently, Jackson (1977) and Robinson (1994).

[42] The terms in formula will behave as previously indicated in the formula that characterizes (NNR).

in some non-deviant way[43]. In this case, when addressing the nature of veridical perceptions, ontological naïve realists of this kind would have to acknowledge that the perceiver becoming acquainted with a mind-independent thing is only a *necessary* factor for perceptions, but not sufficient[44]. So, they plausibly propose a form of NNR.

Another reason why some ontological naïve realists may accept a NNR is to address arguments from hallucination, which conclude that veridical perceptions must (at least partially) have the nature of hallucinations. Ontological naïve realists impressed by this type of argument would have to accept that perceptions have a factor that totalizes the nature of (subjectively indiscriminable) hallucinations, while still affirming (on independent grounds) the instantiation of the naïve-realistic factor. Since the nature of hallucination cannot be given in terms of acquaintance with mind-independent things (for, as I showed in Section 2.1, because of the facticity of the acquaintance relation, that the subject becomes acquainted with mind-independent things necessitates the existence of these things, which is not the case for hallucinations), these theorists should state that it is given in independent terms (in relation to acquaintance with mind-independent things). In recent years, the dominant form of argument from hallucination in the naïve-realistic scenario has been Martin's (2004) causal argument.

As I indicated, adopting NNR can be a strategy that naïve realists adopt to deal with arguments from hallucination. In this case, all they have to do is propose a factor that defines the nature of hallucination that is also compatible with perceptions as

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[43] The Causal Theory of Perception was originally proposed by Grice (1961) and later developed by Perls (1976), Strawson (1979), and Lewis (1980). However, these authors proposed that causal elements are constitutive of the *concept* of "perception" (and "hallucination"). In the context of theories about the nature of perception, relevant causal theorists must attribute experiences to being caused (in a certain specific way) beyond what is conceptually entailed by "perceptions." As defined in the beginning of section 2, theories that concern the nature of "F" must posit elements that are not conceptually entailed by "being F." Otherwise, these accounts would be confused with conceptual analysis, which is not the case. In Moran (2019, 2022), there is a causal account of experiences which is informed by these distinctions.

[44] One could argue that there are NSNRs that are also hybrid accounts, where the non-realistic features (whatever they exactly are) are necessarily coinstantiated with the naïve-realistic one. In this case, the naïve realistic features would be considered necessary *and* sufficient for something be a veridical perception, although there may be other non-naive-realistic features that necessarily accompany these perceptual episodes. However, this possibility does not diminishes the importance of above discussion as highlighting the relevance of NNRs (as opposed to NSNRs). For one may reasonably argue that the non-naïve-realistic aspects attributed are not ontologically dependent on the naïve-realistic ones. For example, that a possible world where there is acquaintance instantiation with mind-independent things that do not correspond to a specific type of causal chain seems to be possible. I cannot see any reason why to banish this kind of world from possible existence. For, for example, if God exists, and so He can become acquainted with mundane entities, it certainly would not depend on light striking His celestial eyes. Representational content is also something that acquaintance instantiations do not entail. Actually, it is a well-established idea that acquaintance relation is not representational in nature (Brewer, 2011, p. 55; Campbell, 2002, pp. 117–118; Martin 2004, p. 39; French, 2014, p. 395; Beck, 2019, p. 608-9).

conceived by ONR. Logue (2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2014), for example, argued that naïve realists can survive the necessity of attribution of the nature of hallucinations in perceptions. In this, she proposes to combine naïve realism with some version of the representational theory of perception. This later kind of theory asserts that the nature of sensory experiences involves what these episodes convey to the subject (Searle, 1983, Harman, 1990, Dretske, 1995). Consequently, an essential feature of the experiences is that they represent (combination of) objects as having (a) certain (combination of) properties in a way that is similar to propositions. Since perceptions convey certain information to us, it seems reasonable to assess their accuracy – i.e., whether what they convey is true or false. Thus, in this account, experiences are always associated with certain accuracy conditions, which specify what must occur for the experience to be accurate. In this case, *veridical* perceptions are sensory events whose content (i.e., what it "says") is accurate in this sense. Those hybrid accounts, therefore, not only attribute an acquaintance relation to perceptions but also these representational facts. In this case, there is a relevant subdivision in NNR. On one hand, there are purist theories, which answer the question as to the nature of perception (and illusions) only in naïve-realistic terms[45]. On the other, there are hybrid accounts, for which the naïve-realistic response only partially answers that question and so provides some supplementary proposition (in non-naïve-realistic terms) about the nature of perceptions. This is enough to show why whether an ONR is NNR or NSNR is a matter that should not be disregarded.

3.2. Identity Naïve Realism.

There is a parallel relevant classification of ONR that is also available. For, these theorists can not only attribute the obtaining of an acquaintance instantiation whenever perceptions/illusions occur (and vice-versa), but also they can say – in a stronger fashion – that perceptions/illusions *are* literally these instantiations[46]. In this case, veridical perceptions/illusions are nothing over and above an acquaintance instantiation involving the associated subject and some mind-independent thing. Call propositions/theories that have as an immediate consequence a proposition having this kind of content (but perhaps

[45] In this case, they would have to be justifiably silent about what supplementary feature some episode has to have to be a veridical perception (or illusion).

[46] Found, e.g., in Campbell (2002, p.115, emphasis added), when it is said that the "experience of an object *is* a simple relation holding between perceiver and object". However, this is a dominant trend in more recent naïve realism.

varying with respect to how the acquaintance predicate is exactly posited) Identity Naïve Realism or INR.

This kind of theory, as well as in the case of NNR/NSNR, provides a mutually exclusive and all-encompassing classification of ONRs[47]. On one hand, we have theorists who attribute identity to the relevant kind of instantiations to all perceptual (or illusory) experiences. On the other hand, we have theorists who merely attribute to them the quality of having the associated subject acquainted with mind-independent things

INRs bring some initial advantages over forms of non-INRs. In the first place, they do not only see perceptions/ illusions as "opaque" events that have in addition certain specified features. Rather, they purport to show what is "inside" them, its components, and how they relate to form their wholeness. So, INRs are not mere accounts of the nature of perceptions/illusions, but they are also an account of all that is intrinsic to them. In other words, INRs provide a non-trivial history about what exactly veridical perceptions intrinsically are (what they "consist of"). Since that which perceptions/illusions are supposedly reducible to is not a simple entity, but an organized complex, INRs provide an account not simply of the (intrinsic) nature of perception, but also of its structure. So, they also have the advantage of providing a reductive account of perceptions/illusions.

A final kind of information that INRs convey (but non-INRs may not) is about what ontological category perceptions/illusions are of. In this case, they would be able to denounce an inaccuracy in the ordinary conception of experiences, which considers them as events. So, if events are not reducible to instantiations (facts, states of affairs, etc.), then INRs entail that perceptions/illusions are not ontological events (i.e., they are not of sui generis ontological category, events) and so, if true, they would provide interesting information about the ontological category of perceptions/illusions.

Besides conveying all this additional and certainly relevant information about perceptions/illusions in general, the fact that INRs are reductive accounts brings some further advantages over forms of non-INRs. For, Occam's Razor entails that some

[47] The version of Naïve Realism that Christy (2019) (in his "Simple Naïve Realism") and Soteriou (2010; 2013; 2016) adopt are examples of non-INRs. Soteriou (2010, p.234) thinks that naïve realists (whom he calls "relationalists") adopt the thesis that "there are phenomenally conscious states whose obtaining *requires* the obtaining of a relation of 'awareness of', but which cannot be specified independently of that relation". So, naïve realism would not need to posit perceptions as having the relevant kind of identity, but only as necessitating the instantiation of the acquaintance relation. In fact, non-INF corresponds to the class under which what I called "Classical Naïve Realism" falls. As I argued in Note 41, this kind of approach assumes that perceptions always involves acquaintance with something and claim that these things are material things (as opposed to mental images), but at the same time they do not make more ontologically-committed statements, about for example their reduction to some types of facts.

perceptual theory that is reductive about veridical perceptions (and illusions) is (if the latter do not have some additional theoretical advantages over the former) in a better dialectical position than another that is not and so (in the absence of contrary reasons) we have to prefer the former[48]. This is because INR theorists are able to refrain from positing the existence of another class of entities (and properties), i.e., the set of perceptions (and *the property of being a perception*) as (at least partially) a peculiar one. Naïve realistic theories that do not have a similar resource will lack the means to actually dismiss that sui generis existence. They would have to posit acquaintance instantiations *and* perceptions/illusions (and the corresponding universals). So INRs are more ontologically economical than non-INRs.

This – along with those many aspects that only INR can tell us about perceptions – shows that in the absence of other heterogeneous theoretical advantages or direct evidence, INRs must be chosen as the standard position for naïve realists concerned about the nature of perception/illusions. However, that this kind of reductive account is free from any drawbacks that its rivals avoid can be an overstatement.

A reason for someone to doubt that perceptions are actually not identical to states of affairs (although keeping the other (weaker) naïve-realistic attributes) is, for example, some resistance to reducing events to instantiations (states of affairs, facts, etc.), so that they are ontologically peculiar entities (Thalberg, 1978; Mourelatos, 1978; Steward, 1997; Polakof, 2017). This – along with the fact that mental phenomena (or at least experiences) are, in fact, ontological events – entails that perceptions in general cannot be like INR conceive them.

There are some reasons for suggesting that perceptions (at least sometimes) are ontological events. Matthew Soteriou (2010), for example, thinks that introspective data show that veridical perceptions are ontological events. He starts by introducing the traditional formulation of transparency thesis, according to which when we try to introspectively attend to what is like to have a perception, it seems to us that we can only

[48] Originally, the Occam's Razor was the idea that we should not introduce unnecessary entities. In recent years, however, philosophers have tended to interpret it as a principle for selecting theories. As per this interpretation, all other things being equal, it is reasonable to opt for theories that require the existence of a smaller number of entities to be true (Quine, 1981; Holsinger, 1981). A relevant variation of the Occam's Razor is not about the numerical comparison between the sets of things two theories involve, but about the amount of *types* they involve. As I showed above, INR is more economical than non-INR in these two kinds of Occam's Razor. For, one, it does need to posit some perceptual event over and above the acquaintance fact it involves and, two, we do not need to posit a "perceptual type" (i.e., the property of being a perceptions) as a type that is over and above the property that the associated subject's being acquainted with a mind-independent thing.

do it through also attending to (or “looking at”, as Soteriou also likes to put) the objects of perception (which are mind-independent) and the corresponding universals). There is, however, a variation of the transparency thesis (which the author calls “temporal transparency”) that serves as an intermediate step to reach the conclusion that perceptions have to be ontological events.

Besides, Soteriou believes that, similarly, introspective data indicate that we cannot attend to an object without attending to its temporally extended features. This is illustrated by Soteriou's statement, "[i]f one tries just to attend to an instantaneous temporal part of the occurrence, without attending to a temporal part of the occurrence that has a temporal extension, then one will fail" (Soteriou, 2010, p. 226, emphasis added).

However, his argument goes one step further. In his view,

> [w]hen one introspects one’s experience […] it does not seem to one as though one can mark out the temporal location of one’s perceptual experience as distinct from the temporal location of whatever it is that one seems to be perceptually aware of. Furthermore, it seems to one as though the temporal location of one’s experience depends on, *and is determined by*, the temporal location of whatever it is that one’s experience is an experience of.” (Soteriou, 2010, p.227, emphasis added).

According to Soteriou's perspective, based on introspective data, perceptions possess a temporal structure that mirrors that of the events observed during introspection. Soteriou argues that if the temporally extended objects that we observe during introspection are events, then the experience itself can also be considered an event due to this temporal isomorphism.

> When one perceives an unfolding occurrence (e.g. the movement of an object across space), it seems to one as though one’s perceptual experience has the temporal location and duration of its object, and it seems to one as though the temporal location and duration of each temporal part of one’s experience is transparent to the temporal location and duration of each temporal part of the unfolding occurrence one seems to perceive. In this respect, perception is also quite unlike a present-tensed conscious act of judging – e.g. an act of judging that ‘The hurricane is now passing over Cuba’. In the case of the judgement, it does not seem to one as though the duration of one’s act of judging depends on, and is determined by, the duration of whatever it is that one’s judgement represents. (ibid).

So, if events are really not reducible to states of affairs, as it is an arguable position, then at least perceptions of events cannot be identified to (relational) states of affairs. Therefore, although INR has certain prima facie advantages, it has some potential drawbacks due to certain parallel assumptions that can make it more desirable for

ontological naïve realists to accept a weaker thesis and so accept some non-INR version of ONR.

3.3. A sketchy taxonomy of Ontological Naïve Realism.

Since the differentiations between NNR and NSNR, on the one hand, and INR and non-INR, on the other, were argued as being the relevant distinctions that some ONR may take, we can propose an interesting way to taxonomize ONRs. Consequently, there are four relevant ways someone can be an ontological naïve realist. They can believe in a) NNRs and non-INRs; b) NSNRs and non-INRs; c) NNRs and INRs; or d) NSNRs and INRs.

I propose that we can further develop this idea by considering that membership in one of these taxonomic groups, along with specific variations such as the choice of acquaintance predicate, the class of objects with which perceivers become acquainted, and whether nature illusions are viewed in a naïve-realistic fashion, exhausts the *relevant* options for ONR[49]. By doing so, we can delimit the way in which relevant instances of ONR can be. This delineation can be made explicit by showing the structures (schemata) corresponding to, respectively, a-d), in which the corresponding instances can have these specific variations. With this in hand, we can potentially obtain any relevant instance of ONR by doing the respective variable replacement. The structures are as follows:

a) $\Box\ (\forall x,t)\ (P(x),t\ [\vee\ I(x),t]^{50}\ \rightarrow\ (\exists o)\ (Aq(S_x,o),t))$, where "Aq" is to be substituted with a member of the acquaintance predicate of the family of meanings I showed in Section 2, and "o" is to be replaced with some variable ranging over some of the options I indicated for the class of things naïve realists might say that we become acquainted with ("physical", "mind-independent", etc. entities, perhaps restricted to some ontological category (objects, instantiations, etc.)).

b) $\Box\ (\forall x,t)\ (P(x),t\ [\vee\ I(x),t] \leftrightarrow\ (\exists o)\ (Aq(S_x,o),t))$. (Here and below "Aq" and "o" retains their meaning as defined in a)).

[49] Supplementary variations of ONR seem straightforwardly irrelevant.

[50] The square brackets here (and in the next formulae) are intended to denote that this is an optional element in the corresponding instances.

c) $\Box (\forall x,t) (P(x),t\ [\vee I(x),t] \rightarrow (\exists o) (x = [Aq(S_x,o)],t))$[51].

d) $\Box (\forall x,t) (P(x),t\ [\vee I(x),t] \rightarrow (\exists o) (x = [Aq(S_x,o)],t)) \wedge ((\forall S, t,o) (Aq(S,o), t \rightarrow (\exists x) (P(x) \wedge x = [Aq(S_x,o)],t))$.

This delimitation of the class of relevant ONRs, based on their taxonomic group and specific variations, can help address the issue of potential disregard of important distinctions between ONRs, which I mentioned in the Introduction. It can also help with the terminological issue I announced there. For one may also recommend future ONR theses to be generated from these schemata, which would, therefore, be composed of clarified and discussed terminology.

4. SUMMARY

The present chapter aimed to address some specific theoretical issues of ONR: 1) the lack of acknowledgment of the distinct general forms that Naïve Realism may take, particularly with regard to their subject matter (e.g., if they deal with the nature of perceptions or with their phenomenology). 2) The lack of acknowledgment of the relevant differences between distinct ONRs. 3) The general tendency for naïve-realistic theses to be formulated in obscure or non-standard terminology (which has been shown to intensify the risks associated with 1) and 2)).

For that purpose, I first attempted to provide a distinctive and minimal characterization of ONR. In doing so, I discussed the concepts that a thesis that all and only ontological naïve realists should believe, which is a contribution to 3) since it clarifies the terminology essential to all the versions of ONR. Specifically, I devoted a significant amount of time to discussing the relation (the acquaintance relation) that

[51] At first glance, one might think that this possibility is not relevant, since it is commonly assumed that INRs are always NSNRs. According to this view, INRs claim that perceptions are just acquaintance instantiations with some mind-independent thing, which implies that nothing other than being instantiation of this kind is required for something to be a veridical perception. However, there are multiple ways ONRs could not compromise on the idea these instantiations are always perceptions. For example, there can be hybrid INRs, which claim that veridical perceptions are actually acquaintance instantiations that additionally behave in a certain way (such as being caused in a non-deviant way or representing the world in a certain fashion). However, it is not necessary that these INRs compromise on the idea that the non-naïve-realistic elements attributed by the accompanying account of the nature of perceptions are necessitated by acquaintance instantiations. For, they may simply not compromise on the existence (or inexistence) of such entailment. Actually, as Note 40, there are even some possible reasons for denying it. In these cases, INR advocates would merely claim that perceptions are necessarily acquaintance instantiations, without compromising on the other way around.

ontological naïve realists must posit. Through investigating its essential features, I found out that there is a variety of relations that ontological naïve realists represent, even though they use the same linguistic token to do so. However, I suggested that there are distinctive aspects that these relations have in common, allowing for a minimal characterization of acquaintance relations. Additionally, I argued that ontological naïve realists have to represent this by using meanings from a specific class, which I delimited. In this, the corresponding class of meaning was described. Bearing that in mind, a minimal version of naïve realism had to be a proposition disjointing sentences of the form [(∀x,t) (P(x),t → (∃o) (Aq(Sx,o),t)], each having "Aq" as interpreted with some member of the class of meaning described. Any and all theorists that aim to deal with the question about what is a perception by a theory/proposition that has this sentence as an immediate consequence should be considered ontological naïve realists and so not a non-ontological form of naïve realist (or another type of theorist). By indicating it, we should hopefully promote the proper acknowledgment of some of the general relevant distinctions among naïve realists (at least the ones concerning the subject matter of these theses) and so address problem 1).

I also highlighted the significant distinctions that ONR may possess by discussing some of the theoretical consequences they entail. As a result, I developed two classifications of ONR based on these relevant features, which were later combined to create a taxonomy of ONR. This comprehensive framework should help to mitigate issue 2). This taxonomy also led to the proposal of four structures that are recommended as the forms for future ONRs. As the variant and invariant terminology of these schemata has already been clarified in the chapter, the propositions generated by them should also be clear. This clarity will contribute to mitigating issue 3).

Chapter 2 – EXPLANATORY PHENOMENAL NAÏVE REALISM MUST BE NON-OBJECTIVIST.

1. INTRODUCTION

As I showed in the previous chapter, although often considered a unitary thesis, Raineri (2021) suggests that Naïve Realism comes in two flavors: Ontological Naïve Realism, which pertains to the nature of perceptual and illusory experiences, and Phenomenal Naïve Realism (PNR). This chapter exclusively focuses on the latter type of naïve-realistic view.

In this context, I take PNRs as referring to *explanatory* theses regarding the phenomenology of perceptions (and illusions[52])[53-54]. I will take "phenomenally fundamental properties" (PFPs) as simply the properties whose instantiations metaphysically ground the phenomenology perceptions phenomenology[55]. The nature of

[52]Depending on the specific version of PNR, its explananda can either be veridical perceptions or a combination of veridical perceptions and illusions. However, for the sake of brevity, I will only refer to the first option when discussing PNR as a whole.

[53] Strictly speaking, there are two types of Phenomenological Naïve Realism positions. The first, possibly referred to as "Phenomenological-Constitutive Naïve Realism", considers the phenomenology of perceptions as individuated by types of mind-independent entities. This form of phenomenological externalism is present in Langsam (2017), Soteriou (2010, 2013, 2016), and Kennedy (2013), among others. The second form, "Explanatory Phenomenological Naïve Realism", metaphysically explains phenomenological facts in perceptions as resulting from instantiations of naïve-realistic properties. The in-virtue-of or metaphysically grounding relation, as described in Audi's (2012a, 2012b) account, is instantiated in metaphysical explanations (of a non-causal nature) of this type. This is the case when we say, for example, that an action x is morally wrong (partially) in virtue of x's instantiating certain non-moral properties (e.g., the property of being a lie). Although there is no consensus on how to characterize the in-virtue-of relation, one feature that indisputably belongs to this relation is that, for every x, F, and G, if x's being F is in virtue of x's being G, then necessarily, every G is an F. In conclusion, the crucial difference between Phenomenological-Constitutive and Explanatory Phenomenal Naive Realism is a necessity versus sufficiency distinction. The former attributes the necessity of certain types of mind-independent entities to the phenomenology of perceptions, whereas the latter attributes (partial) sufficiency. Therefore, the latter type of theory does not need to fix phenomenologies to specific kinds of mind-independent things. Different naïve-realistic facts, each with distinct types of mind-independent things, can metaphysically ground the same type of phenomenological fact.

[54] Here, I assume that phenomenological facts relative to some experience correspond to *exactly* what it is like to undergo that experience (Chalmers, 2006). The properties that are relative to these facts (their "phenomenal *character*") are, as Byrne (2002, p. 9) highlights, maximally determinates. If two distinct experiences, x and y have the same phenomenology in this sense, then what it is like to have an experience is exactly the same thing as what it is like to have experience y. However, this not to be the only kind of relevant phenomenological properties and facts. For example, we can have many experiences that share similar "partial" phenomenological properties, such as red and circular appearances, but are still subjectively discriminable. Unless otherwise specified (as in Section 3), the first sense is the standard interpretation of "phenomenology" and related terms.

[55] To adhere to common usage, which assumes that if one fact is in virtue of another, they involve the same particular, it follows that since phenomenological facts pertain to the experience itself, the fact that explains it would also involve the experience. In this case, PFPs are instantiated by the corresponding experiences.

PFPs can be characterized in different ways depending on the specific explanatory approach taken regarding the phenomenology of perceptions. For example, sense data theorists may define them as the class of properties associated with the subject becoming acquainted with mental images. PNRs, instead, take the class of PNRs as at least partially[56] composed of properties whose instantiations involve acquaintances by the associated subjects with mind-independent things. I use the term "naïve-realistic properties" to refer to features that are characterized in this way.

This general characterization, however, allows for the possibility of many distinct types of naïve-realistic PNRs. For example, some PNR may introduce PFPs taking into account the everyday intuition that "two ordinary observers standing in roughly the same place, looking at the same scene, are bound to have experiences with the same phenomenal character" (Campbell, 2002, p.116). Here, the standard position for PNR is to assert that (the naïve-realistic[57]) PFPs are such that each instantiation of any specific PFP involves acquaintance with "the same" things, and vice-versa[58]. Conversely, if two PFPs involve acquaintance with "distinct" things, then they would be numerically distinct and vice-versa. In this case, objectivists think that PFPs are of the form the property of the associated subject becoming acquainted with such-and-such environmental things or the property of the associated subject becoming acquainted with such-and-such kind of environmental things[59]. PNRs that posit PFPs as individuated in this way are referred to as "objectivism".

My general goal is to scrutinize objectivism. To achieve this goal, I will proceed as follows:

In Section 2, I will introduce a specific type of objectivism that has been designed to overcome a traditional objection. I will explain how the defensive strategy of this

[56] Some versions of PNR allow for the possibility of perceptual phenomenology being overdetermined (Logue, 2014), meaning that naïve-realistic properties would not be the sole explanatory factor.
[57] For the sake of brevity, I will use the term "PNRs" to refer specifically to the naïve-realistic properties introduced by a particular type of objectivism. I will not consider the possibility of this type of objectivism positing non-naïve-realistic properties, as this is not relevant to the current discussion.
[58] I.e., if acquaintances with the "same" things are involved in two instantiations, then the PFPs instantiated by the corresponding experiences are the same property.
[59] Objectivism admits a distinction of interpretation concerning "same" and "distinct" in these claims. If "same" and "distinct" here are taken as implying numerical identity/distinction, then objectivism takes particularistic forms. In this case, PFPs would include things like the property of the associated subject becoming acquainted with my laptop screen. Alternatively, if we read these concepts in terms of sameness in some pre-established kind (e.g., visual properties), then objectivism adopts a generalistic form of PNR, and PFPs would be properties such as the property of associated subject becoming acquainted with something square and gray, etc.(This classification is similar to that found in Mehta (2014, p.311-2), though it differs in relevant ways. However, the discussion below will be neutral with respect to these specificities.

approach works and highlight some cases involved in these objections that could potentially pose challenges (demands for explanations that are not obviously obtainable by selectivists) to selectivism. Although these cases do not constitute positive refutations, they are still concerning.

In a similar vein, Section 3 will discuss a recent objection to objectivism that is not of the previous kind of objection, and will demonstrate how the objectivist can address it, ultimately reducing it to, at most, a challenge similar to the previous ones.

Sections 4 and 5, however, are the main contribution of this chapter. These sections provide novel arguments that conclusively refute objectivism, which is different from the challenges discussed earlier.

