Advanced Research in English Series

LANGUAGE IN SELF-HELP COUNSELLING

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What type of text is a self-help book? What motivates people to read this type of books? What sorts of linguistic structures and strategies are characteristically used by self-help counselling authors? How do these authors textualise problems and the reconceptulisations intended to influence readers' conduct? How do they create and maintain a counselling persona? *Language in Self-help Counselling* investigates these and other related questions.

For example, in an original analysis of narrative, Meurer borrows from philosopher Karl Popper and relates language use to Popper's different 'realities'. Within the hortatory schema of self-help counselling, narrative is looked at as a world 3 reality which has the potential to affect world 2 realities and to influence people's (world 1 entities) actual behaviour. Though hortatory texts are probably universal, they are possibly the least vivid among discourses. Meurer argues that it is thus natural for self-help books to embed more vivid rhetorical modes, such as narrative and question-answer modes, in order to make their hortatory intentions more appealing to readers.

Structure-wise, Meurer shows that authors embed texts within texts, such as predictive and predicted pairs. He describes the textualisation of seven different types of such pairs and how each pair allows for the partitioning and structuring of information within self-help texts, adding persuasiveness to the arguments presented, foregrounding the interpersonal function of language, and making text processing more manageable.

Language in Self-help Counselling also explores language as a classificatory system. It looks into strategies used by self-help authors to classify themselves, their readers and their arguments in certain ways. Meurer investigates how self-help authors present a given problem, the way they discursively construct their identity as counselling personae, and the way they attribute both higher status and higher value to their claims as opposed to presupposed claims of characters in their narratives and of potential readers of these books.

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PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM INGLÊS

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LANGUAGE IN SELF-HELP COUNSELLING

José Luiz Meurer

... The fact is that words play an enormous part in our lives and are therefore deserving of the closest study. The old idea that words possess magical power is false; but its falsity is the distortion of a very important truth. Words do have a magical effect—but not in the way that the magicians supposed, and not on the objects they were trying to influence. Words are magical in the way they affect the minds of those who use them. "A mere matter of words," we say contemptuously, forgetting that words have power to mould men's [and women's] thinking, to canalize their feeling, to direct their willing and acting. Conduct and character are largely determined by the nature of the words we currently use to discuss ourselves and the world around us.

Aldous Huxley, Words and their meaning,
quoted in Hayakawa (1965:3, 2nd. ed.)

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.0 Preliminaries

One of the characteristics of contemporary society is reflexivity, which refers to people's concern with their self-identity, with getting to know themselves better, to reflect upon themselves (Giddens 1991). Closely related to reflexivity are Foucault's concept of confession (apud Fairclough 1992:52-54) and Giddens' (1991) notion of expert systems. In modern society people need to confess, to talk about their problems, wishes, ideas. Because people are interested in developing their self-identity, they resort to specialised technical knowledge of expert systems to help them solve their problems, including their identity 'crises'. Because of the complexities of modern life, people resort to counselling, drawing on expert systems including investment advice, legal consultation, different therapeutic treatments, and the reading of self-help books, one example of which in examined in this book. (I will return to reflexivity in Chapter 6).

Another important characteristic of modern society is the use of interviews to evaluate, classify, and attribute roles and identities to different people. Fairclough encapsulates this practice under the super-ordinate term examination (Foucault 1979). Confession and examination, in the technical sense presented above, are considered two everyday techniques of power in modernity which closely relate to the two discursive practices of counselling and interview, respectively. The latter is used in several different areas and institutions in modern society: there is therapeutic, educational, employment, consumer, investment and legal counselling; and there are medical, sociological, job, and

media interviews (Fairclough 1992). Fairclough (1993:139) considers counselling and interview to be "among the most salient characteristics of modern societal orders of discourse."

The present book deals with aspects of the language of counselling. To my knowledge, in spite of the abundance of counselling materials, texts within this area have not been given attention in discourse analysis. *Calm Down*: *How To Cope With Frustration And Anger*, a 128-page (37,000-word) book by Dr Paul Hauck (1974, eighth impression 1993), has been selected as the basic text for the analysis to be carried out here. This type of text has been chosen because of its representativeness as a sample of advice books, a type of contemporary mass culture written discourse widely read by the general public but largely ignored in discourse analysis.Text/discourse analysis has investigated specific aspects of specific types of language such as the language of the news (Fowler 1991, Bell 1993), the language of biology (Myers 1990), optics (Bazerman 1988), jokes (Chiaro 1993), introductions to scientific articles (Swales 1990, Meurer 1997), the language used by patients in psychiatric consultations such as the ones reported in Labov and Fanshel (1977), and Ribeiro (1993, 1994), the language of geography (Stubbs and Gerbig 1993), of geology (Love 1993), of economics (Henderson et al. 1993), etc. I know of no studies, however, on the language of counselling as exemplified by the data I have chosen to examine in this book.

Many people read this type of publication either in the form of books or in the form of articles in popular magazines. Witness, for example, the number of printings of Dr. Hauck's *Calm Down*, and the list of best sellers in the area in Brazil (e.g., Shinyashiki's *Amar Pode Dar Certo*, in its 25th impression in 1991), and in the USA (e.g., Tannen's *You Just Don't Understand*, 1991). Counselling, sometimes referred to as popular psychology, "is all-pervasive" in women's magazines, another example, as

reported by Ballaster, Beetham, and Hebron (1991:146) and Heberle (1997). Self-help counselling constitutes a form of popular culture and it is interesting to study this type of text to see how it is characterised as a rhetorically organised mechanism of social interaction and argumentation for sociocognitive change. Throughout this book I explore how the book *Calm Down* is structured as such a mechanism.

The analysis of a whole book is expected to shed light on a variety of parameters of textualisation as well as on problems of analysing long texts. By examining a whole book I intend to go beyond the text analysis practice of concentrating on short texts, as illustrated by the following quotation:

> In the construction of this theory [the Rhetorical Structure Theory] we have analyzed more than 400 texts, from one paragraph to several pages in length, of the following types: administrative memos, personal letters, letters to the editor, advertisements, Scientific American articles and abstracts, newspaper articles and editorials, organizational newsletter articles and appeals, public notices in magazines, travel brochures, and recipes. (Mann, Matthiessen, and Thompson 1992:42).