Section 4 presents an argument that shows the falsity of objectivism as presented in the specialized literature up to this point. However, I also demonstrate that a modified version of objectivism could potentially address this argument (although it still faces some challenges). This reformulated theory is a novel type within not only the realm of objectivism, but also the one of Naïve Realism as a whole, as it posits that perceptions necessarily involve acquaintance with facts relative to sense organs. The significance of Section 4 and its argument lies in the conclusion that objectivism must adopt this new type of naïve realism.

Section 5, on the other hand, proposes an argument that positively refutes objectivism, which arguably cannot be salvaged by any modification. In Section 6, objections to the alternative option of PNR (which involves a third slot in the acquaintance relation) are raised. Based on these objections and the issues raised earlier in the chapter regarding objectivism, it is concluded that PNR must be subjectivist.

2. SELECTIVISM SAVES OBJECTIVISM FROM MANY OBJECTIONS.

The traditional type of resistance to objectivism (TROs, hereafter) shows a set (often, a pair) of perceptual situations that have certain phenomenological distinctions, but arguably no available distinction of the acquainted things and so they would have the same PFPs. As I showed in Note 53, the *in-virtue-of* relation has a generality aspect, entailing that experiences with the same PFP have the same phenomenology. So those cases serve as counterexamples to objectivism. Here are the classical pairs of situations used in TROs:

1) The same things perceived by both healthy and "defective"[60] perceivers (Cassam, 2014, p. 110).

2) The same things seen from different perspectives or angles (Ayer, 1956).

3) The same things seen over appearance changes (especially those due to the passage of time) (Brewer, 2011, chap.5).

4) The same things seen in distinct lighting conditions (Brewer, 2011, chap.5).

5) The same things perceived through different senses modalities (Christy, 2019; Mehta, 2014).

6) The same things seen both with and without attentional blindness[61].

There is at least one sense[62] according to which each of those scenarios would involve the "same" acquainted things and so they might be considered as yielding TROs. To avoid inconsistency, objectivists have to show why these pairs of situations are actually composed of distinct PFPs.

William Fish (2009) thinks that objectivism can be saved from TROs if we a) see the acquaintance relation as having environmental facts as objective relata and b) consider that subjective aspects determine which environmental facts we are acquainted with. Objectivists that subscribe to both a) and b) are selectivists. Selectivists typically explain the phenomenological distinctions between members of pairs 1-6) by claiming that there are distinctions in the specific combination of facts that the subjects become acquainted with, which (even for subjects in the same environment) can vary in accordance with distinctions in subjective aspects[63].

Thus, they can comfortably explain why, for example, when you (a shortsighted person) look at a picture on a distant wall, your experience is phenomenologically different from when you put on your glasses in the next moment. For selectivists, this is

[60] Myopia, color blindness, yellow eye, partial deafness, etc. Here we can also include cases with light-distorting lenses.
[61] For real-world examples that suggest events of distinct phenomenologies, even with (allegedly) equivalent perceived things (Simons & Chabris (1999), Mack & Rock (1998), Carrasco et al. (2004)). Fish (2009) discusses the consequence of this type of cases for naïve realism, naturally providing a objectivist explanation.
[62] The one of "same" composing the descriptions that evoke those pairs of cases.
[63] This is why this approach is labeled "selectivism". The subjects have the power of selecting which environmental facts they become acquainted with.

because of a distinction in subjective receptivity between these two moments. In the first moment, you became acquainted with certain facts about the picture's details, while in the second perception, you become acquainted with a surplus of facts (due to "receptivity" properties you have acquired) resulting in a distinct phenomenology. This is their standard explanation for cases of type 1).

Fish thinks selectivist can explain in a similar way differences in shape phenomenology from the same objects (as in 2)) in terms of the "intrinsic shape that a particular is (a way of filling out space) and the relational shape that it exhibits to a perceiver looking at the particular from a specific point" (Fish, 2009, p. 160). These latter properties correspond to the way some surface is projected in an outer point according to laws of projective geometry and are purely environmental, as defined by Gibson (1966)[64]. When a person changes position relative to the thing I am looking at, there is, according to Fish, a necessary change in environmental perspectival facts they are acquainted with, and therefore, selectivists would not have to predict a corresponding identity in phenomenologies.

The same kind of response can be provided to account for the distinction in color phenomenologies in scenarios of type 3). In this case, the explanation would be based on a distinction of facts relative to the wavelength of the light that the objects reflect "and the ratio of the different elements of this color signal to the corresponding elements of the color signal reflected from the surround" (Fish, 2009, p.153)[65].

Based on this understanding, it is clear why the perceptual phenomenology corresponding to an old and blackened coin may differ from that of a new one. The coin's surface has undergone chemical changes over time, altering the way it reflects light. Consequently, there is a change in the facts related to the wavelength that the coin reflects, which one becomes acquainted with at two different times. As demonstrated, selectivists can also explain phenomenological variations relative to things that have changed shape over time. Therefore, type 4) cases should not be worrisome to selectivists.

It is far from obvious, however, that TROs are, in general, harmless to selectivism. For example, one might suggest that it is possible to touch the exact same things that we see, which would make selectivist inconsistent with the obvious fact that perceptions of distinct sense modalities always have distinct phenomenologies. However, as Christy (2019, p.2183-4) highlights, selectivists can appeal to alleged types of "modally-specific"

[64] See also Alva Noë's (2004) "perspectival properties".
[65] See also Fish (2009, chap.6, sect. 2)), Cohen (2004) and Byrne and Hilbert (1997)

facts that are, in addition, necessary for whatever experience of certain sense modality. An application of this strategy is to claim that all and only visual experience involves acquaintance (objective) color facts. Thus, the appeal to modally-specific facts offers a way for selectivists to account for the distinct phenomenologies in type 5) cases.

A further issue that selectivists face is accounting for type 6) situations, in which a perceiver is attentionally blind to certain aspects of their environment. The natural selectivist explanation, which is similar to that used for type 1) cases, holds that the perceiver fails to become acquainted with environmental aspects that they would have become acquainted with had they not had the attentional deficit at that moment.

However, it is not entirely clear that the previous two responses are satisfactory. To illustrate, consider the glasses-wearing/removal situation I mentioned when discussing selectivists' response to type 1). Now imagine that in a third moment, while still wearing your glasses, you become distracted and become attentionally blind to the *same* aspects of the picture that you were not acquainted with in the first moment due to your vision impairment. However, the phenomenologies of the first and third situations are distinct (to begin with, there is no blurriness in the latter case).

Notwithstanding, selectivists could use the same strategy deployed in type 5) cases and deny that, even in the same environment, the facts that we fail to get acquainted with in attentional blindness situations are the same as the ones we fail to get acquainted with in defective scenarios. To support this claim, they could appeal to two options. First, they would have to abandon the intuitive account for selectivism, which holds that if S is attentionally blind to some fact F, then S fails to become acquainted with F, and if S is "visually" blind to some fact F, then S fails to become acquainted with F. Second, they could argue that it is *necessary* to be attentionally blind and visually impaired with respect to different things.

Both options certainly pose a great burden. With the first option, selectivists would need to provide an alternative non-ad hoc account for how we determine which objects in the environment one becomes acquainted with and which one is not, in situations of attentional blindness, or a similar account for sensory impairment. (Or at least indicate a non-ad-hoc general way we come to an account like that, since the phenomenological presence of things[66] seems to be our only current criteria for determining what one

[66] Roughly, this principle, which seems to guide our natural attributions of what are the elements of the can be expressed in "if S is acquainted with something in the environment, then such a thing is phenomenologically present".

becomes acquainted with, so a new strategy is required). The second option also poses the burden of providing some reason why one cannot be (in different situations) attentionally and visually blind to the exact same things (while also being "sighted" in relation to the same things).

Selectivists' treatment of type 5) cases raises similar concerns. While there may be a type of fact exclusive and necessary to vision (such as color facts), it is unclear whether this generalizes to other sensory modalities. As a result, selectivists still need to provide reasons for the existence of such types of facts across all (possible and existent) sensory modalities.

To my knowledge, selectivists have yet to address any of these concerns.

3. OBJECTIONS FROM PARTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY.

The previous section highlighted some challenges to selectivism. Nevertheless, as of now, there has not been any affirmative stance against it.

Thus, it may be reasonable for antiselectivists to consider objections other than TROs. A more recent objection recognizes that although PNRs are concerned with the total phenomenology of perception, they must also address its partial phenomenology[67]. Once this is accepted, it becomes natural to think that these partial phenomenological facts are accounted for by the perceiver's becoming acquainted with specific environmental facts[68]. Indeed, as I showed in Section 2, Fish (2009) himself gave selectivists many suggestions for explaining color and shape phenomenology.

These observations may relieve antiselectivists from assuming that the counterexamples to selectivism demand the exact same acquainted facts. Instead, selectivists would expect perceptions that only share some acquainted facts to be phenomenologically similar. If antiselectivists can demonstrate that these experiences are not actually phenomenologically similar, then they have a counterexample to selectivism.

In this line, Mehta (2014) [69] argues that even if it is not possible for experiences of different sense modalities to involve exactly the same acquainted things (as argued by

[67] Partial phenomenology is what is instantiated by two experiences that are phenomenologically similar but not necessarily identical. Color and shape phenomenologies are the most prominent examples of these properties.

[68] For the relation between partial phenomenology (facts), phenomenological similarities and total phenomenology, see Note 3.

[69] See also Mehta and Ganson (2016) and Clarke and Anaya (2019).

selectivists), it is undeniable that two perceptions of distinct sense modalities can involve acquaintance with some common fact[70]. For example, ways of filling out space, as Fish partially sees what explains shape phenomenology, seem to be a type of fact with which we can become acquainted both tactilely and visually. Mehta believes that this possibility obliges objectivists to predict some phenomenal similarity among the cases, which is not the case, as visual and tactile experiences are utterly[71] subjectively different.

One problem with this argument is that it assumes that selectivists must accept that two perceptions involving acquaintances with something in common are necessarily phenomenologically similar. This assumption is based on the idea that selectivists assume the objective relata in the acquaintance relation are not "phenomenally innocuous". In other words, they would need to accept the "impact principle" – the idea that everything we become acquainted with has some specific impact on, or participation in, at least the partial phenomenology of the corresponding experience[72]. Otherwise, they could not explain the difference in phenomenology between two experiencers by simply citing some fact that one of them does not become acquainted with, while the other one does (as in explanations of type 1-6 cases).

While the present argument is compelling, objectivists have ways to refute it. For one, objectivists do not need to give up on the motivation behind the impact principle, which is to avoid "phenomenal innocuousness".

First and foremost, it is inevitable to read "…has an impact on..." in terms of "…determines…" within the current context. However, when we say that something has *some* impact on another, we do not mean that necessarily the first thing does all the relevant determinative work alone. Rather, it is compatible with the first thing's being only *partially* determinative, serving a non-totalizing part of what ultimately does the entire determinative job. Interpreted this way, the impact principle implies that every acquainted fact composes (either partially or totally) the determinant of some corresponding instantiation of a (partial or total) phenomenal property. This is contrary

[70] But not simply a fact of a type that would be present in every perceptual acquaintance (e.g., something's being a physical object). This restriction is important because PNRs could gladly indicate that those "general facts" are the ones whose acquaintance is merely responsible for a general sensory phenomenal aspect. Here, that which matters is phenomenological facts that are specific to only certain experiences.

[71] At least in relation to phenomenological aspects that are not shared by all perceptions (which distinguishes sensory phenomenology from other types of phenomenal experiences, such as pain and imagination).

[72] See Clarke and Anaya (2019, p.9) for an analogous principle.

to the antiselectivist reasoning that suggests the corresponding acquaintance of the "impactful" thing fully determines the instantiation of a phenomenal property.

Note that this interpretation does not conflict with the original motivation behind the impact principle. If the subject is no longer acquainted with the same things, then what was responsible (considered as a whole) for doing the phenomenological determinative work is no longer present (as at least some part of it is now gone)[73]. Therefore, it is not surprising that the phenomenal aspect that was being generated thereof also ceases to exist, although this may give rise to some other phenomenal aspect that is (partially) determined by substitutive acquaintances.

Moreover, this interpretation should not seem unusual to selectivist accounts as presented in Section 2. In fact, selectivists could argue that this is a common occurrence in visual perception. Fish, for instance, posits that the same instantiation of a light-reflecting property can produce two distinct color phenomenologies depending on its surroundings. He also asserts that shape phenomenology is determined by the way space is filled *and* perspectival properties, and that only when those kinds of facts are acquainted together can they fully determine a specific shape phenomenology. Therefore, selectivists may be willing to accept that while there may be environmental facts that alone partially determine phenomenological aspects, this is not a universal phenomenon.

Therefore, the mere possibility of becoming acquainted with the same facts through distinct sense modalities would not, contrary to what Mehta suggests, lead selectivists to predict any phenomenological similarity. Selectivists, however, need to demonstrate that among *all* possible types of facts that we can become acquainted with through distinct sense modalities, none are solely determinative of phenomenological aspects (arguing for a co-determinative framework in these cases, similar to Fish's account of shape phenomenology). This is undoubtedly a significant challenge for selectivists; however, as in the previous section, we do not offer a positive argument against it.

4. SELECTIVISM AND "SUBJECTIVE" PHENOMENOLOGY.

Given the situation presented in Sections 2 and 3, one might assume that the most effective approach against selectivism is to present challenges and hope that they are

[73] Here, I am disregarding the possibility of overdetermination, which appears to be irrelevant to the present context.

insurmountable. However, as I announced in the Introduction, the main contribution of this chapter is to argue that this is not the case, by providing positive arguments against selectivism/objectivism. Firstly, I think that we can give a positive account when we consider a phenomenological fact of perceptions that is frequently recognized as characteristic of sensations, but less commonly acknowledged as typical of perceptions.

Note that a plausible way to characterize the phenomenology of sensations could successfully separate the "objective" aspects of sensations (such as the property of being a pain of a certain intensity and quality[74]) from the "subjective" aspects (such as the property of being "located" in a particular body part)[75]. Broadly speaking, the latter pertains to where the pain is “felt”, while the former pertains to the pain itself. This classification of phenomenal aspects allows us to say that we feel the “same” (“phenomenologically-objectively” identical) pain in many different body parts. The lesson to be learned here is that the “objective” phenomenal aspects of sensations do not constitute the entirety of their phenomenology.

Something analogous occurs in sensory phenomenology, as seen in tactile perceptions. For instance, when you touch the same object in the same way with one hand and then the other, you have two perceptions with identical “objective” phenomenologies, but there is a difference in subjective feeling. In one case, you feel the object as if it were touched with your right hand, and in the other, you feel the object as if it were touched with your left hand. Phenomenologically, these experiences are different, despite sharing some partial phenomenological features, the “objective” ones.

Although not so evident as in the tactile case, this phenomenological distinction seems ubiquitous among sensory experiences. Smith (2002, p.134), for example, characterizes the “spatiality” of perception (according to him, an essential property of “perceptual consciousness”) as follows:

> The more precise notion of spatiality that we require, therefore, is one that essentially involves not just the spatial relationships between the objects of awareness, but the spatiality of the relationship between any such object and ourselves— more specifically, a part of our body. In vision, for example, objects are characteristically seen, when genuine perceptual consciousness is involved, as more or less distant from us—specifically, from our eyes (or eye). And sounds are heard as being at varying distances from us—specifically from our ears (or ear). Although sight and hearing, unlike touch, are standardly regarded as “distance senses,” the same kind of spatiality is also found in touch. Although when we feel an object that object is usually felt as being in contact

[74] E.g., being a throbbing pain, being a sharp pain, etc.
[75] See Jackson (1977).

> with us, we feel it to be a threedimensional solid body localized beyond our body's surface. What is crucial is precisely this spatial over-againstness with which perceptual objects are given to awareness: an over-againstness which involves a part of our body functioning as sense-organ. Perception concerns the "external world." The suggestion is that this is, in essential part, because perceptual experience presents such "external" objects as literally external—to our bodies.

Here, it is not the place for addressing the nature of the "subjective" contribution (in opposition to a purely "objective" one) in sensory phenomenology, nor is it my point to argue specifically for Smith's account. However, it is undeniable that the phenomenology of perception involves a relation of "over-againstness" between the object as perceived and a phenomenologically subjective element, a sense organ or body part (phenomenologically conceived), as Smith described. Hence, we experience things as if they are in reference to a particular non-environmental element. Things are felt as if they are touched with my right hand, and we hear and see things as if from our heads. As a result, perceptual phenomenology is not exhaustively describable as "it looks [feels, etc.] to S as if x [an environmental thing] is F, G…". Rather, such a description would have to tell us about the above-mentioned reference to the subject[76].

These purely phenomenal distinctions motivate prima facie, for any theorist that aims to explain sensory phenomenologies, the introduction of internal properties. Specifically, one would argue that it is impossible to explain these phenomenal variations in simple terms of acquaintance with such-and-such environmental facts. After all, how could (purely environmental facts, or their combination, explain why I feel something as if it was touched by my right hand and not as if it was touched by my left one? This would suggest that explanations mentioning only acquaintance with such-and-such a kind of environmental facts can only concern the objective part of sensory phenomenology (e.g., something's looking red and round, etc.), but never the subjectively referred phenomenological facts (e.g., something's being seen as if "from" one's head, etc.).

However, objectivists could quickly object that this generalization is not licit, observing that there are purely phenomenological-subjective variations that are arguably accounted for by physical facts[77]. As I showed above, Fish explains the part of visual

[76] This general discussion is also present in Peacocke (1992).

[77] It is not clear whether the variations in sensory phenomenology are solely subjective and phenomenological or if they also involve "modes of over-againstness" (distantly, closely, etc.) not reducible to other aspects, However, for the purposes of this chapter, the subjective-objective distinction in perceptual phenomenology is sufficient.

phenomenology corresponding to "felt distances" (which Smith evoked) by simple appeal to perspectival facts. Something similar could be said about hearing from a distance[78].

The problem is that in many cases, we cannot plausibly attribute the difference in sensory experiences to a difference in acquainted facts. For example, if I touch my pen with my right hand and then touch it in the same way with my left hand, the sensation of a hard, long, cylindrical object would be present in both cases[79]. However, in one case, I would feel as if I were touching the pen with my left hand, and in the other case, I would feel as if I were touching it with my right hand. Let us call the corresponding total phenomenologies P^1 and P^2, respectively. The distinction of partial (subjective, in this case) phenomenological aspects leads to an evident difference between P^1 and P^2. But what kind of environmental facts could we be acquainted with when touching an object with one hand but not the other? There does not seem to be a plausible answer to this question.

Nevertheless, antiselectivists do not need to settle for the intuitive lack of explanatory resources that selectivists would face when dealing with these situations. Preliminarily, however, I have to show why selectivists cannot simply be silent on the answer to the question in the previous paragraph. In particular, selectivists cannot simply say, "there are distinct combinations of facts that make up, respectively, the PFP relative to P^1 and the PFP relative to P^2, end of story", in a manner similar to what current selectivists might say when faced with the challenges presented in Sections 2 and 3 (at least until those challenges are adequately addressed).

Here is why this would be an illegal move. We fairly expect, for every explanatory theory (T) of a certain class (C), that T does not merely generically indicate that a certain set of entities (E) is such that its members account for each member of C. Rather, at least in a possible future development, T should also be able to specify *which* member of E explains a given particular member of C, given unlimited information about the situation in which that C member is found. This is not to say, however, that T must currently have all the means to ground this kind of judgment, but it should not be deemed unattainable.

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[78] Perhaps, they would have a hard time when it comes to phenomena like explaining hearing something as in front or behind oneself, once no distinct spatial relation would be available here.

[79] I used tactile experiences as examples because their phenomenology is easier to grasp in terms of the subjective factor. However, variations in over-againstness are ubiquitous. For instance, imagine that your eyes were magically placed on your belly. Even if your body were moved so you are now staring at the same scene you were before, you would not see it as if "from" your head.

If an explanatory theory admits to having such a handicap, it is in a poor dialectical situation.

The problem is that we have reasons to believe that selectivists *cannot* account for P^1 and P^2 in this particular manner. For, choosing any explanans for P^1 that fails to account for P^2 would be arbitrary for selectivists. This is because there is nothing in the situation involving (say) P^1, which is absent in the one involving P^2, that could indicate to selectivists a specific environmental fact, which they would elect as composing the corresponding acquaintance and PFP. According to our stipulations, the differences between the respective situations as a whole are solely with regard to the (subjective) phenomenologies and the functioning of the relevant body parts. However, none of these distinctions is capable of providing the adequate basis for selecting an environmental fact that would do the determinative work relative to P^1 without applying to P^2 in the same way.

When it comes to the phenomenologies, there seems to be no evident natural affinity between specific (kinds of) environmental facts and only one of those subjective phenomenologies (even in combination with the "objective" phenomenology), which selectivists could use to choose the required explanans in a non-arbitrary way.

The present case differs from, e.g., selectivist explanations that rely on perspectival facts. For example, if two subjects were in an identical environment that contains a cube, selectivists could non-arbitrarily indicate that the appearance (relative to one subject) of the square as a large object is related to specific perspectival facts, while the appearance (relative to another subject) of it as a small object is related to distinct perspectival facts. One could argue that for only one of these subjects, the phenomenology naturally matches the relevant projection of the cube available in the environment in accordance with relevant geometric laws, while in the other case, it does not. Thus, choosing that specific perspectival fact (among all the other ones that the environment contains) as something that the corresponding subject becomes acquainted with is not an arbitrary move.

Nonetheless, there is nothing differentiating P^1 and P^2, except for their subjective components, namely the hand to which they refer (right in P^1, left in P^2). Surely, this kind of subjective reference does not correspond (in any relevant way for its election as a correlative object of acquaintance) to any specific environmental fact, let alone correspond in a way that the reference to another analogous body part, as in P^2, would not.

The other distinction between the situations containing P^1 and P^2 is the functioning of the relevant body parts[80]. Once again, there is no evident natural correspondence between the functioning of a specific tactile organ (say, my right hand) and a certain specific fact in the environment that would not apply to the functioning of a distinct tactile body part (my left hand)[81]. It is even possible to design the present cases so that all the (causal, functional, etc.) relations that the right hand keeps with the environment are precisely the same as the one my right (in the moment they touch the pen) does. So, no candidate correspondence between the hand and a certain environmental fact could ground the selection of a distinctive fact to compose the relevant acquaintance.

Given that the differences between the cases of P^1 and P^2 are solely related to phenomenology and body parts, neither of which can adequately justify the exclusive choice for an environmental fact to compose the relevant acquaintance, then any attempt to do so would be arbitrary and ad hoc, and therefore unacceptable. Thus, selectivism lacks the *potential* resources to provide the exact explanans in these cases and is therefore an unsatisfactory explanatory theory of perceptual phenomenology.

An anonymous reviewer at Erkenntnis (to whom I am very grateful) has noted that this argument may not be decisive against selectivists as they could avoid its conclusion by adopting one of two positions.

Firstly, they could argue that the "subjective" phenomenology I referred to is not instantiated by the perceptual event itself but instead by a sensation that necessarily accompanies every perception, albeit not overlapping with it. Since the argument raised no issues against selectivists' ability to handle "objective" phenomenology, it poses no threat to these selectivists.

Nevertheless, I believe antiselectivists can reject this suggestion as to how to count mental events because it seems that we are obliged to abductively choose the conventional account of perceptions as instantiating subjective phenomenology over it. This account is simpler, more economical, and non-ad hoc. Furthermore, it is implausible to think that there is a sensation accompanying every event because sensations typically have their own "objective" phenomenology, such as the "objective pain" as I mentioned at the

[80] Now, I am not talking about "phenomenological" sense organs or body parts (i.e., that which the subject feels as being over-against the objects of perceptions insofar as it is felt) but about their "biological" counterparts. In the present case, this may include not only the relevant part skin, with its nerve endings, but also all the causal paths involved in the corresponding sensory process.

[81] At least if they have equivalent discriminatory capacities (i.e., every environmental change that yields a phenomenological change for one of them would yield a phenomenological change for another).

beginning of the present section. However, we do not observe such a phenomenological aspect when we have a perception.

The second option for selectivism would be to reject the definition of "objectivism" provided in the Introduction and reformulate it to include PNRs that, more weakly, individuate PFPs by reference to *whatever* the perceiver becomes acquainted with. In this case, since we are dealing with Naïve Realism (as opposed to Sense Data Theories), the reference would be to acquaintable mind-independent things in general, not limited to environmental things. Under this new formulation, objectivists can ideally individuate PFPs at least partially by acquaintance with material things that are located under the perceiver's skin, such as body parts or sense organs.

In light of this, selectivists could potentially counter the argument above by suggesting that the difference between P^1 and P^2 can be explained by a difference in the perceiver's acquaintance with facts related to their body parts. According to this view, on the basis of the subjective component of P^1 (i.e., its reference to the perceiver's right hand) one could attribute to the perceiver's acquaintance with a fact concerning their right hand, which would not apply to P^2. It should be noted that (distinctly from those possible attempts to differentiate P^1's and P^2's PFPs by some environmental fact) the selection of this particular fact is not arbitrary, as there is an evident correspondence between the selected fact and the relevant phenomenological reference to it. This correspondence only occurs between the perceiver's right hand and (because of its subjective component) P^1, making the exclusive selection of this fact non-arbitrary.