This practice has been criticised by linguists interested in the analysis of long texts, such as Phillips (1989) and Stubbs and Gerbig (1993), for example. Stubbs and Gerbig observe that "despite interesting and substantial analysis both of linguistic corpora and also of real texts, methods of analysing individual long texts have received little discussion" (p. 65). Together with these authors I intend to produce a kind of text analysis that exercises its tenets far away from the irony implied by the following comment they also quote from Phillips (1989:8): "Linguistics has traditionally been restricted to the investigation of the extent of language that can comfortably be accommodated on the average blackboard."[1]

In this book I concentrate on the analysis of selected aspects of the language of counselling as represented by the book *Calm*

Down written by Dr. Paul Hauck. I hope to contribute towards the analysis of long texts, a necessary step in text analysis, as suggested by Stubbs and Gerbig (1993).

1.1 Overview of the book

The selected data are analysed under four general perspectives, as follows.

1.1.1 Narrative in self-help counselling

In this part of the book I examine some aspects of the notional structures (Longacre 1983) of narrative in *Calm Down*. Narrative is a highly productive text type in the sense that it can be used not only to narrate but also to describe, expose, and argue (Virtanen 1992). In the language of counselling, narration seems to function most of the time as context and as illustration for argumentation. In addition, narrative also has a community-building, unifying function. The very first chapter of *Calm Down* starts with the narrative of how a certain Mrs Baker was persuaded to take the author's advice seriously in relation to the anger and frustration caused by her husband's drinking problem and associated behaviour. The case is then used as a schema (Meurer 1991) or scenario (Sanford and Garrod 1981) for the presentation and discussion of frustration/anger-related issues throughout the chapter. As we will see later in this book, narrative is also used as a basis for problematisation and reconceptualisation (see definition of these terms in 1.1.3 below).

1.1.2 Textual organisation

A significant part of the general process of attributing ideational meaning to a text relates to the perception of different relations between surface structure elements, such as prediction and clause relations. (Definitions of these terms are given in the sections below). I investigate aspects of these textual phenomena

in *Calm Down* and how they contribute to the overall organisation and meaning of this sample of self-help counselling. In relation to this more textual perspective of the analysis I subscribe to Winter's (1992:132) generalisation that "in our present inadequate state of knowledge, an ideal linguistic analysis is one whose use of categories enhances our understanding of a sentence in the text in its immediate context of adjoining sentences", the context of the adjoining clauses being the co-text of the selected book as a whole.

1.1.3 Problematisation and reconceptualisation

Regarding a more ideational and interpersonal perspective, I examine how the phenomena of problematisation and reconceptualisation is linguistically realised in *Calm Down*. "Problematisation, simply defined, is showing that a prevailing assumption, idea, view, or situation needs re-examination, or re-evaluation of some kind" (Barton 1992:2). In contrast to the practice in academic texts, for example, where authors oppose the claims of other authors, in counselling texts the author opposes assumptions that her/his readers themselves may hold. Following studies by Barton (1992) and Hunston (1993c, 1994) I look into how the author of *Calm Down* uses the strategy of problematisation in order to establish a niche (Swales 1990) or a point of departure. I also investigate the strategies the author uses to establish a counselling persona as well as the strategies the author exploits to work towards persuading his readers to re-examine or re-evaluate previous assumptions, or views, as a way to orient them towards new conceptualisations.

1.1.4 Counselling as a genre

Within the theory developed by Halliday, the concept of genre is not clearly separated from that of register. Halliday (1978) talks about generic structure, to refer to "the form that a text has

as a property of its genre" (p. 133). But then, the concept of generic structure is "brought within the general framework of the concept of register, the semantic patterning that is characteristically associated with the 'context of situation' of a text" (p. 133). In other words, for Halliday, register is a variety of language, corresponding to a variety of situation: the kind of variety in language that goes with variation in the context of situation (see also Halliday and Hasan 1989). Halliday (1978:31) explains: "that kinds of linguistic situation differ from one another in three ways: first, as regards what is taking place; secondly, as regards what part the language is playing; and thirdly, as regards who is taking part". These three variables, taken together, determine the range within which meanings are selected and the forms which are used for their expression. In other words, they determine the 'register'." For Halliday, the aim of a theory of register is "to attempt to uncover the general principles which govern [language] variation [according to the situation], so that we can begin to understand what situational factors determine what linguistic features" (p. 32). For other linguists, what Halliday classes under register is tackled within genre theories. In chapter 5, Counselling as Genre, I look into how genre has been seen by a number of influential linguists and how *Calm Down* can be characterised as belonging to an identifiable genre, pointing out how the analysis of genre can be utilised to bring together several aspects of the analysis carried out in this book.

1.2 Overview of the ideational content of *Calm Down*

A computer search for the most frequent open-set lexical items in the book as a whole revealed the list presented in Figure 1.1, which by itself gives us an idea of the semantics of the overall message. As suggested by the list of items in Figure 1.1, *Calm Down* deals with anger, getting angry and behaving angrily as a

subject matter. The overall objective of the book is to persuade readers to consider what they think it is that makes them feel angry when something happens, or a person does something that prevents them from getting their way or having what they want. Dr. Hauck's basic assumption is that people can learn that there is no need to get angry and behave angrily every time something frustrates them in their everyday life.

lexical item	Number of occurrences
anger/angry/angrily	375
get	343
think/thought	179
make/made	177
frustrate	140
want	131
people	126
behave	108
husband/man	105
way	100
no	99
go	94
time	93
person	89
live/life	84

Figure 1.1 - Most frequent lexical items in *Calm Down*

Dealing with the question of how to cope with anger, *Calm Down* informs readers about a universal form of feeling and behaviour which, if ignored, may have serious consequences regarding not only human relations but also people's health. The argument developed throughout the book to persuade readers to reconceptualise their beliefs about anger, and thus create an alternative reality, can be summarised as follows. Consider situations "A", "B", and "C", such as "A" represents a given

event or circumstance, something that happened to somebody or that someone else did to somebody; "B" represents what somebody thinks or believes about A; and C represents the state of being angry (see Figure 1.2).



Figure 1.2 - Representation of the general process of getting angry.