In fact, the idea that we can become acquainted with components and processes of our body is not new. One of the prominent contemporary accounts of sensations is based on this idea (Armstrong, 1962, 1968; Pitcher, 1970, 1971). However, what is novel is a naïve realist claim that, in sensory perception[82], we can become acquainted with internal things. Although naïve realists, now considered as a whole (and not restricted to PNR), sometimes do not explicitly refer to the objects of acquaintance as environmental – saying, for example, that they are "physical" (Millar, 2015), "mind-independent" (Genone, 2016), or "material" (Price, 1964) –, in context, these authors actually refer to things outside the perceiver. It is no wonder the objects of acquaintances are often

[82] For the remainder of this section, I will use the term "sensory perception" to refer specifically to the ordinary perception that occurs through body parts and is directed towards external objects. This is to differentiate it from broader uses of the term "perception," such as those used by the authors mentioned, who consider sensations to be "perceptions" of bodily things.

considered the same as the objects of sensory perception, which are naturally limited to environmental things.

This is why I initially defined objectivism as specifically individuating PNRs based on environmental things. However, in fact, there is room for arguing (once one motivates the possibility of acquaintance with facts relative to body parts in sensory perceptions) that the broader characterization is in line with the natural spirit of "objectivism", as it individuates PNR in accordance with what the perceiver is acquainted with.

The conclusion of the present section is that selectivists need to propose a new general type of naïve realism, which admits that sensory perceptions may involve acquaintance with body parts. However, even with this modification, selectivists' life is not a bed of flowers.

For, there are many facts relative to body parts whose acquaintance we would plausibly expect to generate objective phenomenology. For example, a reasonable interpretation of the selectivist view would propose that when one looks in the mirror one is acquainted with the fact that their eyes are in fact located in their head. Therefore, this type of fact could not be the one whose acquaintance partially determines the rest of the phenomenology of ordinary visual experiences, where one sees things as if from one's head.

In this case, if selectivists wish to maintain their position, they would likely have two options. Firstly, they could come up with a justification for why, in those cases (contrary to our intuitions), what partially determines one's phenomenology is not a fact relative to body parts. For example, they may argue that in cases like the one involving looking at the mirror, we only become acquainted with color and shape rather than facts about body parts. Second, they could introduce a subclass of facts relative to body parts that do not provide that kind of determination, and justify this. So, although selectivists can account for differences in subjective phenomenology, they still face some challenges.

5. OBJECTIVISTS CANNOT ACCOUNT FOR SHIFTED SPECTRA.

In light of the above discussion, one should notice that presenting a definitive case against objectivism/selectivism is harder than one might initially expect. Surely, selectivists should not underestimate the weight of the challenges raised, especially since there seem to be no forthcoming answers. However, antiselectivists will certainly benefit

from a conclusive argument against selectivism. The goal of this section is to provide a reasoning of this kind.

To start, consider the possibility that two distinct subjects (S^1 and S^2) with the same color discrimination capacities might have, at the same time, significantly different color phenomenologies when gazing at the same part of the environment. For instance, if they were to look at a homogenously painted wall, they would S^1 have a color experience that is phenomenologically identical to what you experience when staring at (what you recognize as) a homogenously painted blue wall, whereas S^2's phenomenology would be the same as the one you would have when looking at a red wall. However, if the hue of the wall's color were to be altered, resulting in a change in the phenomenology of S^1, then S^2 would always experience an analogous phenomenological change if S^2 were in the same situation and vice versa.

(Here, it is important to emphasize that the discrimination capacities being referred to here are in terms of phenomenal experiences rather than cognitive or epistemological ones. That is, two different subjects S^1 and S^2 have the same color discrimination capacities iff if S^1 had a color phenomenology change because of some environmental change, then the same environmental change would yield a phenomenological color variation relative to S^2 and vice versa. There is no relative "colorblindness" here.)

To account for this possibility, selectivists would need to argue that S^1 and S^2 became acquainted with distinct facts. Of course, antiselectivists may argue that selectivists would have to give an arbitrary answer when asked to specify the acquaintances that differentiate S^1 and S^2. However, even that generic[83] explanation is not available to them. There is a modification in this possibility that would provide antiselectivists with a definite conclusion against selectivists. Here's how they could proceed:

First, they would argue that there can be an infinite number of subjects with the same discrimination capacities, yet each would have a distinct color phenomenology in the same environment. This assumption is partially based on the idea that there are infinite possible color phenomenologies. This seems plausible, since there do not appear to be any metaphysical constraints on the variation of phenomenological color.

[83] As opposed to the "specific" type of explanations that were discussed in the previous section.

If further justification is required for this premise, consider the possibility of subjects with increasingly more nuanced color perceptions. We can always imagine a subject that can detect more colors in the environment than another, and therefore has the ability to be aware of more phenomenological colors. However, there are no a priori limits to color detection, other than "objective" colors themselves, which appear to be ideally infinite. Just as we can imagine a creature with greater color-detecting abilities than humans, experiencing phenomenologically distinct perceptions when exposed to light reflection at 600THz and 600.01 THz, we can imagine even more discriminating subjects who would experience a phenomenological variation when experiencing light at 600THz and 600.001 THz, and so on. This suggests that color phenomenology is possibly infinite.

Therefore, it is possible that there are infinite subjects who, if placed in an identical environmental situation (such as the wall scenario mentioned earlier), would experience different colors. This is because there is no metaphysical connection between a particular environmental feature and a specific set of phenomenologies. In our world, there may be a high likelihood that light reflection at 600THz would result in a phenomenological color similar to what we perceive as blue. However, this is only a contingent fact based on our specific evolutionary history and as such could have been otherwise.

Finally, antiselectivists would argue there is nothing inherently problematic with those infinite subjects' having the same color discrimination capacities. For, they (S^1, S^2, etc.) could be arranged in a continuum where for each, subject (S^i) is such that for every situation containing light reflected with a certain wave frequency where S^i would always experience of the same phenomenological color as the preceding subject (S^{i+1}) if S^{i+1} were in a situation of a slightly smaller wave frequency of the light reflected (compared to the situation being considered for S^i).

Therefore, antiselectivists can reasonably conclude that there can be an infinite number of subjects with the same discrimination capacities but with distinct color phenomenology in the same environment. The next step is to recognize that the number of relevant[84] environmental facts in the wall situation cannot keep up with the number of

[84] Here I assume that selectivists would posit *physical* facts (relational or not) as the candidates for acquaintance. Of course, "the fact" that something is such that 2+2=4 and the like (which are indeed plausibly infinite) can be seen (probably by a maximalist about universals) as a fact that is instantiated in the environment. However, no one would expect us to get acquainted with this kind of thing. I also right away deemed as implausible explanations that would "take advantage of" the infinity of rational numbers and the fact that physical quantities are measurable. They may use, e.g., the "fact" that such-and-such part of the wall is 1cm, the "fact" that such-and-such part of the wall is 0,1 cm, the "fact" that such-and-such

phenomenologically distinct possible subjects. This does not seem a difficult thing to demonstrate, since the candidate facts here – whatever they exactly are –, and their possible combination, are finite. If so, then selectivists cannot see a possible distinction of acquainted things among those subjects. Selectivists are literally short of resources to explain such a phenomenological distinction. The natural diagnostic here is that PNRs should search for PFPs that are not exclusively individuated by environmental facts.

Before concluding the argument against selectivists, it is worth addressing some potential objections they may have.

One way out for them would be to claim that they are the kind of selectivists who *only* explain the phenomenology of veridical perceptions. As I demonstrated in Note 52, it is optional for PNRs to explain the phenomenology of illusions by appealing to naïve-realistic properties. Therefore, selectivists could indicate that only one of those possible subjects is having a veridical perception (whose phenomenology would be easily explained by Fish's environmental colors). All the other ones would be having "subjective" color illusions, yellow-eye type of situation[85]. For these selectivists, the corresponding phenomenologies can be explained by, e.g., also mentioning subjective properties[86].

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part of the wall is 0,01cm and so on (or the fact that such-and-such part of the wall is 0,1 cm from such-and-such another part of the wall, etc.). Other selectivist attempts to take advantage of the infinity of rational numbers may include saying that relational properties between points of space (e.g., *being 2 inches away from...*) could help to explain the relevant phenomenological difference. All these options, however, get into the same kind of troubles I announced in the arguments in Section 4. For, there is no intuitive natural affinity between some fact of one of these kinds and only one the subjects in the environmentally identical situation making these attempts ad hoc and therefore unacceptable.

[85] Cases where the subject, e.g., sees an "objectively" white wall as yellow because of her jaundice (which has a similar effect as she was wearing yellow lenses).

[86] Campbell's account would be an option here: "Suppose we have a medium which, like glass, can be transparent. But suppose that, unlike glass, it is highly volatile, and needs constant adjustment and recalibration if it is to remain transparent in different contexts. Suppose, in fact, that the adjustment required is always sensitive to the finest details of the scene being viewed. […] [T]he upshot of the adjustment is simply that the medium becomes transparent. You might think of visual processing as a bit like that. It is […] that there is a kind of complex adjustment that the brain has to undergo, in each context, in order that you can be visually related to the things around you; so that you can see them, in other words. If we think of visual processing in this way, we can, of course, acknowledge that the adjustment and recalibration may not always yield full transparency. You may be looking at the world with a jaundiced eye, so that everything you see seems to have a yellowish cast". (Campbell, 2002, p.119). According to this account, when we have a veridical perception, there is no "subjective interference" between us and the object of perception in the corresponding acquaintance. In this case, we can explain the corresponding phenomenology only by appealing to the object (and its properties). But there might be (illusory) cases where the corresponding phenomenology is also explained by a "subjective" factor that combines with the objective ones to generate the relevant complete phenomenology.

Preliminarily, note that it is quite natural to claim that if x is an F illusion[87], then there is a y, such that is not really F, but x's phenomenology represents y as being F[88]. In other words, x's phenomenology inaccurately represents y as an F. Conversely, veridical perceptions' phenomenology, on the other hand, cannot show something x as being an F if x is not an F.

The present strategy adopted by selectivists involves positing a difference in the veridical perceptive/illusory status of the experiences. This would require a difference in accuracy assessment between these experiences based on the representational interpretation of the veridical/illusory difference mentioned earlier. Accuracy assessment depends on the situation/world in which the representation is located and its accuracy conditions. Since accuracy conditions are defined by the representational content itself and the (environmental[89]) situation is the same for all subjects, selectivists would plausibly have to acknowledge a difference in representational content across the experiences.

The issue is that there does not seem to be any viable options for determining mental content that could justify the claim that there is a difference in representational content among the subjects, at least one that would result in a difference in accuracy between them. Put differently, there are no internal or external factors in (say) the situation of S^1 that could support the view that S^1's phenomenology is *the* accurate one.

In the first place, external factors alone are insufficient to indicate that there must be a content distinction among subjects. If we consider historical factors, we can design situations with no environmental variations whatsoever, including the subjects' ontogenetics and phylogenetics (or culture). For instance, we can imagine subjects that are spontaneously generated in each situation, with no associated history. Additionally, we can assume that these subjects have the same associated dispositions. Given that the subjects have the same phenomenal color discrimination capacities and are identical in every aspect except for their specific position in the spectra array, it is not reasonable to

[87] Which exactly is the property whose instantiations make some color phenomenology accurate is irrelevant for present purposes. They can be the same one as the selectivist attributes as being acquainted with by the perceiver or not.

[88] Which is the natural spelling out of the slogan "x appears to be what it is not", which traditionally describes illusions of x.

[89] In Note 97, I will address the possible attempt to attribute the desired difference in accuracy conditions to the distinction in the "internal" situation among the subjects.

expect their respective phenomenologies to involve distinct causal powers and propensities in the same context[90].

The aforementioned similarities between the subjects also imply that there are no distinguishable patterns of responses[91], whether they be in the past, future, counterfactual, or otherwise. Likewise, there are no distinguishable patterns of stimulation[92]. In other words, all interactions between the organisms and their environment when experiencing the relevant phenomenologies or associated states are expected to be the same[93]. Hence, externalism about the mind fails to provide the necessary tools to differentiate between the representational contents across the situations, let alone one that would result in a divergence in accuracy.

Appealing to internal factors also seems not to do the trick. Firstly, similarly to the argument presented in Section 4, it is clear that there is no natural and exclusive connection between a specific phenomenological color, even in combination with other partial phenomenological facts that forms the corresponding total phenomenology, and some particular fact in the environment that would allow us to claim that such a phenomenology is the only one represent it. Among the present scenarios, the relevant relations, such as causal, locational, "similarity" etc., between the phenomenologies and aspects of the environment are equivalent[94].

Furthermore, in a similar manner, while the brain processes and biological setups of all these subjects may differ to some extent[95], none of them seem to have a special affinity to some specific environmental fact in a way that would allow us to posit a corresponding distinctive representation.

Therefore, it appears that internalism about mental content lacks the resources to account for a difference between the representational content of these phenomenologies, at least the ones about environmental things. As a result, no divergence in phenomenological accuracy can be inferred from them.

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[90] This is a very well- established conclusion from shifted-spectra cases (Cole, 1990).
[91] Of course, considering that effects that involve other mental representations also help to specify representational contents will not help selectivists.
[92] This kind of factor is, e.g., in Burge's (2005, 2011) ability-general element in representational states.
[93] So extended-mind mind accounts on extended-mind (see Clark and Chalmers (1998)) conception and 4E cognition theories (see Newen; De Bruin; Gallagher 2018)) cannot also see content distinctions between these phenomenologies.
[94] In particular, any probabilistic relation between a particular color phenomenology and a specific environmental fact is contingent on the actual world, not extensible to merely possible scenarios, such as those under consideration.
[95] Although it may be questioned whether this is a metaphysical necessity.

In fact, there are ways to consider that experiences with distinct phenomenological colors (that are otherwise phenomenologically equivalent) must have distinct contents, but in this case, the contents are not exclusively about environmental things. Within the literature, the two primary options are relationism and primitivism. The relational approach holds that in an experience containing a certain phenomenological color, the world is represented as causing or being disposed to cause that an experience with that phenomenological aspect (Shoemaker, 1994, 2006). On the other hand, the primitivist approach claims that, in an experience of a certain phenomenological color, the world is represented as having an intrinsic and non-reducible feature, which exclusively corresponds to that phenomenal color[96] (Thau, 2002).

However, it is unclear how these kinds of difference in content could lead to a difference in accuracy between the present situations. For the relationist, all the present experiences must be veridical in the relevant regard since the object represented cause, and is thus disposed to cause, the respective color phenomenology. On the other hand, the primitivist lacks the resources to non-arbitrarily indicate which intrinsic property experientially attributed among all the distinct episodes is the one the wall really instantiates[97].

Consequently, the argument presented cannot be refuted by appealing to a difference in the illusory/veridical status between the cases.

The final way that selectivists may try to counter the argument presented is by adopting a strategy similar to the one they used in Section 4, which attributes the phenomenal difference to a difference in acquaintance with internal elements between subjects. Specifically, they could claim that in perception, we are acquainted with some type of brain process that is exclusive to the phenomenology in question, thus explaining the distinctions in phenomenology. Similar to the previous case, this would overcome the issue of providing a ground for choosing, for each case, an exclusive fact to the subject become acquainted with, as each of these facts is in a causal relation (or, more

[96] *That* property that wall appears to intrinsically have in the corresponding experience (which would be introspectively different in relation to the property that the wall appears to have in experience with shifted spectra).

[97] Selectivists may try to explain the difference in accuracy conditions by pointing to situational factors rather than differences in representations themselves. This is because the situations in question are strictly different, even though they are environmentally identical but internally distinct, as shown. In this case, they would have to admit phenomenal color content as being about internal facts, which, additionally, only occur in one of the present situations. However, any similar choice would be blatantly arbitrary.

comprehensively, in a mind-brain "interaction" relation) exclusively with the relevant episode.

This suggestion faces multiple problems. Firstly, the acquaintance relation seems to require an epistemic relation, commonly referred to as an "opportunity to gain knowledge", with the acquainted entities (Zięba, 2021; Raleigh, 2020). However, it is evident that we cannot gain any knowledge about a brain process (even if we understand all the relevant concepts) when we perceive a monochromatic wall[98].

Secondly, it is unclear how the introduction of acquaintance with brain process would not render acquaintance with environmental facts explanatorily redundant. If we admit that acquaintance with the brain process can explain phenomenal states, then what role is left for acquaintance with traditional environmental objects? Selectivists might attempt to sidestep this issue by claiming that we are only acquainted with the neurological facts responsible for phenomenological color, while other aspects, such as shape phenomenology, are explained by acquaintance with traditional environmental things. Thus, what S^1 would be acquainted with is only what is causally responsible for her unique phenomenological color, but not with the brain process causally responsible for the subjects' shared shape phenomenology.

However, this modification cannot save selectivism from the screening-off problem mentioned above. If they admit that one becomes acquainted with a neurological fact (b^1) that causes a specific aspect of phenomenology, such as phenomenal colors, it is reasonable to expect that the same would apply to another neurological fact (b^2) that causes other types of phenomenal aspect, such as shape phenomenology. For, all the situational grounds to could apply to selecting b^1 as an object of acquaintance also seem to apply to b^2. There is no non-contingent relation that is instantiated between b^1 and the respective situation that would not analogously apply between b^2 and its situation that could possibly exclusively ground the desired choice. Therefore, one may conclude that the corresponding exclusive selection of b^1 is groundless and, as such, arbitrary and unacceptable. The mandatory move, once one acknowledges acquaintance with b^1, is to also admit acquaintance with b^2[99].

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[98] Distinctly from the supposed case of acquaintance with sense organs, in which we could plausibly be able to know something about the corresponding body part.

[99] If selectivists were to embrace this conclusion and claim that the only things we are acquainted with in perception are these neurological factors, it would sidestep the screening off problem mentioned above. However, it would be an illegitimate move since it would potentially identify them as a type of physicalist Sense Data Theory, which is inherently incompatible with naïve realism as a whole.

With these objections to the argument from shifted spectra addressed, we can now justifiably assert that PNR must be non-selectivist, and not merely that selectivism face (although serious) challenges. Furthermore, the present argument is easily generalizable to any form of objectivism, as it is not essentially dependent on the specific ontological category one chooses for the acquaintance's objective relata. In conclusion, we can now state that *explanatory phenomenal naïve realism must be non-objectivist*.

6. CONCLUSION: SHOULD PNR BE SUBJECTIVIST?

Based on that, one might suggest (as it recently was) that PNRs must introduce a three-place acquaintance relation. In addition to the two traditional slots, its instantiations would include the "standpoint from which" the subject is acquainted with objects (Brewer 2011, 2013; Campbell, 2009, 2011, 2016). This would allow for PFPs to be individuated by also (kinds of) things that occupy this relation slot.

However, this kind of proposal has some drawbacks. A first concern arises from how to delineate "standpoints". Indeed, since it was originally introduced to deal with type 2) TROs (as shown in Section 2), it was thought to include spatial relations (between the subject and the object perceived). Nonetheless, as TROs proliferated, authors started to make standpoints containing multiple distinct factors, such as temporal positions, sense modalities, attentional resources, lighting conditions, obstacles, etc. In this case, since these things do not share any distinctive property, PNR advocates seem to introduce a classification that merely reflects human interests. Standpoints are not, to this extent, akin to natural classes. Rather, as far as "standpoints" is conceived in this way, its introduction falls prey to non-objectivity since it is "settled [...] by fiat or arbitration" (Ellis, 2001, p.17). In fact, its proponents seem to be able to include anything they want under this classification.

What is even worse, the only motivating factor for including a certain type of thing under the umbrella term "standpoint" seems to be its capacity to handle TROs and parallel worries regarding objectivist PNRs. In this case, we can deem the present approach as ad hoc and thus unacceptable.

Another issue with this approach is that it requires giving up on an appealing aspect of naïve realism, namely the use of an easily understandable predicate ("... is acquainted with...") for any ordinary language speaker. For, the meaning of this predicate can be easily understood through translations or quasi-translations of familiar predicates,

such as "... is presented to...", "... is manifested to...", etc. However, the three-place "acquaintance" relation introduced by PRNs lacks any ordinary language equivalent. Therefore, not only are PRNs that use the three-place acquaintance relation at a disadvantage compared to those that use the traditional acquaintance relation by not defining their primitive concepts in terms of familiar terms of ordinary language, but it is also unclear how to define their acquaintance predicate at all.

In the light of all these objections, appealing to "standpoints" should be last the resource for PNRs.

However, it seems that PNRs do not need such a desperate measure. As Logue (2012b, p.222) suggests, naïve realists "can appeal to both relata in accounting for the phenomenal character of veridical experience". This means that PFPs of PNRs can be individuated not only by the properties of the acquainted things, but also by the properties of the acquainting subject. PNRs. Call "subjectivism" PNRs whose phenomenal explanations[100] use PFPs with this kind of identity conditions.

In this case, many distinct subjective properties can be appealed to do the relevant explanatory role. The most natural candidates are properties that concern "how the subject's attention is distributed"[101] (Christy, 2019, p. 2182), idiosyncrasies of their visual system, sense modalities, and conceptual powers (Allen, 2013; Brewer, 2013, French, 2014; French & Gomes, 2016, 2019; Pace, 2007). Recently, it has been suggested that neuro-computational properties are also fit for this job (Beck, 2019).

Specifying PFPs like this can make PNR easily overcome both positive and negative issues presented against objectivists without having the drawbacks of adding a third slot to the acquaintance relation. For, PRN advocates are no longer required to believe that there are necessary distinctions of acquainted things wherever there is a phenomenological difference. For example, having such-and-such phenomenological "coloring" neurological process can explain the phenomenological distinction between the subjects in Section 5 in a non-arbitrary fashion[102].

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[100] This expression refers to explanations (of the "in virtue of" kind) in which phenomenological facts are the explananda.

[101] Therefore, the mixed naive realist PFP-theorist can give an alternative account for 6).

[102] In contrast to attempts to select certain "environmental" properties as relative to a specific phenomenological color (which I deemed as lacking any exclusive and natural affinity), selecting neurological factors is non-arbitrary, as they have exclusive and natural connections with the relevant event, such as a causal one.

Chapter 3 – ON THE ORIGINAL FORMULATION OF THE CAUSAL ARGUMENT.

1. INTRODUCTION.

Within the analytic tradition, there exists a longstanding history of arguments that seek to undermine Naïve Realism by capitalizing on the notion that experiences are caused by the brain[103]. Notably, these arguments can be traced back to influential works like George Pitcher's (1971, Chap.1) "Theory of Perception" and Michael Hinton's (1973, Chap. IIb) "Experiences".

However, there are two main reasons why I have chosen not to extensively explore their arguments in the current thesis. Firstly, their arguments are not adequately developed to independently establish a compelling case against Naïve Realism. In the respective works, these arguments function more as brief objections to their own naïve-realistic perspectives of perception. In both cases, the authors quickly dismiss the premises and move on, making them more akin to "hit-and-run" objections rather than comprehensive refutations.

Consequently, this leads to the second reason why I have chosen not to address these arguments: they have had little impact on the broader discussion surrounding Naïve Realism. These formulations, despite being acknowledged by Robinson as potential objections to his own version, have not sparked substantial or sustained deliberation. Prior to their introduction and subsequent to their brief mention, there has been a lack of serious engagement with these arguments.

That being said, the purpose of this chapter is to closely examine the initial exposition of the causal argument as it was extensively discussed within the contemporary analytic context, specifically in the third chapter of Howard Robinson's book, "Perception".

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[103] Robinson (1984, Sect. IV; 1994, Chap. 3, sect. 8) traces the origins of his causal argument back to the seventh century. This argument, formulated as a reductio ad absurdum, begins with the supposed naïve realistic assumption that the object of a veridical perception is part of the perceptual experience. It posits that this event, situated at the end of a causal chain originating from the object through ordinary means, should have its parts located in the same place (or somewhere within it). However, according to Robinson (1994, p. 86), "things located at opposite ends of a causal chain cannot be identified". Therefore, naïve realism is deemed incorrect. Nevertheless, despite the potential accuracy of this historical reconstruction, the same reasons for not delving into versions of the causal argument put forth by Pitcher or Hinton are applicable here.

2. THE ARGUMENT.

The most structured presentation of Robinson's causal argument occurs as follows:

> 1.It is theoretically possible by activating some brain process which is involved in a particular type of perception to cause an hallucination which exactly resembles that perception in its subjective character. 2. It is necessary to give the same account of both hallucinating and perceptual experience when they have the same neural cause. Thus, it is not, for example, plausible to say that the hallucinatory experience involves a mental image or sense-datum, but that the perception does not, if the two have the same proximate—that is, neural—cause. These two propositions together entail that perceptual processes in the brain produce some object of awareness which cannot be identified with any feature of the external world—that is, they produce a sense-datum (Robinson, 2009[104], p.153).