The book is intended to teach, and convince the readers that it is not the case that C is a consequence of A, or that C happens because of A. Rather, C (anger and its aftermath) results from B (what one thinks or believes about A, how one responds to A). Taking this as a fact, the author develops his teaching and argumentation inviting and advising readers to internalise a new set of notions in order to cognitively reshape B such that C may eventually be avoided altogether. According to the author, important life-quality benefits will result for the readers who effectively internalise and make use of the reconceptualisation proposed, while unfortunate consequences of anger will continue to loom for readers who do not.

CHAPTER 2

NARRATIVE IN SELF-HELP COUNSELLING

> From narratives, major and minor, we learn much about ourselves and the world around us. Making, apprehending, and storing a narrative is making sense of things which may also help make sense of other things.
>
> (Toolan 1988, p. xiii)

2.0 Introduction

In attempting to specify a broad discourse typology, Longacre (1983) establishes a useful difference between notional structures and surface structures. Notional structures are related to text function or overall text purpose, while surface structures have to do with the actual textualisation of the functions or purposes writers intend their texts to fulfil. The important point here is that notional functions and surface structures do not always coincide. As I have already pointed out in the introductory chapter, Virtanen (1992), for example, has shown that narrative surface forms are quite flexible in terms of the functions they can perform. They can be used not only to narrate but also to instruct, to argue, and to 'expose'. Using Longacre's (1983) taxonomy, narrative texts, in addition to their narrative notional structure, may also instantiate procedural, behavioural, and expository notional structures.

If we follow Longacre's taxonomy, Hauck's *Calm Down* as a whole can be classified as a behavioural notional structure as the author's main goal is to argue for a certain perspective, his ultimate objective being to lead readers to change their

perception of anger and of the process of getting angry. This classification fits Longacre's (1983:3) taxonomy in that the book displays a behavioural notional structure characterised as "'minus' in regard to contingent temporal succession but 'plus' in regard to agent orientation". In other words, temporal orientation is not important for the overall thrust of the book but agent orientation, in this case orientation toward readers, is. What is crucial about this global classification is that the notional structure of *Calm Down* is constituted by different types of surface structures, narrative being an outstanding one. Of the 37,000 words in the book, 11,189 occur in narratives, distributed in 35 cases. In other words, about 30% of the text is dedicated to narrative structures, i.e., the recounting of perceived sequences of "non-randomly connected events" in the past (Toolan 1988:7). These narrative structures in turn serve a number of different functions, which I examine in this chapter. (Function is understood here in Longacre's (1983) notional structure sense, not in Propp's (1968) sense).

Note that the book starts with the following narrative:

> How to smile at anger
> It was during the third session with Mrs Baker that she finally took my advice seriously and decided I might have something worthwhile to offer her, though it sounded mad.
> 'I can appreciate the fact,' I summarised, 'that living with a drinking husband for thirty years is no picnic. The fact that he is spending the family fortune on drinking is also very hard to take. But the fact that he curses you up one side and down the other every Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday does not mean you have to get angry with the old boy. He's just being a poor sick fellow who can't help himself. For you to get upset over him and his poor behaviour is just plain neurotic.'
> 'Me neurotic?' she almost screamed as she jumped from the chair. 'What about him? He's the craziest guy I've ever met and he's getting worse all the time.'
> 'I know he is. So why should you lose your mind over him? Since your Church frowns on divorce, wouldn't you be so much better

off if you could take him calmly and try to ignore his drinking and swearing?'

'After thirty years of his frittering the business down the drain and after thirty years of his deliberately starting rows with me just so he'll have an excuse to leave the house and head for the pub, or to get out of making sexual advances to me, I should be sweet as apple pie and tell him it's all right?'

'Not exactly. But that would calm you down and give you some relief from your migraine headaches. Since you can't change him, and I presume you can't because you've tried for a third of a century without success and he isn't even motivated enough even now to come to counselling with you, I would definitely say you might as well accept him as a drunk and relax.'

At this point Hauck changes his focus of attention and presents a reasonably long evaluation (Labov 1972) of the events narrated so far: (I will come back to this stretch of text in Chapter 3.) Notice the change from the past tense (*It was during the third session*) at the beginning of the narrative, to the present tense, in the first sentence below, indicating the beginning of the author's comments:

This is the tone our previous sessions had taken: I trying to show her that she was getting herself angry over behaviour her husband simply could not control and she always arguing with me that I just didn't understand her situation and that if I did I wouldn't talk like that.

But it was she who was mistaken, not I. I had been through this debate with hundreds of people before, I knew almost word for word what their arguments would consist of, and I also knew they thought I was ridiculous for suggesting some of the views I did. At such times I grit my teeth and plough on, hoping this session will be the one that brings light to my client, a light so bright that all the mental fog will be dispersed and he or she can finally see what I have been driving at for several sessions or several months of sessions. Mrs Baker was no different from you, the reader, will be as you discover some of the latest psychological findings. These findings are so unusual your first reaction to them will be denial. You will not be able to swallow all the advice I will give to help you

overcome your hatred, resentment, or anger. Only after thinking about my advice for a long time will you be able to use my counselling and make the new psychology work for you. Before that happens, however, you will simply go through the debating and questioning Mrs Baker went through.

The narrative goes on then to its end:

Our sessions continued for another couple of weeks while I attempted to show her how she, not her husband made her angry; what she could do to avoid and overcome that anger; and, lastly, how she could do this for almost every single annoyance she ever encountered, not just the frustrations of living with a drunken husband.

One day she came in all smiles. ‘You wouldn’t believe what happened,’ she said with impatience.

‘Mr Baker swore at you and you laughed,’ was my guess.

‘Yes, how ever did you know?’ was her shocked response. ‘Just a good guess, that’s all. Tell me what happened.’

She took a breath and eagerly related the following: ‘If it hadn’t happened to me I wouldn’t have believed it. The other night my husband was working himself into a foul mood. He had come home from work, started drinking, and was getting more foul-mouthed with every passing minute. At first I tried to ignore it, and for some minutes that helped. But as he kept up his badgering I couldn’t ignore him and then began to feel myself getting hotter and hotter under the collar. I was just about to answer one of his sarcastic remarks when I remembered some of the things you had been telling me. You know: no one can anger me but myself; why get angry with him when he’s such a mess; forgive him for his nastiness and I’ll do myself a big favour, and so on. Well, what happened then was beautiful, a miracle. I felt the tension and anger simply drain from my body. I could hardly believe how good I felt. There he stood, getting redder and redder in the face, expecting me to fire back the same thing he was throwing at me. Instead, I just sat down in my chair with a Mona Lisa smile on my face and let his anger roll off me like water off a duck’s back.

‘Now that I think of it, another reason I felt so good was that I realised I had not simply suppressed my anger and sat there with a lid on it. I’ve done that before, you know - pretend I wasn’t angry but boiling up inside. This time I felt completely at peace because I

> had talked myself out of being angry, not just put it in a pressure cooker.'
> 'And what happened to Mr Baker?'
> 'Oh, him. He got madder and madder as I got calmer and calmer. Finally he put on his hat and, slamming the door behind him, went off to get drunk.'
> A year later I had occasion to speak with Mrs Baker again, this time about another family matter. Before she left my office I asked her how her husband was and how she had managed with her anger over the past few months. I was most gratified by what she said.
> 'My husband drinks as much as ever, even more, probably. He is losing the business, spending our savings, and will no doubt die from alcohol in the not-too-distant future. He's stopped fighting with me because I no longer play that game, thanks to you. I remind myself a hundred times a day that he is disturbed, that the poor dear can't help it, that it's an additional pity he won't even seek professional help, but that my getting upset over his neurosis won't help me or him. In the meantime I've made a life for myself. I attend church, play an active part in the local hospital, and play bridge every Wednesday afternoon. I'm lonely sometimes, of course. However, I'm at peace. Instead of having a frown on my face as I have had for the past thirty years, I now smile a great deal.' (p. 9-12)

Why would Dr. Hauck use narrative at the beginning and at several other parts of *Calm Down*? What do narrative structures add to the overall notional structure of this self-access counselling book? This chapter is dedicated to these questions.

2.1 Narrative and 'reality'

One of the main objectives of authors of self-help books such as *Calm Down* is to provide guidance to readers interested in creating some sort of different 'reality' for themselves. Narrative is one of the rhetorical mechanisms frequently used by writers as co-text in this type of genre to help readers change 'realities' around themselves. It has been said (see Rouse 1990, and section 2.4 below) that all human beings live within ongoing narratives, and that we all make sense of our lives by constantly constructing

narratives. Paraphrasing the quotation from Huxley (see page 9, above) we could say that conduct and character, and to a certain extent 'reality' itself, are largely determined by the narratives we construct and are exposed to as we discuss ourselves and the world around us. Linguists, philosophers and sociologists agree that ultimately discourse processes including the use of narrative help shape our view of 'reality' and influence the constitution of our own identity (see Kress 1989, Rouse 1990, Giddens 1991, Miller 1992).

A narrative is to be understood as a stretch of text in which there is recounted a sequence of connected events in the past (Toolan 1988) relative to the time of recounting (Labov 1972). Narrative may also include events in the future, as proposed in Longacre (1983). In this sense, narrative may be a form of prediction or prophecy, though not in any religious connotation nor involving non-human agency. An example of (a minimal) narrative in the future is General Eisenhower's telling the Allied soldiers before the D-Day assault on the beaches of Normandy (6 June 1944) towards the end of World War 2): "the future generations will speak with wonder about the brave deed you are about to engage in". Orwell's book Nineteen Eighty-Four, though in the past tense, is an example of a long story of an alternative world in the future. This sort of narrative does not take place in *Calm Down*. The reason to mention it here is that authors of books such as *Calm Down* often attempt to influence readers to visualise alternative future 'worlds' for themselves. From this perspective, through the use of narrated situations and events in the past, authors induce readers to 'project' themselves into 'improved' narratives in the future relative to the behavioural topic under discussion: coping with frustration and anger in the case of *Calm Down*.

I have previously stated that writers use narrative to help readers create some sort of different 'reality'. Quite obviously,

one problem here is that the notion of 'reality' is an extremely vague one. Debates about 'reality' have been in the philosophical arena for centuries and we are not nearly close to solving the question of what 'reality' means. However, due to the fact that authors of self-help books constantly attempt to influence the way readers see 'reality' — one way being through narrative, as already observed — it is essential that we clarify the meaning of this term before we focus on specific functions of narrative structures.

For the purposes of this book, I adopt the definition of reality proposed by the philosopher Sir Karl Popper (1967). Rae (1994: 65), in discussing relationships between quantum theory and reality, draws on Popper and on the Nobel prize-winning scientist John Eccles (1977, apud Rae 1994) in order to define reality. This is his definition: "something is real if it can affect the behaviour of a large-scale physical object." (The term large-scale, Rae notes, is used to avoid complexities related to sub-atomic bodies, for instance, which do not matter here). According to this definition, phenomena that we cannot see, such as the wind, or gravity, in addition to visible (physical) objects, are considered real because they obviously affect the behaviour of (large-scale) physical objects. We have no doubt that wind can blow houses away and that objects fall down because of gravitational attraction. Also, since the time Archymedes provided an explanation for his finding expressed in the famous word *eureka!*, it has been known that the quantity of water displaced from a full bath tub, for instance, equals the volume of the body displacing the water. Because such entities affect the behaviour of physical objects, we say they are real. They constitute one type of reality. Popper (1967) and Popper and Eccles (1977, apud Rae 1994) call this type of reality **world 1** objects. I will use the terms *world 1 entities* or *world 1 realities*.

But reality does not end with world 1 entities. Rae (1994:65) explains it the following way: "There are two more 'worlds' in

Popper's philosophy. **World 2** consists of *states of the mind*, conscious or unconscious (my emphasis). These must be considered real for exactly the same reasons as were world 1 objects, that is, they can affect the behaviour of physical objects." In order to make this type of reality clear, let me illustrate the effects of world 2 entities from a number of different perspectives.