Naturally, as it stands, the argument raises numerous questions regarding the precise implications of its premises, particularly the second premise, and how its conclusion can genuinely trouble Naïve Realists. This calls for a comprehensive exegetical analysis of Robinson's argumentation. This analysis will shed light on crucial aspects, including the intended meaning of "to give the same account of" in the given context, among other important considerations. Through this analysis, we can also better understand and evaluate the purported justifications for these premises.

A comprehensive exegetical study of Robinson's argument is presented in the Appendix to Chapter 3. In this section, a detailed analysis is conducted, leading to the reconstruction of the argument along the following lines:

(1) It is plausible that there exists a type of brain process B and a phenomenal character P, such that for any brain process b, if b exemplifies B, then b proximately causes the experience to instantiate P.

(2) There can be a veridical perception p and a hallucination h, such that the proximate causes of p and h are B.

[104] Hereafter, after cite the version of Robinson's (1994) third chapter as reprinted in Byrne and Logue's (2008) "Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings".

(3) For any events x and y, if there is an event property F such that x and y instantiate F, and all instances of F immediately cause an event of the same kind (thus forming a causal generality), then x and y are considered “same causes”. This definition was referred to as (GS).

(4) [From (1), (2), (3)] p and h have the same causes.

(5) F every two events x and y, if x and y have the same causes, then x and y are the same R-properties. This principle was referred to as (S).

(6) [From (5), 6)] p and h are the same immediate effects, thereby exemplifying the same R-properties.

(7) The property of having a certain kind of object of awareness is an R-property of both p and h.

(8) [From (6), (7)] p and h have the same kind of object of awareness.

(8) is inherently inconsistent with any form of Naïve Realism. As elucidated in the preceding chapters, Naïve Realism, whether in its ontological or phenomenal forms, relies on the belief that the object of perception is, to some extent, constituted by ordinary mind-independent entities. Thus, irrespective of the proposed object of awareness put forth by disjunctivists in the context of hallucinatory cases, it cannot be attributed to these entities. This is due to the fact that hallucinations can manifest without the presence of any suitable object in the traditional sense.

The remainder of this chapter focuses on presenting the potential counterarguments that disjunctivists could employ in response to Robinson's argument. In the next section, I provide some initial observations, including potential strategies for challenging premises (1) and (2) (although I acknowledge that disjunctivists may have less dialectical risk in questioning other premises). Additionally, I identify and discuss the crucial premise of the argument that disjunctivists may specifically target in their counterarguments.

3. SOME INITIAL REMARKS.

Since the argument is logically valid, evaluating its soundness requires an examination of the plausibility of its premises. According to Robinson, it is challenging to reject what, in my reconstruction of the argument, corresponds to premises (1) and (2).

In the Appendix to Chapter 3, 1) is referred to as the "plausibility statement" and thus demands specific empirical evidence. However, what constitutes this evidence? According to Robinson and virtually every proponent of the causal argument, it involves established facts regarding how manipulation of certain brain areas correlates with the corresponding phenomenological experiences of individuals during such procedures[105]. Furthermore, it appears that this brain manipulation alone is sufficient for the production of such phenomenological experiences. It is not as if the presence or absence of, for example, a type of environmental object would make a difference there. Additional support for premise (1) can be found in the broader understanding of the seemingly deterministic nature of the brain-mind interaction.

Given that (1) falls within the realm of scientific speculation, it is natural for skeptical doubts to arise. While it is undeniable that there is some level of interaction between brain processing and phenomenology, one can question whether, under what we know so far about the mind-brain interaction, generalities of, for instance, visual cortex stimulation lead to the exact same phenomenology (as we are assuming in a maximally determinate sense) for a wide range of individuals. After all, a causal generality – as mentioned by (S) – would because of the lawlikeness it has to involve, encompasses multiple organisms in different circumstances. This would imply, for example, that there exists a specific type of brain processing in my body, at this very moment as I write this text, that is replicable in yours, resulting in an exact perception of my laptop, my room, and so on. Some may argue that such claims push the boundaries of scientific plausibility as presupposed by (1). The skeptic would argue that until we have more information about the existence of a general psychophysical regularity like this, we should withhold judgment regarding the argument's conclusion. Rojas (2020), for instance, criticizes causal assumptions akin to (1) based on similar concerns.

Additionally, certain philosophers might argue not only that we currently lack evidence for (1), but also that we can never obtain such evidence, particularly for philosophical purposes. According to this viewpoint, relying on premises that are less

[105] See Sections 2, 2.1 and 3.2 an analogous discussion about the evidence we have for this claim.

than infallible (such as those based on empirical induction) can only yield conclusions that are similarly less than infallible. However, they would additionally contend that such fallibility is insufficient for philosophical purposes[106]. In their perspective, philosophy is distinct from empirical sciences, and its evidential requirements are more akin to those found in mathematics. This metaphilosophical stance would, naturally, reject the use of induction or abduction in philosophy[107].

However, I will not place additional emphasis on premises (1) and (2). I tend to agree with Robinson's perspective that targeting this foundation would be somewhat of a desperate endeavor. As I will argue later, the naïve realist position does not necessarily rely on these premises, as there are other premises that can be legitimately challenged.

Considering the current formulation of the argument, there remain five propositions that need to be addressed if a disjunctivist intends to undermine Robinson's argument. However, it should be noted that not all of these propositions are susceptible to refutation. For instance, (GS) is a mere sufficiency condition in the conceptual analysis of "same causes".

Aside from the consequential premises, there are only two crucial points that need to be evaluated in order to reject the argument. a) The plausibility of (S) as a standalone general causal principle. b) Whether the properties associated with having a specific kind of object of awareness, particularly the one disjunctivists would propose for perceptions, can be considered as p's R-property, when "something's R-property" is in such plausible interpretation of (S).

These two points, however, presuppose the understanding of "being an R-property of". As discussed in the Appendix to Chapter 3, there are only two explicit requirements that Robinson (2008, p.156-8) identified as necessary for the application of this concept. It is essential for us to delve deeper into these requirements to gain a better understanding of (S)'s implications.

The first general characteristic, as presented in Robinson's text, is that an object's R-properties are genuinely instantiated by that object. However, this observation may not significantly contribute to (S). As we have observed (and as Robinson himself

[106] This perspective could be advocated by a particular breed of "radical" analytical philosopher who maintains that the scope of philosophy is limited to conceptual analysis, as argued by Valcarenghi (2018).
[107] This objection is somewhat easier to address compared to the previous one. Firstly, as noted by philosophers like Timothy Williamson (2013, 2017), particularly in metaphysics, the support for many indisputably philosophical claims can only rely on abductive reasoning.

acknowledges), it is plausible that any two things, irrespective of their differences, share some common property.

Nevertheless, in our exegetical examination of Robinson (2008, p. 159), it becomes evident that his intention was not solely to assert that an R-property of something must be instantiated by that thing. Rather, his characterization aimed to exclude from properties related to the surroundings, distal causes, or effects from the set of properties that we expect, if we believed (S), to be instantiated by two events with "the same proximate causes". Intuitively, according to Robinson, we cannot reasonably expect that two events sharing the "same cause" would necessarily exhibit properties such as being 1 meter from an object X when one of these events happen to occur next to X.

Now, within the standard philosophical property taxonomy, there exists a distinction that appears to capture the opposition that Robinson aims to establish: the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. In this case, when considering two events with "the same" proximate causes, an (S) believer would expect that intrinsic properties are consistently instantiated by both events, while extrinsic properties may vary. Thus, if F is considered an R-property of x, then F is inherently intrinsic to x[108].

The second part of Robinson's (2008, p.157) original account of R-properties can be summarized as follows: a) if F is an R-property of x, then F is one of the most specific properties of x, and b) if F is an R-property of x, then the exactness of F is in line with natural laws or[109] F is quantifiable[110].

Once again, further exegetical analysis is required. For, the most natural interpretation of a) is in terms of relative property strength[111], suggesting that the R-

[108] Although the precise nature of what constitutes an intrinsic property is still a topic of debate, there are notable definitions that can provide a starting point for our discussion. One satisfactory starting point is provided by Lewis (1983, p. 197). According to his first definition, a property F is considered intrinsic to something x if a proposition that attributes F to x is entirely about x or y, where x is a part of y. His second definition states that F is intrinsic to x if x possesses F due to the way x is or the way y is, where x is a part of y. As a third alternative, F is considered intrinsic to x if, for any counterpart of x, x', x' also possesses F. On the other hand, Kim (1982) proposes that F is intrinsic to x if it is possible for F to be isolated from other entities distinct from x. The corresponding notions of extrinsicality can be derived by negating the defining features of each of these definitions.

[109] I have taken the liberty to make a modification to the logical operator in this statement, as in Robinson's original formulation, a conjunction is used. This modification is warranted due to the clear fact that the R-properties that are pertinent to the argument (specifically those associated with having a certain kind of object of awareness) are not susceptible to quantification in any plausible sense.

[110] Robinson (ibid, p.157) states that the similarity into which that immediate effects of same proximate are subsumed concerns all the "most specific and immediate characterization of the effect". In addition, that genre of descriptions satisfies "the kind of exactness that might answer to, or follow from, a natural law, and be susceptible to quantification" (ibid).

[111] In this case, F is stronger than G iff necessarily all F are G, but the converse is not true.

properties of an event would be its strongest properties[112]. However, this interpretation carries the drawback of assuming a sparse conception of universals from the outset (which Robinson never specified). Otherwise, if we were to adopt a maximalist conception of properties, it would render (S) immediately absurd due to statement a). This would imply[113] that two numerically distinct events would have to share properties as strong as those represented by expressions such as "being equal to x", which cannot be shared by two distinct events. Consequently, such properties could not be applicable across the different effects of "the same causes".

Perhaps Robinson had something else in mind. In his example of striking two "identical nails into identical walls with identical hammers with identical force" (ibid, p.156), he explicitly states that an R-property (relative to the corresponding "same" effects) cannot be, for example, "a nail penetrating a wall" (ibid, p.157), but rather something expressed by descriptions in the form of "a nail penetrating x cm (in the wall)".

There is a well-known relationship between the unqualified property of "penetration" and, for example, the specific property of penetrating 1 cm, as they represent a determinable and its respective determinate. Therefore, it seems that Robinson intended to propose that for a property to be an event's R-property, it must be maximally determinate (i.e., lacking a respective determinate).

Given the ongoing discussion, we can now proceed with a preliminary analysis of this concept. We can say that F is an R-property relative to x iff F is intrinsic to x ∧ F is maximally determinate ∧ the exactness of F is in line with natural laws (∨ F is susceptible to quantification).

4. WHICH PROPERTIES ARE ELIGIBLE TO BE INCLUDED IN NATURAL LAWS?

The issue that arises at this point concerns the final conjunct. As highlighted by Schurz (1995), the nature of what constitutes a natural law remains a topic of substantial debate. Equally contentious is the determination of which properties can be considered

[112] Hempel's (1965, 1968) exigence of "maximal specificity" of the reference class in inductive-statistical explanations, for example, understands "specificity" in a similar way (with the obvious difference, because he deals with classes, instead of properties, that he uses set containment to determine what is more/less specific).

[113] If one admits properties corresponding to both Loux's (1974) "impure predicates" and Armstrong's (1978b) "closed predicates", which, assuming a maximalist position on properties, would not be problematic.

eligible for inclusion in such propositions (or even whether such restrictions can be posited at all). In the subsequent discussion, I will endeavor to present the key contemporary accounts regarding the relationship between natural laws and properties. The aim is to assess whether any of these accounts can shed light on the properties that Robinson had in mind when formulating his definition of something's R-properties.

The initial comprehensive philosophical account of laws within the contemporary analytical tradition that addresses this issue is the perspective that natural laws, particularly deterministic ones, are simply true generalizations expressed in sentences of the form "all Fs are G"[114] (Hempel, 1942; Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948). However, as argued by Drewery (2005), proponents of this approach must impose additional requirements, as certain true "accidental generalizations" – such as "all my books are paperback" – clearly do not qualify as laws.

Efforts to resolve this issue have included additional restrictions on laws, such as defining them as lawlike claims, where "lawlikeness" is a semantic property of generalizations (Tooley, 1977, p. 668). A well-known but arguably insufficient criterion for lawlikeness is the use of predicates that do not refer to properties whose instantiation is dependent on specific individuals or points in spacetime (Carnap, 1947; 1966; part.IV, §21; Swinburne, 1968)[115]. Another variation is to propose that the relevant predicates are "not limited to a finite number of instances based solely on syntactical or semantical properties" (Fetzer, 1974, p.34).

Another approach that restricts the predicates eligible for lawlikeness stems from Quine (1960, §10; 1974, §10), who considered "observational predicates" as those whose interpretation remains relatively stable when confronted with "collateral information" (information beyond what is obtained through sensory perception). Building on this perspective, Salmon (1963) proposed the use of "purely ostensive predicates" in descriptive generalizations within science. Essentially, Salmon argues that objects share the same purely ostensive predicate iff there is a specific way in which they visually resemble each other at a given time, so that this resemblance does not extend to non-instances of that predicate. While these definitions may differ in semantics, they are

[114] Of course, most of the nowadays laws will take the form of a function between distinct natural magnitudes. However, as Armstrong (1982, chap.7) does, we can simply face it as a (perhaps infinite) conjunction of generalizations of the above form.

[115] The aforementioned approaches, including Salmon's, aim to safeguard the regularist perspective by excluding certain evident instances of accidental generalizations from the domain of laws, most notably Goodman's (1954) well-known grue/bleen example.

essentially equivalent and align with the contemporary notion of "visual properties" within the ongoing discussion.

Other models, which do not place as much emphasis on propositional aspects, have also emerged. David Armstrong (1978, 1983, 1991, 1993) provides a notable example of such type of model. He developed a comprehensive metaphysical framework, where laws are regarded as contingent relational states of affairs that hold between distinct universals, and so it has nothing to do with linguistic facts[116]. This relation is referred to as "nomic necessitation", wherein if F nomically necessitates G in world w, then all instances of F are G in world w[117].

Armstrong adopts a minimalist perspective on properties. However, he does not explicitly address the question of which universals exactly exist, as he sees this as a task primarily to be carried out through a posteriori means by "total science". Nevertheless, he does provide certain general constraints on universals. The following list outlines the main constraints he proposes. One, every universal is, has been, or will be instantiated by entities in the natural world. Two, all particulars that instantiate the same universal exhibit some specific resemblance to each other. Three, each universal confers specific (active or passive) causal powers upon its instantiated particulars, and different universals bestow distinct causal powers. This notion aligns with Armstrong's Eleatic Principle (Armstrong, 1997, p. 41)[118].

These criteria, when combined, enable Armstrong to exclude certain predicates that represent properties from the realm of real universals. Firstly, fictional, negative, and disjunctive predicates do not refer to genuine properties because they do not straightforwardly fulfill the first and second criteria.

The same applies to predicates that semantically "restrict their application to a finite number of particulars" (Armstrong, 1978, p.14), referred to as "closed" in his terminology. An example of a semantically closed predicate can be seen in predicates

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[116] Michael Tooley (1977) and Fred Dretske (1977) put forth accounts that align with the aforementioned spirit, although they differ from Armstrong in their Platonistic views on the nature of universals, as opposed to Armstrong's Aristotelian perspective. However, unlike Armstrong, these philosophers did not offer extensive tools for identifying properties, which is of utmost importance for our current purposes.

[117] Regarding the nomic necessitation relation, Armstrongians do not provide much more elaboration beyond what has been mentioned. This lack of further development is often considered a significant limitation of their account, as noted by critics such as van Fraassen (1989, p. 96).

[118] Shoemaker (1980, p. 115) formalizes this criterion using the concept of "conditional power". According to Shoemaker, an object has power P conditionally upon the possession of a set of properties Q if it possesses a property r such that having the properties in Q, together with r, is causally sufficient for having P. On the other hand, having the properties in Q alone is not causally sufficient for having P.

corresponding to definite descriptions or identity predicates, such as “is the heaviest existing object” or “is identical to the moon”.

Additionally, predicates that are “impure”, meaning their application involves reference to a specific particular, also fall into the category of “non-property-esque” predicates. This mainly includes one-place predicates in English that are formed from definite descriptions formed from n-place predicates and a proper noun, such as “is a/the Walmart employee” (which is derived from the two-places predicate “...is an employee of...” and a proper noun). As a result, “relational properties” are excluded from the realm of genuine properties according to Armstrong’s framework (Armstrong, 1978, chap.19, §2).

Especially, for that reason, spatiotemporal “properties”, such as “being 100 miles away from the moon” or “being green after a certain time”, do not qualify as universals according to Armstrong's framework. These properties do not meet the criteria outlined by Armstrong, particularly because they lack the required resemblance and causal power features.

Although Armstrong does not explicitly outline identity conditions for universals beyond these negative specifications and the aforementioned clauses, he leans towards favoring physical properties, such as specific[119] masses, sizes, and shapes[120], as the preferred candidates for universals. This aligns with a naturalistic perspective.

One potential concern with Armstrong’s view is that it primarily focuses on properties of ordinary objects and not events, which is the subject matter of our inquiry. However, with some minor adaptations, we can address this issue. According to Armstrong, the most natural way to account for events is to conceive of them as changes in the instantiation of one or more universals within the same thing. These changes can involve the suppression, acquisition, or substitution of corresponding instantiations

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[119] This term is understood in relation to the relative strength of properties within a specific natural class, such as exact masses or sizes. In this context, maximally determinate properties are those that do not allow for further variations or shades. For instance, a color predicate that represents a true universal would be one that does not admit any additional shades (Armstrong, 1978b, chap22, §1). Regarding “quantified” properties, they are represented by predicates that use singletons rather than intervals. Predicates using intervals typically correspond to classes of closely related properties.

[120] Although Armstrong admits the possibility of more controversial properties, such as color properties (if they adhere to the maximality rule) and substance properties (e.g., “being made of gold”), he also categorizes them as complex properties within his ontology. Substance properties, in particular, are considered relationally “structural”, meaning that their instances must instantiate another property and have a specific relation between them. Kinds of particles, like “being an electron”, are also prima facie allowed by Armstrong. However, he considers them complex properties that consist of a conjunction of characteristics such as a charge of -1.602×10^{-19} coulombs, a rest mass of 9.10908 × 10-31 kilograms, a spin of ½, and so on (Armstrong, 1978b, p.65).

(Armstrong, 1978, p.153). Therefore, causation, in this framework, is understood as a relation between changes.

Armstrong recognizes that an individualistic conception of causation should not be the central focus of his ontology, as causality often exhibits lawful patterns. In response to this, Armstrong (1978, chap. 24)[121] attempts to adapt his nomic necessitation framework to accommodate causal laws. In this framework, complex properties (G) denoted by predicates of the form "undergoes E during t" can be nomically necessitated. Here, E represents a finite sequence of properties of objects and t denotes a lapse of time. The complex property (F) that nomically necessitates G consists of both causally relevant relational properties (including the situational factors ordinarily called "background conditions") and non-relational properties that are instantiated by the objects involved in the causes.

5. WILL ANY CONCEPTUALIZATION OF PROPERTIES THAT ARE ELIGIBLE TO BE INCLUDED IN NATURAL LAWS PROVIDE A PLAUSIBLE INTERPRETATION OF (S) AS A GENERAL CAUSAL PRINCIPLE THAT CAN ALSO MAINTAIN ITS FUNCTION WITHIN THE CAUSAL ARGUMENT?

I believe that with the explanations provided, we have gained a considerable understanding of contemporary perspectives on the conception of natural laws and the properties/predicates associated with them. This knowledge allows us to address the two points mentioned earlier: a) whether there is an understanding of something's R-properties that makes (S) a plausible general causal principle, and b) whether such an interpretation of "something's R-property" would include, in the case of an experience, the property of having a specific type of object of awareness.

As we have seen, it is widely accepted that laws do not involve "properties" that are individuated based on particulars, such as traditional objects, instantiations, or even specific points in space and time. Furthermore, as demonstrated earlier, if we interpret "something's R-properties" accordingly, (S) would immediately become absurd without

[121] Armstrong later abandoned the theory discussed above in his 1980 book and chose not to address causal laws. The reason for this change of mind is attributed to Anscombe's (1971) skeptical criticisms of the generalist view of causation. However, in my opinion, the main issue with Armstrong's 1978 account is that it does not align with the non-relational requirement of universals discussed earlier.

the appropriate restriction. For instance, it would imply that effects of "same causes" must always occur in relation to a specific space-time point or a certain particular.

A potential objection arises here, suggesting that these a priori conditions on the composition of natural laws, which excludes, for example, impure or closed properties/predicates, may not be essential features of natural laws themselves. This objection is exemplified in Toodley's (1977, p.686) statement:

> All the fruit in Smith's garden at any time are apples. When one attempts to take an orange into the garden, it turns into an elephant. Bananas so treated become apples as they cross the boundary, while pears are resisted by a force that cannot be overcome. Cherry trees planted in the garden bear· apples, or they bear nothing at all. If all these things were true, there would be a very strong case for its being a law that all the fruit in Smith's garden are apples. (p. 686)

Therefore, disjunctivists could object that restrictions such as those presupposed by (S) are implausible because there are no necessary criteria that determine which properties are "eligible to be included in natural laws". They would argue that there is no predefined set of properties or inherent criterion that governs the inclusion of properties in natural laws. They may point to cases like Toodley's example to illustrate that there are, at least possibly, laws that do not adhere to these criteria.

A proponent of, for example, the non-impurity criterion for natural laws could respond by arguing that Toodley's case (and similar cases) is indeed a possibility. However, they would maintain that the properties eligible to be included in natural laws they were talking about are specifically limited to the features observed in the laws of the actual world[122].

They could further propose that based on our current knowledge of the laws in the actual world, we are justified – in a meta-inductive fashion[123] – in making general claims about the features that natural laws should have, such as the exclusion of impure predicates/properties. Although these requirements on natural laws may not be accessible a priori, one can argue that we have a posteriori reasons to believe that the real universals composing the laws of the actual world are, for example, always pure.

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[122] In this case, "laws" in merely possible worlds would need to be ontologically accounted for in a different manner than by positing the existence of universals. Alternative explanations, such as coherence aspects, may be proposed to account for the "existence" of laws in these possible worlds.

[123] Schurz (2008, 2019) introduces a distinction between the application of inductive methods at the level of events and the higher-level inference we make from these lower-level inductive procedures.

Similarly, as we can conceive of merely possible scenarios where events with "same causes" are distinct in every way that (S) would consider them the same, (S) must be understood as a meta-inductive principle that applies within the limitations of the actual world (and, at most, some counterfactual worlds). However, considering that perceptions are widely accepted to be instantiated in the actual world, or at least in close counterfactual worlds, this should not pose a significant challenge for the causal argument.

With that in mind, let us now explore whether the restrictions on properties discussed in the previous section can be helpful in formulating a version of (S) that satisfies both points a) and b).

In the first place, it is important to note that in order for the definition of "something's R-properties" to be applicable to a plausible version of (S), it must not only include properties that are instantiated by that thing and are not impure or closed. For, there may be cases where effects resulting from the "same causes" exhibit properties that can vary among them, and these properties are neither impure nor closed. For instance, in a version of Robinson's example of striking nails, two actions of striking nails could result in different outcomes, such as one nail penetrating a red object (if the first striking is with a red nail) and another nail penetrating a green object (since the nail is now green). These properties, or the corresponding predicates, plausibly do not have their application semantically restricted to individuals, nor do they involve reference to specific particulars.

In light of this information, we must explore additional possibilities for constraining something's R-properties that would render (S) a plausible general causal principle. It is clear that there are numerous ways to conceive properties that could be included in a natural law, but cannot, even in a preliminary manner, be partially analyzed as "being something's R-property", as doing so would render (S) immediately implausible.

For instance, the restrictions based on visual properties, as we have seen with the example of visual predicates that can be reducible to visual properties, may not adequately fulfill the requirements. We cannot expect events caused by the same causes, such as two strikes of a hammer on a nail with a certain mass, to have identical visual properties. The previous example of the green and red nail illustrates this point clearly. Therefore, the current restriction renders (S) an implausible principle since we can allow for "contingent" visual properties across events stemming from the same causes.

Another potential constraint on laws, often known as the "Eleatic Principle", suggests that laws confer specific causal powers to objects or events. In this scenario, (S) would imply that effects arising from the same causes consistently possess the same causal powers.

However, Disjunctivists could raise objections to this idea based on points a) and b). In terms of the first point, it is plausible to argue that there can be effects resulting from the same causes that have distinct causal powers. For instance, in the case of the modified hammer scenario, the first event may cause a reaction in Ferdinand the Bull, who strongly dislikes the color red, resulting in a different effect compared to the second event, where Ferdinand remains indifferent to the color green.

Furthermore, many proponents of the disjunctivist view would argue that interpreting (S) in this way would lead to the conclusion that perceptions and hallucinations share the same causal power. According to these disjunctivists, hallucinations exhibit the same behavioral and cognitive dispositions as perceptions (Martin, 2001; 2002). In fact, William Fish (2009) takes it a step further by suggesting that what defines hallucinations is their shared consequences with corresponding perceptions. In this case, for instance, someone hallucinating a glass of water would have similar thoughts (such as "there is a glass of water in front of me" or expressing thirst) and potentially exhibit similar actions (such as reaching out for the glass) as someone who is actually perceiving a glass of water[124].

Another strategy proposed by Armstrong for defining properties that can be in laws of nature is to rely on the determinations made by science itself[125]. According to this idea, Science plays a crucial role in identifying whether a predicate designates a property or not. For this reason, as we have seen, many discussions on properties revolve around well-known physical or chemical features. Properties like mass and charge, for instance, frequently appear in the literature on laws of nature. Therefore, a potential approach, if one wishes to adopt an a posteriori method of discovering universals, is to draw upon the findings of (Perceptual) Psychology, especially when it has reached a sufficient level of development (Burge, 2005, 2011).

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[124] In the upcoming chapter, I will demonstrate that embracing this suggestion comes at a cost. Firstly, it involves denying the intuitions that support the existence of externally-individuated thoughts (Putnam, 1975; Burge, 1979). Secondly, it requires relinquishing the traditional naive-realistic explanation of demonstrative thoughts (Campbell, 2002, 2011). However, it is important to note that the purpose of this work is not to exhaustively argue for positions that challenge the assumptions in the causal argument. Instead, it aims to provide an overview of the various paths that disjunctivists could pursue in doing so.

[125] See also Ellis (2001, 2002) and Bird (2002, 2007).

The problem with using science to define something's R-properties is that there is no indication from within the domain of scientific authority regarding the instantiation of properties across perceptual experiences, which is the subject of debate between disjunctivists and antidisjunctivists. As I will argue in the third section of the upcoming chapter, the properties that science can identify in relation to experiences mainly revolve around phenomenal or representational aspects, as well as (cognitive or behavioral) functions or dispositions. However, the kind of argument we are discussing here requires a purely metaphysical property, such as the property of becoming acquainted with a specific type of thing (such as mind-independent entities). This kind of property, analogously to axiological ones, is not directly or indirectly observable, and therefore, its existence or instantiation cannot be determined by science. As a result, this strategy cannot yield a version of (S) that requires hallucinations to have the same type of object of awareness as neurologically matching perceptions.

Given that the other requirements, such as the semantic nature of predicates advocated by Carnap and Swinburne, which rely on their instantiation being independent of specific individuals or points in spacetime, or Fetzer's requirement of non-limitation to a finite number of instances, are each equivalent to one of the suggestions for restricting properties involved in natural laws, we can conclude that the present discussion encompasses these possibilities. Therefore, in the realm of contemporary considerations about the properties suitable for laws of nature, there is no candidate for analyzing "something's R-property" that can both form a plausible version of (S) from which one can derive that hallucinations have the same object of awareness as matching perceptions.

As we discussed earlier in the chapter, there were other proposed strengthening conditions put forth by Robinson to define x's R-properties, such as F being intrinsic to x and F being a maximally determinate. However, these conditions alone were insufficient to provide a plausible version of (S) that could establish the sameness of objects of awareness in experiences resulting from the same neurological causes. This led to the introduction of the additional requirement that these properties should also align with the notion of properties that can fit into natural laws. Therefore, one possible avenue to explore, in light of these considerations, is to combine some of the proposed notions for defining R-properties with the presently discussed conditions, in order to develop an interesting version of (S) that is suitable for the argument purposes.

This alternative amendment of the definition of "something's R-property" presents a potentially promising solution as it addresses one of the previously mentioned problems

(the ones relative to point a)) concerning the interpretation of properties using the concept of properties compatible with natural laws. The concern was that it would imply the necessity of sharing numerous properties in events resulting from "same causes" that were not actually necessary, as demonstrated by the modified hammer scenario.

However, including the requirement of intrinsicness or maximal determinateness would not be helpful in achieving a plausible version of (S). In the modified hammer scenario, it is possible to design the distinctions between the properties of the relevant "same" effects as intrinsic properties of the objects involved. These distinctions could involve differences in their inherent substance while resulting in the same physical consequences. Since whatever is intrinsic to the objects involved in a particular event is also intrinsic to the event itself (as events are inconceivable without the participating objects), these events, resulting from the same causes, are intrinsically distinct. Therefore, the criteria of purity or closeness, even when combined with intrinsicness, would not serve the intended purpose. This also demonstrates why the requirement of intrinsicness, on its own, would not suffice.

This newly modified type of case also demonstrates that the requirement of maximal determinateness is also of limited assistance. In such cases, the implemented distinctions between the objects can themselves be considered maximal determinates, leading to a differentiation of maximal determinates (which are also pure and non-closed) among the intrinsic properties of these objects.

Moreover, these examples highlight the limitations of other similar combinations that utilize additional factors in establishing a plausible version of (S), particularly in terms of causal powers. As we have observed, variations in the objects involved in events governed by the same causal generalities can result in distinct causal powers exhibited by these events. However, it is evident that these causal powers can also be attributed to maximal determinates, intrinsic properties, or pure/non-closed properties without resolving the challenges faced by (S). For instance, consider a massive object like the Earth causing two objects of the same mass, one sharp and the other not, to displace in the same manner (when released from the same height). While both objects may have the same displacement and fall under the same gravitational generalities, the sharp object movement possesses additional causal powers (such as the potential to cause harm if it were to hit someone below) that the other object does not possess[126].

[126] A similar argument can be applied to visual properties. If we consider visual properties to be intrinsic/maximally determinate (meaning they are pure and non-closed, which is generally accepted), then

At this juncture, it is worth noting that the present disjunctivist defense heavily relied on the possibility that events resulting from the same causes can have distinct corresponding properties due to the involvement of relevantly different objects. In light of this, one could propose a specific requirement for the intrinsicness clause used to interpret "some event's R-properties", specifically targeting what Kim (1969, 1976) refers to as the events' "constitutive properties". Although authors generally do not provide a specific definition for these properties, one way to conceptualize them is as the intrinsic properties of events that are not derived from the objects involved. For proponents who view events as reducible to changes, such as Kim himself, these constitutive properties can be identified as the properties that change (in their correct succession order). An example of such properties could be the "type of movement" exhibited in two dances performed by different individuals but following the same choreography.

Even with this additional specification, arriving at a plausible version of (S) is still challenging. This is demonstrated by the work of Yablo (1992), Wilson (1999), and Shoemaker (2001), who present numerous conceivable cases of causal nonspecificity. As Wilson (2021) summarizes, contemporary science includes many generalizations that pertain to determinable properties.

In the context of causality, this implies that the properties involved in causal generalizations, which are argued to correspond to the constitutive properties of specific causes and their corresponding effects, may not be maximally determinate[127]. Therefore, it is possible that there exist determinate properties within these specific events. These determinate properties could, for example, participate in more specific causal laws[128].

Taking into account (GS), however, this would lead to an inconsistency. It would classify these less specific causal generalities as "same causes", while, at the same time,

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the type of examples involving Ferdinand the bull would be sufficient to demonstrate the implausibility of transferring such R-properties. However, if visual properties are not considered intrinsic/maximally determinate, then the combination strategy proposed earlier could potentially help salvage the plausibility of (S).

[127] Of course, disjunctivists could raise objections to the interpretation of (S) when considering the existence of causal generalities that are independent of the intrinsic factors of the objects involved in the events. Indeed, it is evident that many causal generalities do not conform to this pattern. However, antidisjunctivists could respond by suggesting that (S), as conceived in this context, is a principle specifically applicable to causal generalities that exclusively involve the constitutive properties of events. They could argue that this applies to the proposed causal relationship between the brain and phenomenology. Or at least, for the sake of argument, let's suppose that this is the case.

[128] Actually, as argued by Fales (1990) and Wilson (2012), the case of perception is particularly relevant. Our perceptual organs are not capable of capturing all maximally specific shapes and colors, which means that these maximally determinate qualities are causally irrelevant (relative to our sensory system). Instead, it seems that less determinate properties play a more significant role in perception.

(S) would demand that the events associated with these generalities – which may be involved in different, more specific causal generalities and therefore have distinct corresponding determinates as constitutive properties – always have the same maximally determinate properties.

In light of this inconsistency, antidisjunctivists may propose redefining "same causes" by modifying (GS) to include only the most specific causal laws. This means that causes that only share the same determinable causal law would not be considered "same cases".

However, this approach would beg the question against disjunctivists. As I will explore in the next chapter, some disjunctivists may argue that, when it comes to sensory experiences, the most specific causal generality does not solely involve brain processes. Specifically, they may claim that veridical perceptions involve a specific type of brain process in conjunction with the presence of certain environmental factors. On the other hand, neurologically matching hallucinations would have the same type of brain process but lack the corresponding environmental factors. Therefore, disjunctivists could argue that the presence or absence of these environmental factors plays a crucial role in determining the specific causal generality for a given experience[129].

The conclusion of this section is that there appears to be no interpretation of R-properties that renders (S) a plausible and comprehensive principle capable of encompassing, in its "same effect" clause, the property associated with being aware of a certain type of thing. In particular, the requirements of (S), in any interpretation of "same effects," are deemed implausible as they disregard various potential differences among effects resulting from the same causes in general. Specifically, the requirement of "same causes" proved insufficient in implying any relevant sameness of effects for two reasons. First, it overlooks multiple scenarios where effects falling under the same causal generalities may exhibit significant distinctions mainly due to differences in their corresponding objects. Second, it disregards the possibility of events falling under nonspecific causal generalities. Proposed amendments to (S) that address these concerns have proven ineffective in providing a compelling general causal principle.

6. FINAL REMARKS.

[129] In fact, part of Martin's causal argument aims to refute this possibility, an idea that will be known as (IR). However, in the next chapter, I will explore the ways in which disjunctivists can address and overcome these challenges.

The discussion revealed that any plausible interpretation of “being something's R-property” and, consequently, Robinson's (S) that would allow this principle to maintain its role in the current form of the causal argument would lead to an implausible general causal principle. In fact, it is questionable whether the type of argument raised by Robinson truly provides a fruitful opposition to Naïve Realism and Disjunctivism.

This is because it relies on a synthetic principle (in a Kantian sense), such as (S), that must possess certain indispensable characteristics in order to function as intended. The challenge here lies in establishing a general consequential fact that assumes, in its antecedent, a certain type of property that is instantiated by supposedly common causal factors between perceptions and hallucinations. This property characterizes “being the same cause as”. Additionally, there is a need to establish a relation that applies between particulars and universals, such as “being something’s R-property”, which accounts for the sameness of effects. However, it is crucial that this relation is established between perceptions and a specific property, and the transfer of such property to hallucinations be undesirable for disjunctivists.

However, despite the need for a principle with these specific requirements, it seems that no such principle has emerged thus far. The challenge of establishing a general consequential fact that encompasses the desired properties and relationships remains unresolved. While various attempts have been made to formulate a principle that captures the desired sameness of effects between perceptions and hallucinations, none have successfully met the criteria. This indicates that the task of finding a comprehensive and satisfactory principle within the framework of synthetic principles, such as (S), remains an ongoing challenge for proponents of the present type of causal argument.

Chapter 4 – AGAINST LOCAL SUPERVENIENCE FOR HALLUCINATIONS: How to resist Martin's causal argument.

1. INTRODUCTION

The argument known as the "causal argument", developed by Michael Martin (2004) in his influential paper "The Limits of Self Awareness"[130], is currently regarded as the primary challenge to Naïve Realism (Soteriou, 2016, 2020; Fish, 2010; Tim & French, 2021). The primary objective of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive examination and analysis of such an argument, with a particular emphasis on exploring potential strategies that naïve realists could employ in response to it.

1.1. The causal argument as an argument from hallucination.

Firstly, it is important to recognize that the causal argument can be understood as a specific type of argument from hallucination, as outlined by Snowdon (1992, 2005b). This category of argument generally consists of two steps: the base case, which involves characterizing a hallucination in a particular manner, and the spreading step, where one argues that this characterization also applies to a matching perception. The underlying contention is that this compatibility poses a challenge to certain accounts of perceptions, typically Naïve Realism or Direct Realism.

In the base case of the causal argument, the characterization of hallucinations is expressed through a relation that can be instantiated by specific properties and sensory episodes. This relation is denoted by the predicate "...is the fundamental property of...". As a result, it necessitates that the second element of the relation be an instance of the corresponding property. Accordingly, the argument in the base case asserts that an arbitrary hallucination has a certain fundamental property (hereafter, "FP^h" will stand for the fundamental property of the arbitrary hallucination).

Of course, understanding the argument requires us to characterize this relation. According to Martin (2004, p. 60), the fundamental property of something is defined as "that in virtue of which [this thing] has the nature it does". Martin's (2004, 2006) account

[130] However, it can be traced back to Robinson's (1986, 1994). Furthermore, Martin's argument is also defended by Sollberger (2007, 2008, 2012).

of the fundamental properties presupposes a specific ontology. He posits that objects and events generally have their natures defined by properties organized in a hierarchical manner (Martin, 2006, p. 361). This implies that every existing entity possesses a series of properties, interconnected through the relation of being more specific than. Moreover, within this ontology, each entity instantiates only one hierarchical series of properties, with the fundamental property representing the most specific property associated with it[131].

Upon quick reflection, contemplating fundamental properties as outlined in this account (assuming no additional qualifications are provided, which entail that they include, for instance, spatiotemporal aspects) would naturally raise skepticism regarding the plausibility of spreading FP^h to veridical perceptions. Regrettably, Martin does not say much more about how to account for something's FP or "nature". Nevertheless, when pertinent to the discussion, particularly in Section 3.2, I will dedicate time to exploring potential candidates for understanding fundamental properties in a manner that is charitable towards the potential plausibility of the argument's premises.

Sollberger presents an alternative perspective on fundamental properties, approaching them from a phenomenological standpoint (Sollberger, 2012, pp.583-4). According to Sollberger, if F is the fundamental property of x (where x is a sensory experience), then x's possession of F determines x's phenomenal character.

Despite their differences, both accounts commonly assume that the conventional understanding of FP^h involves either acquaintance with mental images (for sense data theorists) or specific intentional contents (for representationists) (Martin, 2004, pp.38-40).

1.2. The Screening off part: why naïve realists find such spreading undesirable.

In Section 2, I will explore in depth how the causal argument spreads FP^h to matching perceptions. However, before delving into that, it is essential to provide additional details on how the argument operates and why the spreading of FP^h from a hallucination to a veridical perception poses an undesirable conclusion for Naïve Realism.

[131] In this case, one can observe a similarity between Martin's fundamental properties and natural kinds, as defined by philosophers like Ellis (2001, 2002).

The "screening off" part of the argument aims to demonstrate this undesirability. Its rationale, as outlined by Martin (2004, pp.58-63), is as follows. It starts by assuming that Naïve Realists attribute different fundamental properties to veridical perceptions compared to matching hallucinations (ibid, pp. 41-2). In other words, naïve realists must adopt a disjunctivist standpoint. This is because, according to Naïve Realism, the fundamental property of perceptions involves acquaintance with a specific environmental entity, which is a requirement that hallucinations cannot fulfill.

The argument then proceeds to assert that FP^h, which is "spread" to perceptions, must also serve as *their* fundamental property. In other words, it must fulfill, with respect to perceptions, the role established by Martin or Sollberger in the previous paragraph, rather than being merely instantiated by these events. After all, if these properties play such roles in hallucinations, there is no initial reason to believe they would behave differently in perceptions.

In this case, the line of reasoning suggests that we should not be disjunctivists. Whatever explanatory role the additional property proposed by naïve realism could have in perceptions (with regard to their nature, phenomenology, etc.), FP^h, which is already forced to be present in perceptions according to the argument, would serve the same function. Therefore, the postulation of the additional property becomes theoretically redundant or unnecessary. A version of the principle of Occam's razor in its explanatory sense would guide us towards abandoning such a postulation. In other words, FP^h "screens off" the naïve-realistic feature.

Notice that the argument may remain neutral regarding the specific intrinsic nature of FP^h. What is important for the argument is the theoretical or explanatory *function* that these properties must supposedly possess as fundamental properties, particularly when instantiated by perceptions.

1.3. Conventional approaches to challenge the causal argument.

Most of the existing strategies to counter the causal argument focus on addressing its screening off part. Since this part is based on the widely accepted methodological principle of avoiding unnecessary theoretical entities, the common approach is to challenge the claim that FP^h can fulfill the same explanatory roles as the naïve-realistic property, and so FP^h should not "take its job". There are two primary methods of accomplishing this task.

The first strategy is Martin's (2004, 2006) approach, which argues that although there may be the spreading of FP^h (and thus it is instantiated by the perception), FP^h is not the *perception's* fundamental property (Martin, 2004, pp.63-8). As a result, it does not fulfill the theoretical roles associated with fundamental properties. Therefore, the explanatory function of the naïve realistic property in relation to perceptions remains "unrivaled", and so there is no methodological obligation to abandon it.

Of course, this approach places the burden on disjunctivists to indicate the nature of PF^h and why, contrary to initial expectations, while it may fulfill a specific explanatory role for hallucinations, it cannot perform the same function when instantiated by perceptions. In Martin's particular case, the justification for this distinction lies in the trivial instantiation of PF^h by perceptions, which is a mere consequence of the fact that nothing can be numerically different from itself. Consequently, it cannot be considered their fundamental property. However, this triviality of instantiation does not apply to the hallucinatory case, allowing them to be considered as potential candidates for FP^h.

In Martin's approach, FP^h pertains to being introspectively indiscriminable from a veridical perception of a certain phenomenology. However, this line of reasoning gives rise to certain concerns. Firstly, it appears implausible to assert that the nature of hallucinations, or what accounts for their phenomenology, is solely based on being introspectively indiscriminable from certain episodes. In fact, this seems to invert the natural order of explanation, which posits that hallucinations are indiscriminable from perceptions due to their inherent phenomenological similarity (Tye, 2007), rather than the reverse. Furthermore, Martin's specific account has encountered criticism from various scholars in recent years and is currently far from a widely accepted viewpoint (Siegel, 2004, 2008; Farkas, 2006; Hawthorne & Kovakovich, 2006; Byrne & Logue, 2008; Smith, 2008; Sturgeon, 2008).

Indeed, one of the primary concerns with Martin's approach of circumventing the causal argument is the absence of a plausible candidate property that satisfies both the criteria of being a potential FP^h and possessing a distinct aspect when instantiated by perceptions, which would plausibly allow us to think that they are preventive of the explanations associated with fundamental properties. Over the years, no such property has been identified, and it appears unlikely that one will emerge in the future. Consequently, an alternative approach may be adopted to address the screening off part of the causal argument.

Logue (2013) presents an alternative account that challenges the screening off part of the argument. According to this view, it is acknowledged that FP^h spreads to perceptions and can fulfill the same explanatory functions in both perceptions and hallucinations. However, Logue goes further and argues that naïve realistic properties possess additional theoretical and explanatory virtues that are exclusive to them. In this perspective, veridical perceptions require a broader range of explanations compared to matching hallucinations. As a result, Logue denies that FP^h is explanatorily equivalent to the naïve realistic feature, asserting that the former would not "take" the latter's (explanatory) job.

Indeed, there are several theoretical or explanatory virtues that are claimed to be exclusive to Naïve Realism. Examples of these supposed virtues can be found at the General Introduction. In fact, if Naïve Realism did not possess any advantages over its non-disjunctivist rivals, such as sense data theory or representational accounts, then, for dialectical-methodological reasons, the postulation of Naïve Realism would have to be abandoned in favor of these theories. (In fact, in such a scenario, the causal argument would be unnecessary to reject Naïve Realism in the first place.) From an economic standpoint, these theories would be more favorable as they do not require the postulation of a supplementary fundamental property, like Naïve Realism does alongside FP^h.

While Logue's strategy presents a more promising approach against the screening off part of the argument, it also brings about significant dialectical drawbacks for Disjunctivism, although these drawbacks may be arguably justified. This is not solely due to its lesser ontological and conceptual economy compared to non-disjunctivist rivals (a burden that disjunctivists have faced from the outset, as I indicated), but also because it assumes a heterogeneous nature of perceptions. This ontological complexity can be seen as more compromising than simply introducing new entities into one's ontology. Moreover, accepting Logue's strategy introduces another dialectical issue for disjunctivism, namely the need to acknowledge a "partial screening off" of the naïve-realistic property. This is because some aspects that the property aims to explain, such as phenomenology, can now be accounted for simultaneously by FP^h. Additionally, Logue's account has the drawback of significantly restricting the pool of candidates for FP^h, as they can only be compatible with perceptions. Consequently, disjunctivists are forced, for example, to dismiss accounts like sense data theory outright.

In this case, it is undeniable that the causal argument poses significant challenges for naïve realists, even without taking into account its screening off part. Therefore, it

would be highly advantageous for naïve realism to find a way to counter the first part of the argument. Rejecting the base case is deemed unacceptable, as "[o]f course, the disjunctivist should offer an account of hallucinations" (Tőzsér, 2009, p.56). Consequently, the only viable option for naïve realists is to challenge the spreading step. This chapter aims to address this very goal[132].

The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, I will outline the basis on which the causal argument establishes the spread of FP^h to perceptions, highlighting a premise that disjunctivists should focus their resistance on. Additionally, in this section, I present and swiftly dismiss a flawed argument for this premise that is often cited as a justification for it in versions of the causal argument. Following that, I will examine the primary source of justification that antidisjunctivists should emphasize to support this premise, which is as well as the aspect that disjunctivists should focus on to resist the causal argument. This analysis will provide two distinct reasons that collectively establish the premise. The main contribution of the chapter will revolve around demonstrating the potential sources of resistance for the first reason (Section 3) and the second reason (Section 4).

2. HOW TO SPREAD FP^h TO PERCEPTIONS.

The causal argument proposes that the spreading of FP^h occurs through two premises:

(1) Anything that is internal to a hallucinator can also be reproduced in a perceptual case.
(2) FP^h is locally supervening.

(1) suggests that there can be counterparts that are intrinsically identical but differ in terms of being either a perception or a hallucination. This can be demonstrated by

[132] This is where the significance of the present chapter becomes apparent. Despite the fact that, as mentioned earlier, the causal argument poses a significant challenge for Naïve Realism, it has surprisingly received limited critical attention in the literature, particularly regarding Martin's specific version. To the best of my knowledge, Martin, Logue, and Moran (2019, 2022) are the only authors whose attempt to refute the argument was relevantly debated. However, as demonstrated, Martin's solution offers little promise, and Logue's approach, while effective, comes with the drawbacks of accepting the spreading conclusion outlined previously. On the other hand, Moran's approach challenges this spreading step, but as I will demonstrate in Section 4, it remains underdeveloped in significant respects.

considering a typical perceptual scenario, such as perceiving your laptop. In this situation, there are both inner factors (B) (defined in terms of intrinsic aspects of what is under the organism's skin[133]) and external factors (E) involved. External factors include the light reflecting off your laptop, which reaches your retina, and so on. Now, let's imagine another scenario where B is instantiated, but E does not occur. Instead, an "artificial process" is employed, such as using electrodes, to replicate the internal factors. In this case, it is plausible to expect the emergence of a matching[134] hallucination.

(2) posits the existence of a distinct internal type that is sufficient for the instantiation of FP^h. The argument holds that if the internal factors responsible for a hallucination can be replicated in a perceptual case, then the sufficient factor for FP^h would also be present in the perceptual case, leading to FP^h's occurrence. This is essentially how the spreading of FP^h is demonstrated within the framework of the causal argument.

Given that (1) seems mostly uncontroversial, disjunctivists who aim to challenge the spreading part of the causal argument should plausibly direct their attention to (2). The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to examining this proposition.

2.1. The argument from the surgeon.

Why should one accept (2)? Before delving into the topic, it is important to establish an assumption that underlies the causal argument. This assumption is grounded in the idea that "genuine causation is characterized by a pattern of causes and effects that demonstrates implicit generality" (Martin, 2004, p. 57), aligning with a generalist theory of causation[135]. In this context, if a causes b, it implies (sets of) properties F and G, where all instances of F cause G (a "pattern"), a possesses F, and b possesses G. One should note that there should be constraints on the specific nature of properties F and G;

[133] Naturally, (1) focuses solely on neurological factors and does not encompass mental aspects in general. This deliberate limitation is crucial to avoid begging the question against the disjunctivist position.
[134] Some authors argue that we currently lack empirical evidence to support this expectation (Rojas, 2020). While it is plausible that there is no concrete proof (which would likely require more advanced technology than what we currently possess), assuming the opposite – that an "external" factor could "interfere" with what one can introspect – seems inconsistent with our existing empirical knowledge about the interaction between the brain and the mind.
[135] So, strictly speaking, the argument could be resisted by adopting a particularistic view of causation. However, this option may appear desperate for disjunctivists (considering possible modifications of the argument) since they would have to argue that generalistic causation is metaphysically impossible, which seems to be an unsupported assumption.

otherwise, this position would become trivial. These constraints will be addressed when relevant to the present argument.