Firstly, it is well known today within therapeutic studies and other areas of knowledge such as medicine that emotions such as anger, fear, guilt, and sadness — which are all states of mind — may seriously impair functions of the human body. As the effect of these world 2 entities is quite obvious, we have no doubt that they are real. Hauck, for instance, points out in *Calm Down* that the effects of anger — a main world 2 reality — have sent many people to years in prison, having also been a major cause for divorce. In another example, T. James (1992) reports that "negative emotions block the flow of energy in the body." According to this author, "the latest findings in quantum physics and quantum biology indicate that emotions trapped in the body have the possibility of creating functional blockage in [our] nervous system" (audio tape No. 2). In addition, he claims that emotions such as anger, when active for long periods of time, can cause the brain to send signals to the various organs in the body, leading not only to discomfort but also to other physical problems, including heart attack. (A similar view is held by Hauck as shown on pages 27, 79, and 112 of *Calm Down*). James further reports that the J*ournal of the American Medical Association* recently acknowledged (in an article entitled "30 Year Retrospective Study of Type-A Behavior") that negative emotions do play a role in disease: among 'hard driving' executives it is not: the long hours, the hard work, and competition, but anger and hostility that are the major contributing factors in heart attack.[2]

Further illustration of the reality of world 2 entities — i.e., states of mind — and their effect on human beings, is found in

the research on information recall and its relation to human emotion. As noted by Ashcraft (1994), a cognitive psychologist, the past 15-20 years have witnessed a great deal of interest in the interface between emotion and memory. The interest in the area is evidenced by the appearance of a new journal — *Cognition and Emotion* — dedicated to this domain of knowledge. Ashcraft reports on experimentation involving the interplay between emotion and memory for information. In one of the experiments reported, carried out by Leight and Ellis (1981, apud Ashcraft 1994), subjects were required to recall nonsense words (e.g. bonkid, natvim) after having been induced into a depressed state of mind by reading self-referring "sad mood" induction statements such as:

> 1. Today is neither better nor worse than any other day.
> 2. However, I feel a little low today.
> 3. Sometimes I wonder whether school is all that worthwhile.
> 4. Every now and then I feel so tired and gloomy that I'd rather just sit than do anything.
> 5. Too often I have found myself staring listlessly into the distance, my mind a blank, when I definitely should have been studying. (Ashcraft 1994:645)

The performance of the above subjects was compared to the performance of subjects "placed" in happy and in neutral mood states, also by making use of mood induction statements. The results revealed that the emotional state of the subjects affected their recall of information: the "sad mood" subjects recalled significantly fewer words than the "neutral mood" subjects. Surprisingly, the "happy mood" subjects also recalled less than the "neutral mood" subjects. Ashcraft states that this research and more recent findings (e.g., Ellis and Ashbrook 1988, apud Ashcraft 1994:646) indicate that "any strong emotional state tends to disrupt your focus or attention to the demands of the task". According to Ashcraft (1994:646), "Ellis and Ashbrook (1988) suggested a resource allocation hypothesis as an expla-

nation; the mood state affects cognitive processing so that mental resources — working memory, attention, effort and the like — are not allocated efficiently to the task at hand. The consequence is interference with some aspect of performance..." I believe that these findings, together with the examples from Hauck and James I have mentioned above, are evidence enough of the effects of world 2 entities, our second type of reality.

We can now move on to the third aspect of reality, Popper's world 3. Rae (1994:65) explains it this way:

> Beyond worlds 1 and 2 is world 3. Following Popper, world 3 is defined as the products of the human mind. These are not physical objects, nor are they merely brain states, but are things such as stories, myths, pieces of music, mathematical theorems, scientific theories, etc. These must all be considered real for the same reasons as were applied to worlds 1 and 2. Consider for example a piece of music. What is it? It is certainly not the paper and ink used to write out a copy of the score, neither is it the gramophone record on which a particular performance is recorded. It isn't even the set of sound vibrations in the air when the music is played. None of these world 1 objects are the piece of music, but all exist in the form they do because of the music. The music is a world 3 object, a product of the human mind, which is to be considered as 'real' because its existence affects the behaviour of large-scale physical objects — the ink in the paper of the score, the shape of the grooves in the record, the pattern of vibrations in the air and so on.

Popper (1967) specifies that world 3 includes arguments, theories, "and, of course, the contents of journals, books, and libraries" (p. 59). An important aspect of world 3 entities that must be emphasised here is that "their reality is established only by the intervention of conscious, human beings. The piece of music, a story, or [a] mathematical theorem result in a particular mental state of a human being (i.e., a world 2 object) which in turn affects the behaviour of world 1 [i.e., the human body, in this case]. Without human consciousness this interaction would be impossible and the reality of world 3 could not be established" (Rae 1994:66).

Narratives, as products of the human mind thus constitute world 3 entities. As such, they have the potential to affect human beings' states of mind, world 2 entities. States of mind, in turn, may affect the human body — a world 1 entity — making one laugh or cry, or develop an ulcer, for example, or behave in a certain way. Within this perspective, I look in the rest of this chapter into how Hauck uses narratives with the intention of affecting readers' states of mind. Paraphrasing questions I have already asked, why do authors of self-help books intersperse narratives in their discussion of subject matter? How can narratives like the one about Mrs Baker, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, contribute to create world 2 types of reality, to reinforce them, or to change them? What sort of 'reality' does the author intend to influence readers to create?

2.2 Functions of narrative surface structures in self-help counselling

As an upshot of the weak version of the well known Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, and of work within the area of critical discourse analysis, there is a consensus among a large number of linguists today (e.g., Kress 1989; Lee 1992; Fairclough 1993; Kress and Hodge 1979/1993) that the meanings we encode in language help create 'reality'. In their otherwise illuminating analyses of language use in present day social interactions, what these linguists have not specifically focused on, however, is the meaning they attribute to the broad term 'reality'. In order to discuss the functions of narrative, it seems helpful to adopt Popper's notions of world 1, 2 and 3 as defined above. This will allow us to distinguish different types of 'realities' and to examine how each one of these affects or interferes with the other(s).

All the linguists mentioned above agree that 'reality' is "a matter of perspective and interpretation, rather than an 'objective' property of [a given] situation" (Lee 1992:7). The 'reality' these

scholars are talking about seems to refer to world 2 entities in Popper's sense, as I have specified above, i.e., states of mind, the way we perceive, think about, and understand world 1 and world 3 entities. By adding this perspective to Lee's (1992, and the above mentioned linguists') notion of reality as "a matter of perspective and interpretation, rather than an 'objective' property of [a given] situation", we may be giving the term *reality* a slightly more precise meaning. This, I hope, will help with the ensuing discussion of narratives.