That said, before even starting to analyze the relevant reasons for taking (2) seriously, it is necessary to address a reasoning that has been cited as its basis (Sollberger, 2007, p. 256; 2008, p.4), which is quickly found to be inadequate. The argument is based on the fact (supported by all we know about the relation brain-mind) that an extremely skilled neurosurgeon can induce hallucinations through direct electrical stimulation "whenever they want", regardless of external circumstances. Whenever one stimulates the cortex in the right place, a (same type) hallucination would consistently accompany it. This manipulative pattern suggests a general regularity between brain processes and hallucinations, leading to the inference that cortical stimulation alone can be the cause of hallucinations. Within the framework of generality outlined earlier, this supports the claim that (types of) internal processes are causally sufficient for the manifestation of properties in hallucinations. As FP^h should be one of these properties[136], it is inferred that these neurological properties are sufficient for FP^h, thereby supporting (2).

To understand why this reasoning fails, one should recognize that it rests on the assumption that there is a general pattern involving mere cortical stimulation and hallucination[137]. According to this view, hallucinations consistently occur in the presence of a certain type of brain process, *irrespective of* the corresponding environmental factors. However, this assumption is false. If a sensory event is caused by B and B involves the traditional non-deviant causation process, then that event is not a hallucination. Instead, it is a perception, and being a perception excludes it from being classified as a hallucination. Therefore, the absence of specific external factors is part of what is sufficient for an event to be a hallucination. This implies that there is no general pattern between *pure* brain processes and hallucinations. Consequently, one cannot extract the corresponding causal conclusion[138-139].

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[136] The bridging inference is mine. In general, authors defending the argument from the surgeon's case often move directly from the assumption that hallucinations are caused by brain processes alone to the claim that FP^h participates in the corresponding general causal pattern.

[137] This type of inference, which is discussed in Section 3.2.2, involves a general pattern where Fs are consistently followed by Gs, possibly allowing us to make causal inferences that Fs cause Gs.

[138] In fact, there is plausibly a genuine regularity between brain processes and sensory experiences (understood in terms of phenomenology or indiscrimination), as I argue in Section 3.2. The sticking point for the causal argument lies in how to derive a specific conclusion regarding the causation of *hallucinations* from this pattern.

[139] Other variations of the argument from the surgeon, which do not depend on a direct causal inference from the alleged pattern between brain processes and hallucinations but aim to establish a favorable conclusion for the causal argument based on the putative "independence of" external factors (i.e., "the

The lesson learned is that despite the presence of those manipulative facts (which necessitate deviant causation), the existence of perceptions prevents its generalization to the conclusion that there is a universal pattern between pure brain processes and hallucinations. This sufficiency does not strictly hold.

Some may argue that I am not presenting a charitable interpretation of the argument from the surgeon and that the relevant pattern does not specifically apply to the "hallucinatory kind"[140] but rather to the fundamental property of hallucinations or other properties that necessitate it. However, it cannot be the case because of the fact that the causal argument cannot *begin* with the assumption that there is a pattern, or something entailing it[141], involving neurological processes being followed by FP^h-episodes. This would imply that veridical perceptions sometimes possess FP^h, which is the very point the argument seeks to prove.

Nonetheless, in Section 3.2, I will explore whether the causal argument can profit from the (empirically-based) patterns between the mind and the brain that are potentially shared ground in the debate. In this section, I will particularly focus on the well-established patterns involving brain activity and phenomenology (or indiscriminability facts).

2.2. A more plausible way to get to (2).

However, the argument from the surgeon's case is not the sole pathway that leads us to (2). In the subsequent discussion, I present the primary line of reasoning that supports (2).

To reach this conclusion, one begins by assuming that "mental typing is at least partially a causal matter" (Sollberger, 2012, p. 586). In simpler terms, it is believed that every mental event is associated with a property that can be causally accounted for[142].

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occurrence of [the] h[allucination] requires no more than S's brain being in a certain state" (Sollberger, 2008, p.4), encounter the same challenges mentioned above.

[140] That corresponds to the "neutral" concept of hallucination I am using (not to confuse with hallucinations' fundamental properties). This concept is what allows us, for example, to say that distinct kinds of theorists about hallucinations (e.g., sense data theorists, representationists, and disjunctivists) study the same type of mental events (although they may disagree on its nature or some of its properties). As I will show in Section 4.2.3, it can be plausibly analyzed in terms of sensory phenomenology and deviant causation.

[141] For example, one between types of brain process and the set of intrinsic properties of some hallucination.

[142] When y is caused by x and the corresponding general pattern is that Fs cause a G, we will say that x's possessing G is causally accounted for by F.

This follows naturally from adopting a generalistic view of causation and acknowledging that mental events always have their causes[143].

Moreover, one supposes that the complete causation for mental events occurs *merely* under the subject's skin. In other words, "[t]he causal work is exhausted by what happens locally between" (ibid, p.587, my italics) local neurological causes and the immediate mental effect. Therefore, taking into consideration the present generalistic framework, only intrinsic aspects of brain processes and structures can causally account for properties in mental events. As a result, specific environmental properties cannot (not even partially) causally account for property in mental episodes. This idea can be referred to as the "internal restrictedness of mental event's causation" or simply (IR).

(IR), nonetheless, leaves room for properties of mental events that are not *causally* accounted for. These properties are usually referred to in the causal argument as "non-causal constitutive conditions for the occurrence of certain perceptual types of mental effects" (Sollberger, 2012, p.585)[144].

Therefore, (IR) alone is insufficient to support (2). It could be still possible that FP^h is non-causally constitutive, which means that assuming perceptions and hallucinations share the same (neurological) causes does not guarantee they share the same fundamental property[145]. Therefore, (1) requires an additional assumption: the fundamental properties of hallucinations are always solely causally accounted for. This assumption can be referred to as "Causal Exclusivity of FP^h" or simply (CE).

3. RESISTANCE TO LOCAL SUPERVENIENCE I: Against (IR).

Section 3 is entirely devoted to the critical examination of (IR). In Section 3.1, I will delve into the justification of this premise, as it is commonly presented by proponents of the causal argument. Subsequently, in Section 3.2, I will scrutinize these reasons and propose potential lines of defense that disjunctivists could employ to impugn (IR).

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[143] So, the disjunctivists could resist the causal argument also by resisting the claim that the interaction between brain and mind is causal.

[144] This is one of the reasons why proponents of the current version of the causal argument believe they have a dialectical advantage over Robinson's (1994, 1985) argument. The premises of the present argument are deemed more acceptable by the disjunctivist, as they allow for the possibility of perceptions inherently involving certain external objects. In contrast, Robinson's causal principle does not accommodate this possibility.

[145] The intuition that fundamental properties, in general, must be either causally or non-causally accounted for stems from the idea that if it were not, the corresponding instantiations would be inexplicable.

3.1. Why (IR)?

The causal argument, as commonly defended, presents two reasons for accepting (IR). Firstly, according to Sollberger (2012), the justification for adopting such a restrictive view of the causation of mental episodes is based on the fact that it is

> in line with the working hypothesis currently applied by the cognitive sciences and the neurosciences, for empirical researchers pay attention to local causation and internal states of the subject and do not seriously pursue the possibility of direct action at a distance in their explanations (see Gazzaniga et al. 2002: ch. 5 & 6). That is, a well established method of current scientific practise is to assume that perceptual states causally depend on proximate stimulations and internal input, such that the causal effects of distal causes are completely accounted for by their proximate causes. (p.586-7).

Therefore, positing that experiences are (even partially) caused by elements external to neurological processes would contradict fundamental methodological scientific assumptions (Martin, 2004, p.54). So, it is appropriate to adopt (IR).

Secondly, Martin argues that (IR) can be supported by empirical evidence demonstrating a regularity between brain activity and sensory experiences. According to him,

> We have broad empirical grounds for supposing that altering the pattern of activity in an agent's visual cortex has consequences for what they can or cannot see. So there does seem to be a causal dependency of our visual perceptions on the activity of parts of the brain, even if we do not yet know the full pattern of this dependency (ibid).

In other words, the second rationale for accepting (IR) is based on a supposed regularity between brain activity and mental events (in special, sensory experiences).

3.2. Resistance to (IR).

It is noteworthy that both lines of reasoning rely on the insights provided by perceptual science, including its findings, assumptions, and methodology, to understand experiences and their causes. As Tyler Burge (2005, 2011) aptly points out, perceptual psychology is a "serious science", with "well-established results". Therefore, if (IR) is adequately supported by these scientific observations, any attempt to reject (2) by denying (IR) would place disjunctivism in a precarious dialectical position. As Goldhaber (2019,

p.7028) emphasizes, “any philosophical thesis which conflicts with the findings or foundational assumptions of perceptual psychology may appear poorly informed or arrogantly anti-scientific, and false either way”.

The paragraphs below will examine whether disjunctivists who deny (IR) would indeed have to face the aforementioned dialectical issues. This assessment will focus on evaluating whether the two proposed justifications are genuinely capable of supporting (2).

As demonstrated, the first reason for accepting (IR) is based on a presumed methodological principle within the field of Perceptual Sciences. This principle is intended to guide scientists, doctors, and other researchers when investigating the specific causes of a given mental phenomenon. For instance, if their goal is to understand the immediate causes of a particular (type of) pain, the principle discourages them from examining distant factors, especially those occurring in the environment. By considering these external components as unlikely causal candidates, the principle suggests that attention should be directed solely to the internal processes taking place within the subject’s body.

In the first place, disjunctivists could resist (IR) by noticing that this methodological precept is far from universally accepted. There is a branch of Perceptual Science, including, for example, Ecological Psychology, that emphasizes the broader interaction between organisms and their environment (Michaels & Palatinus, 2014). Those perspectives “propose to construe cognition not as something that happens only inside our brains but as involving constitutively the interactions of the organism with its environment and as giving a fundamental role to its body in organizing and structuring the perceptible world” (Carvalho, 2021, p.287). In this context, the considered data and the corresponding explanations are not restricted to local factors.

Furthermore, upon further critical analysis of the current methodological principle, it becomes evident that it is not an independent claim. In order for it to be considered a reliable and justified methodological guideline, one must demonstrate that investigations conducted under its guidance lead to outcomes that are true or at least closer to the truth. If this is indeed the case, one must assume that there is likely no mental causation that involves an environmental component. Therefore, the methodological assumption is built upon the prior notion that the immediate causes of mental episodes must always be confined to local factors.

In this case, the methodological principle requires a prior justification as to why Perceptual Sciences would assume that the immediate causes of mental episodes are confined to internal factors. The primary candidate for this justification is the second reason provided by Martin to support (IR), i.e., an associative regularity between certain types of brain processes and specific kinds of mental events. In this case, given the dependency for the justification of the methodological precept in relation to the adequacy of this idea as a justifier of (IR), by analyzing the effectiveness of this regularity in supporting (IR), we have examined the justifications presented by its advocates. I will now turn my attention to this matter.

Here, we can adopt a neutral stance regarding specific approaches to the nature of causation and, in particular, the relationship between causal generalizations (or laws) and their instances. However, it seems necessary to assume, as a common ground, as Martin seems to do, that inferences to causal generalizations/laws are based on supposed regularities in the world (Mill, 1843). This suggests that when the existence of an associative regularity of the form "[most, etc.] Fs precede Gs" (where G is the consequent and F is the antecedent of this regularity) is justified, it serves as sufficient grounds to conclude a causal generalization of the form "all [most, etc.] Fs cause a G"[146].

While additional constraints may be proposed to differentiate regularities that correspond to causal generalizations from the ones corresponding to mere accidental generalities[147], I will not explore the possibility of regularities involving brain processes and mental phenomena that cannot support a corresponding causal inference. Thus, I will set this detail aside.

Taking into consideration the general observations made earlier regarding inferences to causal generalities, a significant issue emerges when we reconsider the

[146] Some additional observations regarding the current inferential framework. Firstly, the term "inference" as used here refers to, normatively, a *reasonable* theoretical or belief-based choice. In this case, it presupposes the plausibility/justification of the (existential) suppositions it uses as input. (Otherwise, it would fail to provide an adequate basis for the pertinent causal generality that may support (IR)). Therefore, it should not be confused with a mere process of hypothesis generation or a description of how scientific agents proceed. Another important aspect to consider within the inferential framework adopted here relates to how it accommodates the possibility of deducing causal generalizations solely based on prior theories (Bogen, 2016). However, in the present case, such situations do not appear to apply, primarily due to the plausible fact that, at least in terms of empirical data, one can only infer a causal generality between the brain and the mind based on a presumed corresponding regularity between them. (The justification for the existence of such a regularity can be obtained through various means, including general observations about the interaction between the brain and the mind, which may also involve inductive or abductive reasoning. Regardless of the specific justification method employed, the inferential step derived from it remains essential and sufficient for inferring the relevant generalities).

[147] There may also be constraints regarding "frivolous regularities", including disjunctive or overly general regularities, among others. See Carroll (2020) for an overview of examples of non-lawful generalities.

construction of the reasoning that would support the desired causal conclusion of antidisjunctivists. For, it becomes evident that (IR) goes beyond being a mere causal claim about mental events. It also encompasses an *exhaustiveness* clause, stating that "[c]ausal explanation of the occurrence of types of perceptual states in the science assumes that the effects of distal causes are *entirely exhausted* by their effects on proximal causes" (Burge, 2005, p.22, my italics).

This poses challenges for the current antidisjunctivists due to the potential existence of overlapping causal generalizations. These are cases where two general causal patterns coexist, where there is an F^1, F^2, G^1 and G^2, such that all F^1s cause a G^1 and all F^2s cause a G^2, and G^1 and G^2 can both be instantiated by the same event x, with an F^1-token and F^2-token causing x. (Here, we can remain neutral on whether these causal tokens have to be identical or not. The current generalistic framework requires, for something to be considered a cause, its subsumption under a causal generality, without any requirement of being the sole (relative to a certain causal level) cause of the event or, potentially, some of its (same level) causes).

In fact, there is nothing inherently problematic or mysterious about the idea that an event can have two distinct properties that are causally accounted for in separate and distinct ways. One well-known type of example that is ubiquitous in contemporary science involves determinable causal laws, which naturally entail corresponding determinate causal laws (Yablo, 1992; Wilson, 2021). In such cases, the determinable generality can provide causal explanations for the determinable aspect of an event, while the corresponding determinate generality can account for the correlated determinate aspect of that same event.

Therefore, whatever regularity ("pattern") Martin mentions (in the quotation in Section 3.1), which is derived from "broad empirical grounds", it alone cannot show *all* possible (same level) causal generalities related to certain experiences. Rather, it may only indicate their participation in a generality whose antecedent is a neurological type. In this case, it does not prove the absence of (partially) external factors in overlapping causal generalizations. Asserting otherwise, as (IR) does, would exceed the scope of science's authority[148].

[148] Here, one could present a counterargument to the disjunctivist's causal hypotheses that contradicts (IR), which posits that, in perceptual cases, the causal generality involves a neurological type B and an environmental aspect E (including the object of acquaintance) as the antecedent, and the naive-realistic property as the consequent and, in neurologically matching hallucinatory cases, the generality would have B and non-E as the antecedent, and FP^h as the consequent. According to this objection, disjunctivists would

At this stage, antidisjunctivists may argue that while causal generalities inferred from empirical data typically do not by themselves support overlapping causation, they specifically contend that the inferred causal generality in the present case does. In other words, they would emphasize that while it may not be generally true that science and its discovered regularities lead to exhaustive claims, there are specific situations where they can, and the present case is an example of such a situation.

Certainly, in this scenario, antidisjunctivists would be required to assign a causal generality to experiences that would serve this exclusionary function. In order to do so, they would need to determine the property that acts as the consequent of such a causal generality, with a neurological factor as its antecedent. It is important to note that in this case, the reasoning involved would not solely rely on regularities derived from empirical data, but also on the incompatibility of these generalities with overlapping causation. In the following discussion, I will present potential candidate consequent properties that antidisjunctivists could propose (without begging the question against disjunctivists) to fulfill this purpose.

As indicated in Section 2.1, the most plausible candidate for the consequent in relation to types of brain processes is phenomenal character. In fact, based on our current understanding of the brain-mind relationship, it is highly likely that intrinsically identical brain stimulations occurring in intrinsically identical brain structures (such as the ones involved in your brain as you read this dissertation) will consistently give rise to the same phenomenal character. A similar argument can be made for (behavioral) functional roles and dispositions.

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need to postulate a corresponding causal generality due to the observed regularity between B alone and the common phenomenal character. However, this poses a significant drawback within their account. The objection argues that since both the naive-realistic property and FP^h necessitate a common phenomenal character, these separate laws, along with the necessitation facts, already provide a causal explanation for the instantiations of the phenomenal character. Consequently, the causal law solely between B and the phenomenal character becomes unnecessary, leading to the conclusion that at least a component of their total causal account is explanatorily redundant.

Disjunctivists have multiple strategies to counter this line of thought. Here, I present one possible option. They can reject the causal account presented earlier and argue that the disjunctive causal hypotheses do not explain the specific instantiations of fundamental properties themselves, but rather what remains when we subtract the corresponding instantiation of phenomenal character. (In this view, disjunctivists would claim that the instantiations of phenomenal characters are not simply necessitated by corresponding instantiations of fundamental properties, but are actually proper parts of those properties. This perspective appears to be defensible. Disjunctivists could argue, for example, that instantiation of the naïve realistic property of becoming acquainted with a red circle is literally composed of the corresponding instantiation of the property of things looking to one red and circular. The fact that the former instantiation cannot be conceived without the latter may be regarded as support for this mereological stance.). Consequently, there does not need to be an explanatory redundancy in disjunctivist's causal account.

The challenge arises when antidisjunctivists attempt to apply the same strategy by considering properties other than those ones as consequents of the generality. In these cases, it appears that we lack additional properties of experiences that disjunctivists would agree have a corresponding generality involving neurological properties.

For example, if antidisjunctivists aim to compel disjunctivists to assert the necessity of representational content in experiences, they would plausibly employ traditional arguments supported by the supposed ubiquity of the capacity for looks or appearances to be evaluated in terms of accuracy (Siegel, 2010)[149].

Given these considerations, it becomes challenging to overwhelmingly argue that these properties are determined by internal brain processes alone. For, disjunctivists could respond, by making a similar argument to Tye (2007), stating that without the direct reference inherent in object-involving contents (which naturally cannot be solely internally determined), it is difficult to explain how cases of "veridical hallucination"[150] can have different accuracy conditions compared to corresponding veridical perceptual cases. This motivates Burge, who shares the tenet with the causal argument that the causation of experiences is limited to internal factors, to argue that "[t]he accuracy or inaccuracy of a perceptual state - including whether a perceptual state successfully represents anything in the environment at all – depends on the distal condition" (Burge, 2005, p.23). Therefore, disjunctivists have substantial non-ad hoc grounds for rejecting a causal generality between types of neuronal processes and perceptual representations.

Finally, antidisjunctivists may seek to argue that the identified consequent properties are the fundamental properties of the events or some property entailing them. However, as shown in Section 2.1, such an argument cannot merely assert the existence of a regularity between specific types of brain processes and, for instance, FP^h. For it would beg the question against disjunctivists.

Therefore, it appears that we have insufficient empirical evidence to propose for experiences causal generalizations that involve types of purely neurological processes as antecedents, other than the ones disjunctivists could already adopt, such as those with phenomenal, behavioral, and other related factors as their consequents. As a result, disjunctivists cannot be compelled to conclude that this type of causation is exclusive, leaving room for the possibility of external causation. In this case, an argument based

[149] Here, I do not delve into the question of whether these properties are the fundamental properties of experiences. Otherwise, we would beg the question against disjunctivists.
[150] These cases are discussed in Section 4.2.3.

solely on empirical generalizations, as suggested by Martin, is inadequate to support (IR)'s exhaustiveness clause. Therefore, disjunctivism does not necessarily adopt an anti-scientific stance by not accepting (IR).

4. RESISTANCE TO LOCAL SUPERVENIENCE II: Against (CE).

Now, let's shift our attention to the second assertion supporting the adoption of (2), which is (CE). In Section 4.1, I will outline the justifications presented by proponents of the causal argument for this principle. Section 4.2 will examine the reasons put forward in favor of (CE) and explore the strategies that disjunctivists may employ to challenge it, thereby resisting the causal argument by not accepting (2).

4.1 Why (CE)?

The conjunction of two assumptions gives rise to (CE). Firstly, it is assumed that internal events are exclusively determined by causal factors and so do not involve non-causally constitutive conditions. In the present context, "internal" takes on a slightly different meaning from its previous use, which primarily applied to properties (types, factors, etc. and relevantly boiled down to the neurological aspects. Here, "internal" is used in a locational sense and applies to tokens rather than properties. Specifically, it refers to a mental episode not being located in the corresponding environment. Equivalently, it indicates that something is not, or does not have some of its parts, equal to some parcel of the environment. This sense of internality aligns with McDowell's (1992, p. 36) or Putnam's (1975, p. 227) conception of internality.

The second assumption is that hallucinations fall under the category of internal events, which will be referred to as (HI). The combination of (CI) and (HI) directly entails (CE)[151]. However, the question arises: Why should we accept (CI) and (HI) in the first place?

[151] Moran (2019, 2022) offers an alternative reading of the causal argument, suggesting that the current premise does not assert that hallucinations are internal in the present sense, but rather emphasizes that their fundamental properties are internally-individuated. According to Moran, the argument relies on independent intuitions regarding the supposed fact that FP^h is internally individuated. However, this cannot be a correct interpretation of the causal argument. This is because, combined with the internal reproducibility between veridical perceptions and hallucinations (premise (1)), this assumption would suffice to account for the spreading of FP^h's veridical perceptions. In this case, all the specific discussion about causation by Martin would become unnecessary, and the argument loses its characterization as a "causal" argument.

(CI) is partially supported by the notion that only external events, such as perceptions according to Naïve Realists, involve non-causally constitutive conditions. Sollberger (2008, p.7-8) indicates that

> [p]erception [according to naïve realists] necessitates the interaction of a broad intricate network that comprises both S and S's environment. If so, then it seems natural to suppose that the artificial stimulation of S's brain state does not have to give rise to exactly the same mental effect h as in genuine perception; after all, brain-activation constitutes just one single piece within this broad, complex network.

The appeal of positing non-causal constitutive conditions for external episodes stems from the recognition that causation – which, as outlined in the causal argument's (IR), involves only neurological factors – is insufficient to explain them. The instantiation of purely neurological properties alone cannot account for aspects that entail a connection to the environment, such as experiences that involve being acquainted with environmental objects. Granting such sufficiency to neurological properties would imply attributing to the brain alone the divine power to create elements of the environment, which is clearly absurd. Therefore, in order to fully explain the properties of perceptions from this perspective, we must consider factors beyond what is solely within the subject's body.

For "purely mental" events, which lack such kind of environmental involvedness, however, the regular causal processes performed by the brain should be sufficient to account for them. So, no additional causal constitutive conditions are required. Therefore, through inference to the best explanation, we arrive at (CI).

When considering (CE), Martin (2004, p.58) primarily draws upon the widely accepted belief that "hallucinations are internal events". Martin argues that it is generally agreed upon that the occurrence of hallucinations does not introduce any additional conditions in the external world beyond the presumed state of awareness of the subject.

Although this observation may initially seem to provide a satisfactory foundation for (CE), it is important to consider some initial observations that can enhance our understanding of this claimed support. First and foremost, the discussion surrounding the argument from the surgeon case in Section 2.1 has revealed that it is not entirely accurate

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While it is questionable how a philosophically technical and obscure or undefined notion of "hallucinations' nature" (or, worse, using Sollberger's definition of "fundamental properties", as the explanans for the phenomenology of hallucinations) can elicit our intutions, I believe that Moran's argument warrants further discussion. However, it is important to highlight the differences between Moran's argument and Martin's causal argument.

to assert that the conditions for hallucinations are exclusively non-environmental. Taking such a stance would essentially deny the possibility of perceptions altogether.

However, one may suggest a more restricted interpretation of Martin's baking for (HI), namely, the intuition hallucinations *are nothing more* than the subject's putative state of awareness. This seems a ground for (CE), which is more specifically (according to the present use of "internal") about the lack of hallucinations' (and their parts) *identity* to environmental things, not, more strongly, about the conditions for their occurrence.

In Martin's (1997, 2002, 2004) framework, two types of "awareness" are relevant in the present context: acquaintance and intentional relations. Considering it, if we assume that hallucinations are merely the subject's state of awareness, we align ourselves with standard accounts of hallucination, namely, Sense Data Theory or Representational Theories. In fact, both of these theories naturally consider the "awareness" of hallucinations to be internal in the current sense. Acquaintance with mental images and representational states, whether internally individuated or not, do not plausibly have direct counterparts in the environment (Rowlands, Lau, and Deutsch, 2020). However, if the argument adopts these traditional accounts of hallucination, it may weaken its effectiveness against disjunctivists, who may propose alternative perspectives on hallucinations. Interestingly, Martin's own response to the argument involves a non-traditional account of hallucination, as discussed in the Introduction.