If we can agree that states of mind — which include understanding, beliefs, and emotions — though being a matter of perspective are real entities, we should also agree that states of mind can in principle be influenced — reinforced, upset, changed — by perspectives or viewpoints held by other human beings. In *Calm Down* the author struggles to change readers' understanding of anger and to influence their future behaviour by harnessing narratives as context, as illustration, and as both illustration and context for his discussion of the subject matter. In addition to (1) context, (2) illustration, and (3) illustration/context for (further) discussion, narratives also reveal themselves as (4) unifying, community-building rhetorical mechanisms (Miller 1992). Within these four functions narratives are an important means used to influence other people's states of mind. The first three functions are more visible, while the fourth is a more abstract one. Let us examine each one of these, respectively.

2.2.1 Narrative as context

In its function as context, or in this notional structure, to recall Longacre's (1983) term, the narrative serves the purpose of inducing the reader to create a mental schema (Meurer 1991), or scenario (Sanford and Garrod 1981) within which to process the incoming text. It is interesting to observe, in passing, that the use of narratives as context occurs in other quite different genres

as well. Take, for instance, *Language In Thought And Action* by the linguist Hayakawa (1965), and *Science In Action* by philosopher of science Latour (1987): both also begin with narratives. In Mrs Bakers' case, the story is the rhetorical mechanism (a world 3 entity) that the author uses in order to direct the readers' attention (a world 2 entity) to a world of 'real' events and people (world 1 entities). Specifically, this is done within the two main events in the narrative, namely: "the third session" the author (as a counsellor) had with Mrs Baker, and the session they had "one day [when] she came in all smiles". These two main events are presented in the lively form of a dialogue between the author and Mrs Baker, and serve in turn as context for several other events. Thus, within event 1, "the third session", we come to know about: Mrs Baker's living with a drinking husband, his cursing her, his spending the family money, frittering the business down, and deliberately starting rows, Mrs Baker's migraine headaches, her reported attempts to change her husband without success, the counsellor's attempts to show her that she was getting herself angry over behaviour her husband simply could not control, and her arguments with the counsellor because he just did not understand her situation.

The reason (Labov 1972, Polanyi 1979) for the author to report "the third session" with Mrs Baker, or what makes the event tellable, is that it represents a turning point in Mrs Bakers' understanding and behaviour relative to frustration and anger. It was in this session that Mrs Baker had finally taken the author's advice seriously and had decided that he had something worthwhile to offer her. Implicitly, the author lets the readers know that Mrs Baker is now moving in the direction of comprehending why it was she who was mistaken, not him, in relation to her getting angry with her "poor old man." (See Chapter 3 for the linguistic analysis of how Hauck attributes higher value to his point of view as opposed to that of Mrs Baker).

Within main event 2, the session when our heroine came in all smiles, the narrative form — again through dialogue — portrays the woman as a 'new' person: she has overcome anger by putting Hauck's advice into practice. She now "knows" and practises the idea that no one can anger her but herself, she forgives her husband's nastiness, and avoids bothering about his problems. As a consequence of her learning and of her new state of mind and related behaviour she is now at peace, plays an active part in the local hospital, and plays bridge every Wednesday afternoon, and smiles a great deal — all this in spite of her husband not having changed at all.

Mrs Baker's case, due mainly to its position in the text, is used in order to set up the context for the discussion that will ensue. Looking at the text from an interactive perspective (Sinclair 1982, 1987; Hunston 1993b), it seems theoretically valid for us to assume that as the reader goes through the narrative s/he may wonder, or anticipate (Winter 1977; Tadros 1985) why the author is telling her/him this story. In addition, interaction takes place not only between writer and reader but also within the text itself (as I will show in chapter 3). In this sense, the position of the narrative by itself at the very beginning of the chapter suggests that further textualisation may clarify, or specify (Winter 1982) the point of the narrative. From the perspective of Winter's (1986) basic text structures, narratives constitute the situation to be evaluated in the text following them.

In terms of its ideational content, this introductory narrative shows that Mrs Baker's behaviour has changed, as I have pointed out in the previous paragraph. This raises the expectation that given the understanding of a set of basic principles, which the author promises to deliver in the book (itself a world 3 entity), it is possible for readers as well to change their behaviour in relation to anger and rage. The narrative raises the expectation that readers themselves can learn how to construct healthier, more satisfactory, and more efficient states of mind (world 2 realities).

In this way the author has built a relevant schema or scenario for further use in the book. In fact, Mrs Baker's case is then referred to time and again throughout the whole of the first chapter of the book, reinforcing the schema instantiated by the narration of her predicament, the effective changes she went through, and the overall improvement of her quality of life .

2.2.2 Narrative as illustration

The human world-view, our world 2 entities or 'reality', is to a large extent constructed and reinforced through the use of language. In addition, existing human world-views are constantly changing, change being expedited also through the use of language. If we consider *Calm Down* at its highest macrostructural level of meaning, what its author intends to do, as we have seen in the introductory chapter, is to teach readers that they are responsible for making themselves angry, that people get angry by mistakenly thinking they have to have their own way all the time, and that this view can and should be changed. Within this context, narratives are used throughout the book in order to illustrate the various specific points the author discusses and tries to teach. When narratives have this function they usually occur at the end of a section.

Of the 35 narratives in the book, 8 are used for illustrative purposes. I present an example of this type next. Before looking at the example, note that it occurs in a chapter called "How to keep things in proportion". In terms of the overall goal of the book, as summarized above, at this point Hauck is trying to argue that "One of the worst tendencies we all share is to make big things out of little things. We blow situations up out of all proportion, and then we get scared of the monsters we have created. That often leads to anger. It is, therefore, very important to realize what is and what is not a catastrophe, and what you can do when you are in a very serious situation" (p. 54). By the time the narrative I am showing next occurs, the author has argued

this point, has presented a second section called "Most frustrations are quite tolerable", and has moved on to the third section, termed "Why distinguish between annoyances and catastrophes". This specific section starts with the following generalization: "If you think that what is happening to you is going to kill you, then you certainly aren't going to sit still and let people walk all over you. But if you do not think something is the end of the world, you're going to take it calmly and not get angry over it. Whether your emotions take one direction or the other will depend entirely on what happens at this point" (p. 58). It is here that a narrated case comes in as an illustration for the point being made. Here is the narrative:

> One man I counselled told me how furious he was because his older brother wanted some money from him to help take care of their mother. My client couldn't afford additional payments to his mother's welfare and in addition didn't think they were necessary since his mother had a trust fund which could have supported her easily. But it bothered him considerably to think his brother would try to squeeze a few extra pounds out of him for personal services to care for their mother.
> 'But it is not right,' Bill insisted. 'I've been fair with Henry in every request he's ever made to me. But when he made this demand I felt he was taking me for a ride.'
> 'No, that's not why you're angry, Bill,' I stated. 'Nothing you've said so far sounds neurotic or unreasonable, and to become angry you've got to say angry things to yourself.'
> 'Such as?'
> 'Such as, "It's awful to be treated unfairly by my brother. '
> 'How does that make me angry?'
> 'Because you make catastrophes out of annoyances. It isn't true, for instance, that it really is awful to be treated unfairly by your brother. Prove to me that it's terrible. How has it hurt you ? Not how have you hurt yourself over it, but how has it hurt you? He accuses you of being a miser. Are you a miser? No? Then let him have his opinion and you can have yours.
> 'If on the other hand you had said to yourself: "What a nutcase my brother is, he's trying to squeeze blood out of a stone when he

knows very well I haven't got any money, and worst of all it isn't even necessary to have more. Well, he'll just have to go to Mother's trust fund and support her with that money. Maybe that will leave less for him when she dies, but I can't help that. I don't know what's come over him, he's certainly become inconsiderate over the years. Hope he improves soon. However, if he doesn't, that's his problem, not mine." Now, Bill, if you had spoken and thought to yourself in that vein, could you possibly have been upset?'
'I suppose not. By not making a big thing of his accusations I simply couldn't have reacted too emotionally in any way at all, could I? In other words, it would have been no different from his saying hello to me. If I make a big thing out of that, then I run the risk of being disturbed. If not, then I'm going to be undisturbed. Right?'
'Right. ' (p. 58-60)

Some of the parallels between the author's advice and the above illustration are:

AUTHOR'S ADVICE We need to learn that:	THIS ILLUSTRATION
1. we are responsible for making ourselves angry and that this can be avoided. (Overall aim of the book)	1. Bill, a "man I counselled told me how furious he was because his older brother wanted some money from him to help take care of their mother." This story will show that he drove himself into this state of mind and that this could have being avoided
2. we get angry by thinking we have to have our way all the time	2. Bill thinks his brother Henry should not "try to squeeze extra pounds out of him for personal services to care for their mother"
3. we get angry by believing that people who frustrate us	3. The way Bill sees his brother's attitude implies he believes Henry

or do not let us have our way are bad (and therefore must be punished)	is bad (and deserves at least to be scolded).“It is awful to be treated unfairly by my brother”, which Hauck says Bill must have told himself and Bill is shown to agree.
4. we have a tendency to make big things out of little things and this leads to anger	4. ‘How does that make me angry?’ Because you make catastrophes out of annoyances’.
5. there is a distinction between annoyances and catastrophes and that most of the time what happens to us is not “the end of the world.” We can thus “take it calmly and not get angry over it.”	5. By the end of the story Bill has realised that he has made a catastrophe out of something that could have been seen simply as an idiosyncratic behaviour of his brother.
6. our emotional reactions depend on the way we “see” things in their “real” proportion	6. Once Bill sees his brother’s behaviour from the perspective suggested by Hauck in the story, his emotion may more easily “adjust” to the “real” proportion of the annoyance.

The narrative is used to illustrate that it is necessary to distinguish between catastrophes and annoyances. Within the context of the book as a whole, the narrative also emphasises the author’s assumption that people *talk themselves* into being angry, and that this is something to be avoided. The way the narrative character is made to refer to his own emotion — he is furious at his brother because of a request for money — and the way the author perceives the situation, make it clear that author and character have different standpoints regarding the

unreasonableness of the character's fury. What is specifically at issue is whether the character in the narrative is creating the mental picture of a "big thing out of a little thing." By the end of the narrative it is plain that the character is *blowing things up out of proportion*. His fury, the narrative shows, results from a mental picture he has constructed and which will not help him with anything.

The author's argument seems to lead to a consensus: if there was doubt at the beginning of the story on the part of the character regarding the unreasonableness of his fury, by the end of the story this doubt has disappeared. For readers, that same doubt has either disappeared as well or has at least decreased significantly. This way the narrative illustrates another perspective of how people manage to make themselves unreasonably angry, distressing themselves. The author has thus used a narrative as an argumentative strategy to substantiate the overall thrust of the book: the same way as one can talk her/himself into a state of anger, one can "see" things from a different perspective and wisely avoid getting oneself into such a state.

2.2.3 Narrative as illustration and context

As mentioned previously, when functioning as illustration of a given standpoint, narratives usually occur at the end of a section. Most of the narratives in *Calm Down*, however, occur somewhere in the middle of sections and serve both as illustration of a previous point and as context for further discussion. Of the 35 cases in the book, 26 have this dual notional structure. Here is an example:

> A schoolboy questioned and disagreed with his father's statement about the relative harm of marijuana in comparison with alcohol. In a few minutes his father was so incensed at having his authority questioned that he struck his boy so hard the boy was knocked against the wall and slid to the floor. Harsh words followed until the boy was ordered out of the house, although he had nowhere to go.

> The father would have claimed he was teaching his cheeky son a lesson, and would hardly have understood that he made a catastrophe out of being disagreed with. Once he believed it was horrible and unbearable to have his son disagree with him, he became afraid of appearing wrong. This was so alarming that he had to defend his image as an infallible father to the point where he became very fallible indeed. The fear of being wrong blinded him to the sensible realization that he certainly could be wrong, and that even if he weren't, it hardly mattered that his son disagreed with him. And finally he did not see the obvious fact that the son would not now politely agree with his father even if he could see that he was mistaken. (pp. 61-62)

As illustration and context, narratives are usually preceded by a generalisation explicitly stating what the narrative will be an illustration of. The previous example, which occurs within a section called "Anger can cover up for fear", is preceded by the following generalisation:

> One of the saddest examples of how fear brings on anger is easily seen in the parent who cannot stand being corrected. Should the child of one of these parents show Mum or Dad where she or he is mistaken, the parent becomes intensely defensive and angry at having his or her intelligence or authority questioned.