In this case, proponents of the anti-disjunctivist view would benefit from establishing (HI) on more neutral grounds. This can be easily accomplished, as it genuinely appears that when we experience hallucinations, there is no element in the environment that is involved in or constitutes the event. So, this intuition tells us that none of its parts can be located in the environment, making them non-environmental. This is in contrast to perceptions, at least according to the naive realist perspective, where the events have elements that naturally belong to and can be naturally located in the environment (such as the external object of acquaintance). However, when we inquire about the environmental components of hallucinations, there seems to be no available immediate answer. In this case, we have an intuition that aligns with the claim that hallucinations (unlike perceptions) exist solely within someone's mind or, at the very least, are not "out there" in the external world. Given its neutrality, this general intuition, which we can appropriately label as the "Internal View of Hallucinations", appears to be a more suitable approach to establishing (CI).

4.2 Resistance to (CE).

As previously mentioned, the following analysis will evaluate the adequacy of the reasons supporting both (CI) and (HI) and explore additional considerations that may lead us to question their validity. In Section 4.2.1, a disjunctivist perspective will be presented as a potential counter to these principles. Section 4.2.2 will examine the specific argument that antidisjunctivists could employ to weaken the appeal of (CI) and (HI). Finally, in Section 4.2.3, a potential objection to these arguments will be explored, along with possible rebuttals by disjunctivists.

4.2.1 The negative view of hallucinations.

As announced above, here I will present an alternative idea, which disjunctivists could raise as having at least the same force as (CI) and (HI), that can serve to impugn the causal argument by defeating (CE). This present account is that hallucinations have a negative component. Call it the "Negative View of Hallucinations".

This perspective suggests that hallucinations can be considered as "failed experiences" when compared to matching perceptions. In a broad sense, this translates to the idea that hallucinations are characterized by the absence of elements that are essentially present in matching perceptions.

The negative view of hallucinations is not a novel idea. Authors such as Macpherson & Batty (2016, p. 265, my italics)[152] have discussed what they refer to as the "traditional account of hallucinations", which states that "you have an experience as of an object and its properties but there is *no* (worldly) object, and there are *no* (worldly) properties, that you perceive ["are aware of"] in virtue of having that experience". Other authors, including Thau (2004, p. 250), Tye (2014, p. 303), Johnston (2004, p. 135), and Moran (2022, p. 14), share similar views and acknowledge intuitions regarding the negative nature of hallucinations.

The definition of the current proposal was deliberately broad and existential. However, it is possible to "unpack" it and explore various more specific perspectives that highlight the particular elements present in perceptions that are essentially absent in corresponding hallucinations. Here, I will provide a brief taxonomy of these options:

[152] See also MacPherson (2013).

One perspective, the "actualist-intrinsicist" view, suggests that hallucinations necessarily involve the absence of something that is deemed intrinsic and actual (i.e., does not merely involve a potential of what instantiates it, such as dispositions) to matching perceptions. For example, they could involve the lack of a relation to a mind-independent reality. On the other hand, the "actualist-extrinsicist" view posits that hallucinations fundamentally lack something that is extrinsic (though possibly essential) to perceptions. For example, one can claim that hallucinations essentially deviate from the causal processes that occur in perceptual cases (Moran, 2019, 2022). Another perspective, "dispositionism", asserts that hallucinations lack the dispositions found in veridical perceptions. This may include the absence of certain cognitive dispositions (McDowell, 1986, 1991; Evans, 1982) or epistemological dispositions (Pritchard, 2012; McDowell, 1992, 2008) in hallucinations.

4.2.2 From the negative view of causation to the negation of (HI) and (CI).

While simply adopting (some version of) the Negative View is not sufficient to refute (CI) or (HI), there are arguments that question their truth individually or in combination. One such line of thought emerges from the dispositionist perspective within the negative view, which posits that hallucinations exhibit dispositions, or causal roles, that are absent in (neurologically) matching perceptions.

This line of reasoning is rooted in the acceptance of a "Disjunctivist Semantic Theory of Demonstrative Thought". According to this theory, when we perceive something, we have a disposition to form demonstrative thoughts (such as "That...") based on that particular perceptual experience. In contrast, when it comes to (neurologically) matching hallucinations, the content of the corresponding thoughts generated is never identical (Evans, 1982; McDowell, 1986, 1991).

Fortunately for disjunctivists who aim to challenge the causal argument, this perspective is supported by autonomous motivations. It is a widely held belief that the "demonstrative" thoughts generated based on hallucinations cannot refer to the corresponding external environment. When we experience hallucinations, there appears to be a certain "encapsulation" that hinders us from demonstratively referring to objects in the environment. For example, in cases of "veridical hallucinations" (discussed in the next section), it is not expected that the experiencer could demonstratively refer to the clock as their perceptual twin would. As a result, there is always a distinction between

the referents – and thus the accuracy conditions – of the demonstrative thoughts generated from perceptions and their counterparts relative to matching hallucinations. In this scenario, the "that"-thought that a hallucinating subject has at best purports to make a demonstrative reference that its perceptive intrinsic twin actually achieves. These types of thoughts are often regarded as pseudo-demonstrative thoughts (Evans, 1982, p.295), characterized by "failed reference" (Tye, 2014, p.303).

While it is not logically obligatory for proponents of the reference difference to also propose a difference in content (Dummett, 1973, p.110), it is a natural consequence. Given the implausibility of alternative "conjunctivist" accounts that attempt to explain the difference in reference by appealing to elements other than content[153], perceptual disjunctivists are justified in abductively choosing the Disjunctivist Semantic Theory of Demonstrative Thought as their preferred explanation[154].

(Indeed, there are several disjunctivists who, despite their disjunctivist view, maintain an antidisjunctivist stance when it comes to the causal roles of experiences. Scholars such as Martin (2002) and Fish (2009, 2008) argue that hallucinations and matching perceptions can possess the same cognitive dispositions. However, there is ample room for challenging their position. For, their argument relies on the supposed

[153] More importantly, a (Neofregean) descriptivist specified can be considered, which posits that the content of an indexical expression or thought can be conveyed through a purely qualitative definite description. However, a significant challenge arises in finding a description that, when uttered by someone in a perceptual case, refers to nothing at all in a corresponding veridical hallucination case. These cases are almost identical in their environmental and possibly internal aspects. The only necessary distinction between these types of cases, at least for the present antidisjunctivist, is the distinction inherent in perception itself, which is plausibly only a distinct part of the causal chain whose terminal point is the experiences. This suggests that the only description capable of exclusively picking up the environmental object in the perceptual case would be something like "the object that causes [in the non-deviant way] this very event" (Searle, 1983).
However, there are several problems with this suggestion. The first issue is a longstanding criticism faced by descriptivist views (Perry, 1977, 1979). According to this criticism, that type of expression is not a plausible candidate for specifying the relevant thought. For, experiencers may be clueless about what may be causing their experience and could actually have not acquainted all the relevant concepts. If we were to ask an experiencer what they are referring to, they would likely respond with something like "I am referring to that clock" and say nothing about causation. Additionally, as Kaplan (1989) argues, it seems that the two utterances (or thoughts) could not have "said" the same thing (and hence have the same content) since one of them "speaks" about the clock while the other does not. However, the most significant concern arises from the fact that this description, in order to accomplish the desired task, should plausibly have an indexical content itself ("the object that causes *this* experience"), which posits a begging of question in the account. Similar concerns also apply to other conjunctivist options, where the purported difference in reference or truth-making is attributed to the context associated with cognition, such as Burge's (1977, 2009) de re belief theory or accounts based on possible worlds.

[154] Unfortunately, there hasn't been much philosophical inquiry dedicated to uncovering the true nature of "failed demonstrative thoughts" in contrast to successful ones. However, a survey conducted by Tye (2014) sheds light on the possible options in this regard. Although Tye's discussion primarily focuses on the content of hallucinations, specifically what fills the position of the absent object in veridical experiences, I fail to see why we should assume a difference between the "attributée" elements in the content of experiences and the corresponding "that"-thoughts.

authority of introspection in determining the content of intentional states. Nevertheless, this transparency principle can be reasonably dismissed due to its incompatibility with externally-individuated contents (Boghossian, 1994). Cases involving externally-individuated content can parallel introspective counterparts with plausibly distinct externally-individuated content, as illustrated by Putnam-like (1975) or Burge-like (1979) scenarios).

The Disjunctivist Semantic Theory of Demonstrative Thought commonly employs a causal framework to account for successful demonstrative thoughts. According to this view, one typically holds that (successful) demonstrative thoughts concerning an environmental item X are generated through a combination of factors. First, a veridical perception (or illusion) of X is considered essential for the formation of successful demonstrative thoughts. Once "merely having the thing somewhere in your visual field" (Campbell, 2010, p.197) does not suffice for picking up specifically X amidst other objects one perceives, a corresponding attentional component towards X is often posited as necessary for the formation of demonstrative thoughts about X (Campbell, 2002, 2010). Lastly, the presence of a volitional state and the absence of any pre-established defeaters (such as the world not ending after one decides to refer to X) are also considered influential factors in the causal chain underlying demonstrative thoughts.

Of course, these theorists would also need to address the causal framework for corresponding "bad" cases, i.e., failed demonstrative thoughts as of X. Given the previous causal hypothesis, the natural position here is to argue that all but the first component (the perceptual event itself) are part of the present causal framework. Just as the occurrence of a perception and the other mentioned factors can compose the explanans of a causal account for a successful demonstrative thought, a hallucinatory episode, along with the three mentioned factors, can explain the emergence of a failed demonstrative thought. While there may be other possible explanatory options for failed demonstrative thoughts in theory, as I will explore in the next section, the present account, with its explanatory sufficiency and alignment with the previous framework, appears to be the most compelling choice[155].

[155] Here, I assume that there is a significant distinction between failed demonstrative references and "vainly demonstrative" references, which are formed without any experiential basis. Langsam (1997) emphasizes that a crucial aspect of both failed and successful demonstrative thoughts is their connection to the underlying experience. This recognition is essential for our current discussion as it underscores the significance of the experiential episode itself, be it a hallucination, perception, or illusion, in the causal explanation of both failed and successful demonstrative thoughts.

Given both frameworks, perceptual disjunctivists seeking to counter the causal argument would then refer to neurologically and environmentally matching experiences, such as the veridical hallucination and its perceptual counterpart (as presented in the next section), that are the basis for forming (failed and successful) demonstrative thoughts. Given the identical neurological aspects of these experiences, it is also expected that they would involve the same attentional and volitional states[156]. Furthermore, the absence of the defeaters necessary for the emergence of (failed or successful) demonstrative thoughts can be the same in both cases. Therefore, the explanatory distinction between these cases can be attributed solely to a difference in the experiential element, namely the veridical perception and the hallucinatory experience, respectively.

The crucial point is that whatever is intrinsic to one event cannot be fully applied to what is intrinsic to the other. Put differently, there cannot exist a parcel within the perceptual event that is intrinsically identical to the entire hallucinatory episode, and vice versa. Based on the causal frameworks discussed earlier, such an "intrinsicality containment" would suggest the absurd conclusion that there would necessarily be both a failed and successful demonstrative thought in at least one of these situations. In this case, hallucinatory episodes cannot boil down, for example, a mere intentional state that could be entirely intrinsically reproducible in a matching perception.

Consequently, there must be a component in hallucinations that cannot be intrinsically replicated in the neurologically matching veridical perception. However, the present situations are internally identical. Therefore, there is no internal aspect within the hallucinatory case that fulfills the requirement of being intrinsically different from the perceptual one. Consequently, there must be an external factor present in the hallucinatory episode, but absent in perceptions, that accounts for this necessary distinction. Disjunctivists can reject the hypothesis (HI) based on the cognitive disposition of hallucinations. (The precise nature of this component, as attributed by disjunctivists, and how one could respond to the charge of locality with regard to the external factors, which

[156] Antidisjunctivists could present a counterargument to the reproducibility of the three factors across the two experiential cases by introducing two ideas that challenge the underlying assumptions of the causal frameworks discussed earlier, particularly concerning attention. Firstly, they could propose a conception of attention that is not directed towards mental items, such as experiences, but rather towards mind-independent entities and their properties, such as clocks. Secondly, they may argue that attention is a real relation, distinct from intentional relations, and implies the existence of the entities to which attention is directed. However, this "disjunctivist theory of attention" is clearly incompatible with the premises of the causal argument. Analogous counterargument using "disjunctives theories of volitional states" can also be dismissed under the same basis.

underlies (HI) according to the previous justifications, will be further explored in the next section.)

The problem is that this parcel cannot be internal. For, the situations evoked are internally identical. So, there is no internal part in the hallucinatory case that could fit this requirement of a difference in relation to the perceptual one. Therefore, there must be some external factor that is present in the hallucinatory episode, but that is absent in perceptions, that respond to this necessary distinction. In this case, disjunctivists can deny (HI) based on the cognitive disposition of hallucinations. (What exactly disjunctivists would attribute to be this parcel – and how one could respond to the charge of local, which underlies the internal – is explored in Note 157).

By contrast, it is relatively straightforward to refute (CI) through the negative view of hallucination. By considering (IR), one would assert that only neurological factors can account for the property instantiations of hallucinations. However, the mere presence of these neurological factors does not obviously suffice for the manifestation of the negative properties associated with hallucinations. After all, if it were the case, then all the negative implications introduced by the current understanding of hallucinations would also apply to perceptions, which can be neurologically identical to hallucinations. Hence, one can reasonably reject (CI), at least when combined with (IR), based on the negative view of causation. Consequently, in order to accommodate the intuition that hallucinations possess these negative properties, one would have to propose either causal or non-causal elements for hallucinations that go beyond what is confined to the organism's internal processes[157].

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[157] One concern that may arise from these observations is the potential involvement of negative causation, which some may view with suspicion. However, disjunctivists, following a contemporary metaphysical trend that embraces realism about negative causation, easily counter this concern by arguing against the prejudice and highlighting the indispensability and irreducibility of negative factors in certain causal explanations (Shaffer, 2000). These explanations often involve omissions and preventions, for which the corresponding ontology must admit the existence of negative entities (Lewis, 1986, p. 217). (Some scholars, such as Beebe (2004), attempt to avoid a direct correspondence between causal accounts and their putative ontological counterparts by allowing for alternative conceptions. However, since not all information about the causal history of something can be included in its causal explanation, relevance must be established, and it is unclear how this relevance can be accounted for without a prior understanding of causality itself.) There are two common metaphysical concerns regarding negative causal explanations. First, the idea that nothing seems to generate nothing (Moore, 2009, p. 54-55). It appears absurd to claim, for example, that the absence of elephants caused the grass to grow. Second, it seems implausible to introduce absences or negative entities into our ontology, which is typically understood to encompass what exists rather than what does not exist by definition. According to this view, including negativities in our ontology would imply accepting non-existences, akin to fictional entities (Molnar, 2000, p. 84-5). However, a contemporary trend in metaphysics offers potential solutions to these issues by treating negative events as existing entities within our ontology, similar to traditional objects and positive events (Jago & Barker, 2021). One specific approach is to consider negative events as facts with negative properties (Hommen, 2014). These negative elements, while irreducible and distinct from positive entities, are regarded as existing within the

4.2.3 An objection against the disjunctivist use of the negative account of hallucinations.

At this juncture, an antidisjunctivist could challenge at least one of the aforementioned conclusions by invoking Grice's (1961) concept of veridical hallucination. These cases involve experiences that are objectively and phenomenally similar to an ordinary veridical perceptual case, with the only difference being the absence of a specific component in the causal chain that is typically present in perceptual experiences. To illustrate this, consider Grice's example: imagine you are looking at a clock, and all the usual processes of light reflection, retinal stimulation, and so on, occur, giving you the perception of a clock in front of you. However, at a later moment, your visual cortex spontaneously fires in a way that reproduces the exact neurological events that occurred earlier. As a result, it still appears to you as if there is a clock before you, and you may not even notice that you are now experiencing a hallucination.

This pair of cases is commonly presented to demonstrate that the *analysis of the concept* of hallucination, as we commonly use it, involves a negative requirement related to causation. The only reasonable distinction between these cases lies in the presence or absence of a specific component in the causal chain that we would typically expect in normal perceptions. One case involves a "deviant" type of causal history, where a part of the causal chain is missing, while the other case follows a "non-deviant" causal chain that aligns with our expectations of environmental objects reflecting light, striking the retina, and so forth. However, the intuitive difference we attribute to these cases, specifically that one is a perception while the other is a hallucination, seems to be independent of specific perspectives on perceptions and hallucinations. It does not necessarily depend on one's stance regarding metaphysical factors, such as the "fundamental property" of experiences (which can vary among different philosophical positions), or even empirical factors, as neuroscientists and doctors may hold differing opinions on the matter. It is "acknowledgeable by any person, whatever their education, who can count as having the

corresponding ontology. . This perspective also helps disjunctivists explain how hallucinations could be located in the environment. By considering negative events as instantiations of negative properties by positive traditional particulars, one could posit, for example, the absence of acquaintance with mind-independent things (or the factors that non-causally account for matching perceptions), which according to the argument above have to constitute hallucinations, within the environment. In this case, it would be claimed that the corresponding properties are instantiated by the environment.

concept[s] in question' (Snowdon 1981, 176). In this case, no further requirements beyond the acquisition of these concepts seem to be needed for making this differentiation. Given this minimal requirement, the most plausible explanation for the difference in attribution lies in the distinction in meaning between the relevant predicates. One of them necessitates the well-known "non-deviant" type of causation, while the other requires causation that deviates from this norm. Therefore, this pair of cases serves as a valuable lesson about the "analysis of concepts" (Snowdon, 1990, p. 121)[158].

Building upon these considerations, antidisjunctivists could propose a hypothesis concerning the negative aspects of hallucinations, as explored by the negative view of hallucinations. This hypothesis would argue that these negative properties of hallucinations do not arise from intrinsic qualities inherent to hallucinations themselves. Instead, antidisjunctivists suggest that these negative properties result from external conditions that accompany hallucinations, particularly the causal negative factors discussed earlier, which were shown to be arguably conceptually entailed by the very notion of "hallucination". According to this hypothesis, these external conditions confer upon hallucinatory episodes the disposition for the emergence of failed demonstrative thoughts. More precisely, it could argue that the explanation for failed reference encompasses not only the three "common ground" elements discussed earlier but also the sensory phenomenology, which is intrinsic to hallucinations, as well as the fact that these events possess deviant causation.

This causal theory of failed demonstrative thoughts can also be argued to possess initial advantages over the one proposed by disjunctivists in the previous section. Firstly, it has the advantage of being economically motivated, as it does not rely on any additional assumptions about hallucinations beyond what we already assume when simply conceptualizing them. Additionally, it is compatible with (HI), which, as I have shown, is independently justified. At the very least, antidisjunctivists would contend that the alternative frameworks are evidentially underdetermined in comparison to the proposed framework by disjunctivists, which would prevent these theorists from advocating for them due to the potential arbitrariness and ad-hoc nature of the proposed accounts.

[158] This is actually a widely held position. See also Strawson (1979), Steward (2011) and even Grice (1961). Moreover, one can further develop this line of thought by following Broad (1962, p. 190-1) and analyzing "hallucination" as encompassing two essential concepts. Specifically, hallucination can be understood as mental events that possess sensory phenomenology and deviant causation.

In the first place, disjunctivists could criticize this strategy by claiming that antidisjunctivists, in their present reasoning, are begging the question against them. As stated in the Introduction, it is part of Naïve Realism's (and thus Disjunctivism's) motivation to provide an explanation for (successful) demonstrative thought. Therefore, antidisjunctivists have to admit the naïve realist view on demonstrative thought should already have additional reasons beyond their main rivals, including a causal theory of demonstrative thought. In terms of dialectical advantage, the causal theory holds the initial upper hand since it can initially explain perceptual thought in purely physicalist terms, benefiting from its reducibility to natural theories. Consequently, antidisjunctivists cannot begin by presupposing that demonstrative thought can be explained in terms of the causality of experiences.

Therefore, the causal framework proposed by disjunctivists must align with what was described in the previous section, involving the direct involvement of the perceptual event itself (rather than something external to it) in the explanation of successful demonstrative thought. Consequently, when faced with the task of explaining the corresponding "bad" case, it would be natural for disjunctivists to maintain the parallelism with the "good"-case causal framework. They would not, for instance, suggest that the explanation involves the hallucinatory event along with something external to it, such as deviant causation. Given that naïve realists have already established a causal framework that encompasses the intrinsic aspects of perceptions, it would be expected for them to propose a parallel framework for failed demonstrative thoughts, incorporating the hallucinatory events themselves in the corresponding explanatory role. Therefore, antidisjunctivists must begin with the assumption that this framework has its own motivation, which outweighs that of its rivals.

Moreover, disjunctivists could further explore the intuitions underlying the relevant negative view of hallucinations. They could argue that these intuitions do not pertain to what is external to hallucinations (even when we usually refer to them through the representation of these aspects), but rather they directly target the episodes themselves. In fact, it seems that these events alone, even when we abstract from any accompanying external conditions, possess negative components. So, one could argue that all those intuitions regarding hallucinatory events do not require any additional information to deem them negative. Their intrinsic identity may intuitively be perceived as inherently possessing these negative aspects.

Additionally, as we have observed, disjunctivists have an additional motive for challenging (CE). Even antidisjunctivists were able to argue that the negative dispositions in hallucinations are indeed due to external factors, they would be forced to concede that hallucinations are not solely internally determined, whether causally or not. As I have demonstrated in the preceding section, this amounts to rejecting (CI) and (IR), which are fundamental aspects of the rationale behind the causal argument.

5. SUMMARY.

This chapter primarily addressed the resistance to the notion of local supervenience for hallucinations, which serves as the premise in the spreading part of the causal argument that antidisjunctivists should focus on. Specifically, it presented forms of resistance that disjunctivists could employ to challenge the main reasons supporting this notion.

This principle was built upon two foundational ideas, (IR) and (CE). (IR) was claim by the causal argument to be supported by empirical observations believed to provide evidence for the causal conclusion. However, this support was challenged on the basis that these observed regularities could also be compatible with alternative disjunctivist hypotheses. Consequently, it was argued that adopting the desired causal conclusion would involve begging the question against these disjunctivists.

(CE) was based on two propositions. Firstly, it proposed that hallucinations are inherently internal events, occurring within the subject and lacking any external location. Secondly, it posited that internal events are exclusively constituted by causal factors. An argument derived from the standpoint of naïve realism and the natural explanation of both successful and unsuccessful demonstrative thoughts highlighted that assuming external hallucinations begs the question against disjunctivists.

Additionally, the Negative View on Hallucinations illustrated the inconsistency of attributing hallucinations solely to internal factors, particularly when considering the claim of causal exclusivity put forth earlier. This inconsistency arises from the fact that hallucinations commonly exhibit multiple negative characteristics. If these principles were combined and assumed to be true, it would render these negative aspects of hallucinations inexplicable.

General Summary.

As stated in the General Introduction, the main aim of this dissertation was to investigate specific aspects pertaining to Naïve Realism as a prominent and comprehensive philosophical account of perception. Additionally, a key focus was placed on addressing one of its significant challenges, commonly referred to as the causal argument.

The first two chapters of the dissertation examined specific aspects of Naïve Realism as a philosophical theory of perception. Within the scope of Naïve Realism, a broader distinction was made, highlighting its two possible primary subject matters: the nature of perception and the explanation of its phenomenal aspects. The initial chapters of this dissertation provided separate discussions for each version of Naïve Realism.

Chapter 1 played a vital role in establishing the groundwork for the first version of Naïve Realism, specifically referred to as "Ontological Naïve Realism". The justification for undertaking this endeavor stems from various issues associated with present-day discussion regarding ontological naïve realism. These include the failure to recognize the diverse forms that Naïve Realism can encompass, especially concerning their subject matter (whether it pertains to the nature of perceptions or their phenomenology). Additionally, the lack of acknowledgement of the significant differences between distinct versions of ontological naïve realism is a concern. Moreover, there is a general tendency for naïve-realistic theses to be expressed in unclear or non-standard terminology, which exacerbates the risks associated with the aforementioned issues.

To address these concerns, Chapter 1 of this dissertation aimed to provide a comprehensive characterization of Ontological Naïve Realism by defining its minimal and distinctive thesis. In doing so, I discussed the essential concepts that should be integral to all versions of Ontological Naïve Realism, thereby contributing to the clarification of terminology in this field (as stated in point 3). A significant portion of the chapter was dedicated to exploring the acquaintance relation, which is an essential conceptual element posited by Ontological Naïve Realists. By examining its fundamental features, I discovered that there are various ways in which Ontological Naïve Realists represent this relation, despite using the same linguistic expression. However, I proposed that there are underlying commonalities among these different representations, allowing

for a minimal characterization of acquaintance relations. Considering this, it was necessary to formulate a minimal version of naïve realism as a proposition that disjoins sentences of the form [(∀x,t) (P(x),t → (∃o) (Aq(Sx,o),t)], where the interpretation of "Aq" is associated with a specific member from the class of meanings representing one of those options of acquaintance relation.

This characterization provided a foundation for identifying important distinctions within the realm of ONR and exploring their theoretical implications. Based on these significant features, two classifications of ONR were developed, which were subsequently combined to create a comprehensive taxonomy of ONR. This framework aims to address issue 2) by offering a systematic categorization of different ONR positions. Furthermore, this taxonomy led to the proposal of four recommended structures for future ONRs. The variant and invariant terminology associated with these schemata has already been clarified in the chapter, ensuring that the propositions generated by them are clear.

Chapter 2 takes a more evaluative and critical approach to the second prominent type of version of Naïve Realism. More specifically, This chapter introduces original arguments that endorse a particular version of Phenomenal Naïve Realism called "Objectivism".

After providing a general characterization of Phenomenal Naïve Realism and its "objectivist" version, the chapter proceeded to examine a traditional type of argument against objectivism, which has had a significant impact on the ongoing discussion. However, it became evident that the most famous arguments of this do not definitively refute objectivism. Despite the potential challenges they pose, it appears that objectivists can always offer a response to them (although the response may potentially be awkard). Subsequently, another type of objection against objectivism, which has recently emerged, was presented. Nonetheless, objectivists may still have the opportunity to counter this line of reasoning, much like they did with the traditional objections.

However, a following section introduces an argument that challenges the validity of the prevailing form of objectivism as presented in the existing literature. Nevertheless, I also demonstrate that a revised version of objectivism could potentially overcome this argument, although it still encounters certain difficulties. This modified theory represents a novel approach within the realm of both objectivism and Naïve Realism in its entirety, as it posits that perceptions inherently entail familiarity with facts pertaining to sense

organs. The significance of this section and its argument lies in the conclusion that objectivism must embrace this new form of naïve realism.

In contrast, the subsequent section presents an argument that decisively challenges objectivism, suggesting that no modification can salvage its position. Specifically, it examines shifted spectra cases and provides an alternative interpretation that demonstrates how objectivists lack the necessary resources to adequately explain potential variations in phenomenology solely based on the external environment. Building upon this analysis, the chapter reaches the conclusion that a subjectivist perspective is more fitting for phenomenal naïve realism.

The final two chapters of the dissertation were dedicated to exploring the causal argument and its implications as a significant challenge to Naïve Realism. Chapter 3 specifically focused on Howard Robinson's version of the causal argument. After investing considerable effort in reconstructing the argument due to its original versions containing obscure points, I identified the most promising premise for naïve realists to concentrate on: the causal principle known as “same causes, same effects”.

In the chapter, the objective was to identify a version of the causal principle that, while being a general causal principle, would not beg the question against naïve realists. The exploration involved considering different specifications in Robinson’s text. However, it was discovered that none of the available options met these criteria. Whether combining maximally determinate and intrinsicality aspects, or introducing a property candidate as a participant in a natural law, the potential principles generated implausible general causal principles.

Chapter 4 focused on an altered version of Robinson's argument, as articulated by Michael Martin, which has become a prominent form of the causal argument in the ongoing discussions surrounding naïve realism and disjunctivism. The chapter commenced by highlighting certain problems with the prevailing responses to this argument, particularly those that concentrated on its “screening off” part. These issues prompted an examination of the other facet of the argument, which involves the extension of fundamental properties of hallucinations to perceptions.

The most viable approach for naive realists to address this causal argument involved a premise incorporating a principle referred to as “local supervenience for hallucinations”. This principle was derived from two separate foundational notions. Firstly, it is grounded on the idea that experiences, in general, are causally determined solely by factors internal to the subject. Secondly, it derived from the assertion that

hallucinations are exclusively causally constituted, meaning they lack any non-causal constitutive conditions.

The initial principle was initially motivated by certain empirical observations, which were believed to provide evidence for the causal conclusion. However, this support was challenged on the grounds that these supposed regularities could also be compatible with alternative disjunctivist hypotheses. Thus, it was argued that selecting the desired causal conclusion would entail begging the question against these disjunctivists.

The second premise leading to local supervenience for hallucinations, on the other hand, was based on two distinct propositions. Firstly, it posited that hallucinations are inherently internal events, meaning that they do not occur within or have a location in the external environment. Secondly, it argued that internal events are exclusively constituted by causal factors.

The "Negative View of Hallucinations", a conception derived from our ordinary intuitions about hallucinations, was introduced as a prima facie plausible perspective that had the potential to challenge both of these assumptions.

Firstly, an argument grounded in the perspective of naïve realism and the natural explanation of demonstrative thoughts, both successful and unsuccessful, revealed that the assumption of external hallucinations begs the question against disjunctivists. Secondly, this argument demonstrated that the notion of hallucinations being solely caused by internal factors, when combined with the assertion of causal exclusivity outlined earlier, is at odds with the multiple negative characteristics that hallucinations plausibly possess. If these principles, when combined, were true, then these negative aspects would become unexplainable.

Appendix to Chapter 1

In Chapter 1, I introduced and addressed two interconnected theoretical issues that arise in contemporary discussions about naïve realism. These issues served as motivation for the research conducted in that chapter. The first issue concerns the lack of recognition of important distinctions within the realm of naïve realism. The second issue pertains to the presence of obscure or non-standardized terminology in naïve realistic theses, which has been argued to contribute to or exacerbate the first problem. In this appendix, I will provide concrete examples that illustrate how these issues manifest in current discussions.

One of the most emblematic examples of the second issue (and also contributes to the occurrence of the first issue) is the use of "…constitutes..." (and related concepts), specially when combined with "phenomenal character". The way these concepts have been put together implies not only that they were usually understood in non-standardized or obscure fashions, but also that it really yielded a lack of mutual understanding between peers and the (unacknowledgedly) proliferation of naïve-realistic theses.

For example, Campbell (2002, p. 116) writes that "[t]he phenomenal character of your experience, as you look around the room, is constituted by the actual layout of the room itself: which particular objects are there, their intrinsic properties, such as color and shape, and how they are arranged in relation to one another and to you". Of course, the standard reading of "…constitutes…" and "phenomenal character" will make this observation eccentric. For "phenomenal character" is (as ordinarily taken) a property and so only in some non-standard accounts of properties (which was never indicated by Campbell) can be taken as literally having particulars as proper parts.

The usual way of making sense of it is, for example, in Smith's (2002, p.43-44, emphasis added) lines: "[p]erceptual consciousness is, at least when veridical, an immediate registration of a normal physical object, in the sense that the sensory character of your conscious state […] *is accounted for* by the possession by that object of perceptible qualities, together with the fact that you stand in a relation of awareness, or receptivity, to it […]. That which gives sensory character to perceptual consciousness is a public quality of some physical object". In this sense, those objects would not be literally a part of perceptions' phenomenal character but are actually in some explicative nexus between them (which can be naturally understood in terms of *in-virtue-of* relation). This

relation does not require necessity, as "constitution" (in any natural reading) does, but only sufficiency. (For the nature of *in-virtue-of* relation, see, e.g. Audi (2012a, 2012b)).

Fish (2009, p.6), on the other hand, thinks that we should take "…constitutes…" in the usual mereological sense.

> As far as the conscious character of visual perception is concerned, the core claim of naive realism is that, when we see, external objects and their properties "shape the contours of the subject's conscious experience" (Martin 2004: 64). The metaphor of 'shaping' is read in a constitutive rather than a merely causal sense. Consider the following scenario: looking down at a glacial valley, I say to you, "Can you see how the glacier shaped the contours of the landscape?" Here, 'shaping' is being used in a causal sense the glacier shaped the contours of the landscape by causing the elements of the landscape to be the shape they are. In this reading of "shaping", the claim that external objects "shape the contours" of conscious experiences would in fact be compatible with any metaphysical realist theory of perception. But if I were to ask instead, "Can you see how the sides of the hills shape the contours of the landscape?" I would be using 'shaping' not in a causal sense but rather in a constitutive sense— on this reading, the hillsides shape the contours of the landscape by actually being the contours of the landscape.

This, I suggest, is how we should understand the naïve realist's claim that external objects and their properties shape the contours of the subject's conscious experience: they shape the contours of the subject's conscious experience by actually being the contours of the subject's conscious experience". So, according to Fish, naïve realists are concerned with the idea of veridical perceptions (as conscious episodes) themselves as are literally having mind-independent things as mereological constituents. So, here, what is at issue is the proper parts of experiences, not their phenomenology. This thesis will be shown as a consequence of a specific type of Ontological Naive Realism, INR, as proposed in Section 3, along with the idea that facts have particulars as proper parts.

A supplementary interpretation was generated from some forms of arguments from the so-called transparency thesis, which indeed yielded a new naïve-realistic proposition, is to read Martin's constitutional thesis (from which, according to Fish's own text, Fish's thesis derives) as saying that "veridical experience has object-involving phenomenal character, and the hallucinatory experience does not" (Kennedy, 2013, p.236). In this case, Kennedy (differently from Fish) really had in mind the traditional interpretation of phenomenal characters, but, at the same time, he thinks that naïve realists in Martinian tradition think that perceptual phenomenal characters are individuated with respect to environmental things (they cannot, therefore, be instantiated by hallucinations, e.g.). (This is, for example, essentially similar to Langsam's (2017) "naïve-realistic"

approach). In this case, Kennedy really thinks that, for Martin, the naïve realistic point is to argue for a specie of phenomenological externalism (against the internalist option shown above).

Here, we can see not only the use of obscure/non-standardized terminology in naïve realistic theses (highlighting the second theoretical issue mentioned), which has lead to a multitude of interpretations, but also a lack of recognition of crucial differences among the theses resulting from it (related to the first theoretical issue). For example, Martin's naïve-realistic thesis has been interpreted in very distinct ways, even varying with respect to their subject matter. This was the case in Fish's and Kennedy's interpretations, which respectively regarded Martin's thesis as a mereological fact of perceptual episodes (therefore as a thesis about the nature of perceptions) and as a thesis about their phenomenology. This illustrates the danger that motivates Chapter 1.

The previous paragraphs demonstrate how Martin's original account inadvertently led to the emergence of two distinct and relevant naïve realist theses, despite not being explicitly recognized as such. Another illuminating example of this kind of situation can be found in Fish's (2009) work on the Disjunctivist-&-Naïve-Realist total approach. This example highlights the extreme case where, due to the use of obscure or non-standardized terminology, new naïve realist theses were inadvertently created based on previous misinterpretations.

Fish (2009) uses Byrne's (2008) conception of "phenomenal character", which is actually akin to Martin's (2004, 2006) "fundamental properties" (i.e., the properties in virtue of which an experience has its nature), reserving the term "what it is like aspect" for what we usually call "phenomenal character". This is why, for example, Fish claims that, according to naïve realists, the "acquaintance property [i.e., the property of becoming acquainted with some mind-independent thing] can therefore be *identified* with the experience's phenomenal character" (Fish, 2009, p.20, emphasis added), instead of asserting, for example, that the acquaintance is what is *responsible* for what is like to have a certain perception without equating the two. For, phenomenal character, conceived standardly (as reducible to what-is-likeness properties), is typically reportable using expressions like "it looks/seems to one as…", which is obviously not captured by corresponding "acquaintance reports".

Assuming that Fish's "phenomenal character" is what is *responsible* for the experience's nature (rather than identifying it to what is like to have the experience) also fits nicely his disjunctivist claim that "hallucinations lack phenomenal character

altogether" (Fish, 2009, p.81). Supposing that Fish was conceiving phenomenal character standardly would amount to affiliating him with the far-fetched view that hallucinations are non-sensory events (like beliefs and the like). The present interpretation of "phenomenal character", however, allows us to say that Fish was only viewing the nature of hallucinations in negative terms, as Martin did.

The problem, however, is that the lack of acknowledgment of such non-standardized use of "phenomenal character" by Fish led Logue (2011; 2012b) to think that Fish was claiming (quite surprisingly) that there is nothing it is like to hallucinate. This misinterpretation led Logue to introduce (since it was not in Fish's original account) this "eliminativist" approach as a sui generis disjunctivist option. Here, one may see how a Chinese Whispers-style process, from Martin to Logue (through Fish), gave rise to three distinct approaches. It is undeniable, therefore, that the lack of conceptual clarity and fixation in fact have been a hindrance in contemporary naïve-realistic (and disjunctivistic, by extension) contemporary discussion.

Appendix to Chapter 3.

As shown in Chapter 3, Robinson's argument is structured as follows:

> 1.It is theoretically possible by activating some brain process which is involved in a particular type of perception to cause an hallucination which exactly resembles that perception in its subjective character. 2. It is necessary to give the same account of both hallucinating and perceptual experience when they have the same neural cause. Thus, it is not, for example, plausible to say that the hallucinatory experience involves a mental image or sense-datum, but that the perception does not, if the two have the same proximate—that is, neural—cause. These two propositions together entail that perceptual processes in the brain produce some object of awareness which cannot be identified with any feature of the external world—that is, they produce a sense-datum (Robinson, 2009, p.153).

Formulated in this manner, however, the argument still contains certain inconsistencies or obscurities, especially when considering the subsequent points discussed by Robinson. Therefore, it is necessary to engage in further exegetical analysis in order to extract a version of his causal argument that is worth discussing. As a preliminary step, I will rephrase both premises in an attempt to align them more closely with Robinson's official version, ensuring compatibility with the remaining text.

First and foremost, it is important to note that Robinson asserts the impossibility of perceptions and hallucinations having numerically identical causes, even in hypothetical scenarios, due to the presence of distinct underlying remote causes (which aligns with a form of origin essentialism for events). Therefore, when considering premise 1, we should interpret it as "...activating some *kind* of brain process...". Strictly speaking, referring to types participating in the causal relation as themselves causing something is nonsensical. Consequently, since Robinson seems to have mixed up discussions about causal types and tokens, I interpret "a particular type of perception" as solely referring to "a token of perception of a specific kind". This interpretation is likely what Robinson intended, given that the phrase "that perception" appears to refer back to the aforementioned term.

The final preliminary aspect to consider about premise 1 is how to interpret the phrase "it is theoretically possible". In Robinson's subsequent discussion (ibid, p.153-4), it appears that he does not simply refer to physical non-impossibility, which only requires

compatibility with natural laws. Instead, he includes the notion of positive plausibility[159], which encompasses specific empirical evidence that supports the theoretical possibility. In other words, for Robinson, "theoretically possible" implies not only the absence of logical contradictions or violation of physical laws but also the presence of empirical support and evidence that makes the possibility more plausible.

Given these considerations, premise (1) can be tentatively reformulated as follows: "There is plausibility in asserting that by generating an instance of a specific type of brain process associated with a particular kind of perception-token, it can induce a hallucination with the same phenomenology as that perception".

The second premise also requires further clarification. Firstly, I understand it as a general metaphysical principle, which can be formulated as "Necessarily, for all mental events...".

Secondly, the phrase "give an account" should not pertain to the general types of mental events, such as being a veridical perception or being a hallucination. If that were the case, it would lead to the undesirable conclusion that an event could simultaneously be both a perception and a hallucination.

As Robinson's (2008, p.155-9) discussion progresses, it becomes evident that the relevant "account" pertains to the objects or contents of awareness of the experiences generated. In other words, if two sensory episodes are given the same account, it means they have objects of awareness of the same kind. This interpretation is strongly supported by the fact that Robinson highlights the significance of giving the same account for two events, implying that one event cannot involve a mental image while the other does. Additionally, Robinson explicitly states that denying premise 2 would involve denying that the relevant brain process produces anything beyond a bare act of awareness in the case of normal perception, while still allowing it to produce an internal object or content when artificial stimulation produces a hallucination.

Moreover, Robinson does not give any explanation about what it amounts to two objects being of "the same/different kind", but obviously mental image and physical things are not of the same kind in this relevant sense.

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[159] I employ this term in a manner that is somewhat comparable to how Cellucci (2014) uses it, drawing inspiration from Laudan (1977, 1980). In this context, "plausibility" does not refer to strict propositional aspects like truth or probability, but rather to scientific merit. Specifically, it pertains to having specific empirical support. It is important to note that while the existence of a 10km diameter golden globe is not physically impossible, it is not considered plausible in the current sense due to a lack of supporting evidence or scientific merit.

Hence, in possession of all these adaptations, premise 2 is provisionally stated as "necessarily, for all perceptions and hallucinations, if they have the same neural cause, then they have the same kind of object of awareness".

Nonetheless, the present exegetical effort has to go further to clarify the intended meaning of premise 1 in Robinson's argument. As the discussion progresses, it becomes evident that the proposed interpretation of premise 1 is not precisely what the author intended, even in the terms I previously suggested.

Following the exposition of the argument, Robinson proceeds to justify premise 1, which he considers to be an entirely plausible proposition. He asserts that premise 1 "claims that there is some state of a subject's brain which is sufficient for their having a particular type of experience" and that it implies "the sufficiency of the brain for the production of experience, *phenomenally conceived*" (ibid, p.153-4, my italics). Therefore, the intended meaning of premise 1 goes beyond the mere possibility of a generic kind of brain processing with at least two instances — one causing veridical perception and another, resulting in matching hallucination. This would be a mere consequence of the fact that there are universal properties, which can be instantiated by very different things (or processes) (ibid, p.157). Rather, what Robinson emphasizes in premise 1 is, more restrictedly, the existence of a brain process that is "sufficient" for producing a particular phenomenology, specifically one associated with a possible perception.

But what does Robinson mean by "sufficient"? Based on his exposition, it becomes evident that he is referring to a type sufficiency or causal generality, wherein the relevant brain processing type is such that all its instances lead to the same phenomenology. In other words, the brain process in question is capable of producing a specific type of experience consistently across its instances[160].

In this case, premise 1 would say something like there is a kind of brain processing B that is sufficient (in that sense) for some phenomenology, so that it is possible that one particular instance of B causes a veridical perception and some other instance of B causes a hallucination. Plainly, that hallucination has the same phenomenology as the perception and thus so they are phenomenally matching.

[160] The existence of generalizations of this form in all cases of causation is implied by "rules by which to judge of causes and effects", from Hume's *Treatise*. This was originally expressed in "where several different objects produce the same [kind of] effect, it must be by means of some quality, which we discover to be common amongst them. For as like effects imply like causes, we must always ascribe the causation to the circumstances, wherein we discover the resemblance" (Hume, 2007, p.174).

I would like to make a further adjustment in the way I interpret the proposition from this point onward. Since premise 1 consists of a conjunction of three sentences (one addressing the existence of a type like B and its corresponding instantiation in both cases of perception and hallucination), I will break it down into its constituent parts. This will result in the creation of the first three premises in my formalization, allowing for a more focused and systematic evaluation of each component.

Considering the supposed plausibility of what premise 1 requires, Robinson devotes a significant portion of his argument to justifying premise 2. He acknowledges that the natural response from naive realists would be to assert that there might indeed be a type of brain processing that aligns with the description provided in premise 1, but it does not necessarily imply that all instances of this processing will result in awareness of the same kind of things. According to this perspective, it is conceivable that some instances of this processing could give rise to awareness of mind-independent entities, while others may generate awareness of sense-data events, both exhibiting identical phenomenology. This suggestion allows for the existence of B, something whose instances consistently produce a particular phenomenology, without determining the specific type of objects of awareness. For example, instances of B could "always cause a 'seeming to see something red' but that sometimes it will do this by causing a genuine seeing and sometimes by causing a hallucination, where these two states are essentially different" (ibid, p.157).

Plausible as it may be, this suggestion contradicts a seemingly compelling principle known as the "same proximate cause, same immediate effect" principle, abbreviated as "(S)". This principle posits that for any two events x and y, if they have the same immediate causes, then they must be the same effects[161]. However, it is necessary to provide further clarification regarding this principle.

Firstly, when Robinson refers to "same" in the context of (S), he does not mean numerical identity, but rather type-identity based on the descriptions under which two

[161] Although Robinson does not provide explicit definitions for the terms "proximate cause" and "immediate effect," there is likely to be little or no disagreement on their meaning. A tentative analysis of the relation "proximately causes" can be formulated as follows: "For all episodes x and y, x proximately causes y if x causes y and there is no event z such that z causes y but does not cause x." With this understanding, it follows that, necessarily, for all episodes x and y, x is a proximate cause of y and, conversely, y is an immediate effect of x if x proximately causes y. It is important to note that this analysis may raise some concerns regarding overlapping events (such as events and "sub-events"), which may necessitate further adaptation. However, the essence of the definition remains intact. Furthermore, for the purposes of this discussion and in Chapter 3, the terms "cause" and "effect" will be used to refer to "proximate cause" and "immediate effect" respectively.

things can be classified. However, if he does not adequately restrict the types of descriptions he mentions, then the principle "(S)" becomes empty or irrelevant, rendering the argument ineffective[162].

As discussed in Chapter 3, Robinson (ibid, p.156-8) opts to define "same effects" in terms of the sharing of specific types of properties, which I will refer to as "R-properties", between these events. The exact nature of such a particular-to-universal relation, both in Robinson's explicit definition and in possible interpretations that would render (S) a plausible principle, is extensively explored in Chapter 3. However, regardless of the specific definition of "being some event's R-properties", in order to arrive at the conclusion that perceptions and hallucinations have the same kind of object of awareness, it is necessary to include the property of having a certain kind of thing as its object of awareness.

An adaptation. Premise two, as currently formulated, is merely an immediate consequence of (S) and the underlying assumptions regarding the relevant hypothetical hallucinatory and perceptive events. It also asserts that these events share the same immediate cause, and that the R-property of a perception corresponds to the property of having a material kind of object, while the R-property of a hallucination corresponds to the property of having a mental kind of object of awareness. In order to facilitate a more detailed analysis of the argument, I will break premise two down into these four separate propositions.

A final remark. As demonstrated, Robinson explicitly attempts to clarify the concept of sameness when referring to immediate effects, providing a provisional analysis. According to his understanding, two things are considered "the same" in this context if one possesses the other's R-properties, and vice versa. However, Robinson did not approach the concept of sameness in the same manner when applied to proximate causes. While he presents a specific pair of concrete cases of proximate causes that qualify as "the same" based on the current definition, he does not establish a general criterion explicitly.

Certainly, it is reasonable to apply the previous analysis of the sense of "sameness" in "same causes" to the issue of effects as well. While Robinson does not

[162] Traditional quantifiers are not applicable in this context, as stating that events resulting from the same cause fall under exactly the same descriptions would imply numerical identity. Similarly, using an existential quantifier would not convey the intended meaning of having at least one common description, as it would simply be a consequence of the trivial claim that any two things share some feature.

provide an explicit analysis of the “sameness” of proximate causes, he also does not suggest that the first analysis is exclusive to immediate effects. Therefore, it is plausible to interpret “is the same as” as having a single sense, rather than assuming a more complicated exegetical option. A reasonable interpreter would be initially justified in adopting this approach.

The problem with accepting this suggestion is that it would render the argument incomplete. Robinson's discussion does not provide sufficient information about the brain processes that cause sensory events. Without further clarification, we cannot infer whether these brain processes are truly “the same” or not. Consequently, the argument would be flawed since it relies on the assumption that the relevant brain processes possess the same R-properties. However, the argument does not provide any additional details about the R-properties of these brain processes, other than their capacity to cause events with a specific phenomenology.

Hence, there is a lack of clarity regarding the definition of “being the same causes”. The argument relies on the assumption that the causes of the brain events mentioned are “same causes” in order for (S) to apply. However, Robinson's discussion only provides general information about two causes being “the same” in terms of their inclusion in the same general pattern of proximate causation, akin to a Humean regularity. Therefore, the only viable interpretation we have is to understand "same causes" (at least to some extent) in these terms. Thus, the argument presupposes something along the lines of:

(GS) It is necessary that, for all events x and y, if there is an event property F, such that x and y are F and all F’s instances whose all its instances immediately cause an event of some same kind, then x and y are considered “same causes”.

Someone, especially after considering the implications of interpreting (S) in this way, may argue that this interpretation is overly ungenerous towards Robinson. However, if our aim is to faithfully reconstruct his intentions based on his written work, we cannot go beyond this point. Nevertheless, in Section 4 of Chapter 3, I explored various alternative interpretations of “same causes” that could potentially make (S) a more plausible general causal principle.

In the face of all these preliminary clarifications, it is time to structure Robinson’s argument in a clearer fashion:

(1) It is plausible that there exists a type of brain process B and a phenomenal character P, such that for any brain process b, if b exemplifies B, then b proximately causes the experience to instantiate P.

(2) There can be a veridical perception p and a hallucination h, such that the proximate causes of p and h are B.

(3) (GS).

(4) [From (1), (2), (3)] p and h have the same causes.

(5) (S).

(6) [From (5), 6)] p and h are the same immediate effects, thereby exemplifying the same R-properties.

(7) The property of having a certain kind of object of awareness is an R-property of both p and h.

(8) [From (6), (7)] p and h have the same kind of object of awareness.

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