This strategic use of a generalisation is somewhat similar to the use of what Labov (1972) calls "Abstract" in personal narratives. Like the Abstract, the generalisation constitutes a kind of summary of the story at the same time as it provides the point, the reason why it is worth telling. In addition, the generalisation serves as a link between the topic under discussion and the story itself.

When the narrative itself is finished, which is signalled by a return from past tense to the present tense, the author goes on evaluating the situation portrayed in the story. It is in this sense that the narrative functions at the same time as illustration and context for further discussion. Textually, the sequential pattern is

realised as follows: generalisation + narrative + further discussion. For the example above, this is the discussion the author presents immediately after the narrative (of the schoolboy) is over:

> These defensive adults who always have to be right and who get bothered at the prospect of being shown up are among the most unsure of all. They fear being mistaken so much that they become violent to avoid facing the truth. Angry people are often the most scared and the most inadequate. If they weren't so frightened, they'd hardly make so much of innocent events and get into blind rages over incidents a child could overlook.

It is interesting to notice that the story could be left out, and the text would still be cohesive and coherent. This can be tested by reading the two last quotations above, i.e., the generalisation immediately followed by the discussion. Leaving the story out, however, would cause the text to decrease in vividness and probably to have a lesser impact on the reader.

The illustration-context narrative of the schoolboy occurs later in the same chapter as the previously quoted example of brothers Bill and Henry. We can notice that besides using the example to illustrate the point at hand (that Anger can cover up for fear — the title of the section), the author keeps in perspective both the more general aim of the chapter (to keep things in proportion) and the more global aim of the book as a whole, to teach readers how one can become an "unangry" person. That is, the schoolboy narrative also illustrates the idea of blowing things up out of proportion at the same time that it reinforces the need to understand the psychology of anger, the only way one can get to the state of being an "unangry" person. Keeping such a perspective results from (competent) textualisation strategies on the part of the writer (which I discuss in chapter 3).

2.2.4 Narrative as a unifying, community-building device

According to Miller (1992:8), several authors see narrative as having a "unifying, community-building function." Philosopher Joseph Rouse (1990), for instance, states that "membership in communities is constituted in substantial part by sharing [a] past as a basis for further action, and by our accountability (to ourselves and others) for the intelligibility of those actions in terms of that past." Rouse further affirms that "the intelligibility of action, and of the things we encounter or use in action, depends upon their already belonging to a field of possible narratives" (p. 181). In his view, "we live within various ongoing stories, as a condition for our being able to tell them, or for *doing* anything else that can count as an action" (ibid. - emphasis in the original).

Within the community-building function, part of the significance, and justification of the use of narrative in Hauck's *Calm Down* stems from the narrative potential to encapsulate human difficulties and solutions as difficulties possibly similar to the ones the readers are facing, or want to help other people with (in case they are counsellors themselves). Readers are exposed to events where human beings they can identify with — and who in turn relate to other human beings within similar social communities as the readers' — are seen in action. And as defined by Rouse (1990:183), "an event counts as an action only if it can be construed as having been brought about by an agent." Narratives are excellent rhetorical means to bring agents into action. And in narrative structures readers can mirror themselves in the action of 'visible' agents such as Mrs Baker (p. 9); a radio operator (p. 22); Bob and his very submissive wife (p. 31); a schoolboy who disagreed with his father (p. 61); Peter and Jenny (p. 88); the Hogans (p. 100), etc.

Seeing these agents in action and watching how they change their views and more satisfactorily cope with anger and frustration,

the readers of the book are encouraged to share the values this 'new' community shares with the author. They are encouraged to imitate those agents, *share their past as a basis for further action* in solving their own difficulties and in creating a better life for themselves. Readers are led to find comfort as they realise that the strategies they may try to use to find possible solutions for their own *difficulties already belong to a field of possible narratives*. This is expected to help the readers because, to repeat Rouse, "we live within various ongoing stories, as a condition for our being able to tell them, or for doing anything else that can count as an action" (p. 181). The recounted case studies help reassure the readers that they also can develop new states of mind (world 2 realities) and this way improve their relationships and their quality of life similarly to the individual characters in action in those narratives.

2.3 Summary of Chapter 2

Narratives are encoded in language and we are constantly making sense of things through the use of language. We have seen that narratives, as products of the human mind, constitute **world 3** entities in Popper's (1967) sense. In addition, narrative structures do not simply coincide with a single narrative **notional structure** (Longacre 1983). Instead, in the self-help counselling book *Calm Down* by Dr. P. Hauck (1974) narratives are used sometimes as **context**, schema, or scenario (Meurer 1991) for further discussion or evaluation, sometimes as **illustration** of the point(s) under discussion, sometimes as both illustration and context. In all cases narratives function as **unifying, community-building** world 3 entities.

From a psycholinguistic or cognitive perspective, narrative texts are in general easier to understand than other types of text (Reiser and Black 1982, Meurer 1985). In *Calm Down*, the author uses narrative structures to straightforwardly lead readers

to create what he sees as more efficient and satisfactory states of mind regarding frustration and anger. In so far as present time can project into the readers' future, the 'new' or alternative **world 2** realities reinforced by the narratives throughout the book have the potential to influence readers to construct 'new', alternative narratives for themselves in the future. As **world 3** entities, narratives are thus used to affect world 2 'realities', which in turn will affect events and actions involving the readers (**world 1** entities). The three types of 'reality' thus interact through narrative surface structures and their different notional structures.

In the next chapter I look into some of the aspects of the actual textualisation of the ideational content of *Calm Down*, our representative sample of self-help counselling.

CHAPTER 3
TEXT ORGANISATION

> Science has begun to crack the beautifully designed code that our brains use to convey complex thoughts as words and their orderings.
>
> (Pinker 1994:124)

3.0 Introduction

A great number of different descriptions exist today of different aspects of text structure and organisation. The last twenty years of research in text analysis have made it clear that texts are not just groups of sentences strung together but organised units of communication textualised according to greater or lesser degrees of conventionality, depending on genre (see Chapter 5) and purpose, among other parameters. Among the variety of patterns of textualisation occurring at both local and global levels of textual organisation we find prediction, also referred to as anticipation (Winter 1977) and prospection (Sinclair 1993). In the present section of this book I examine aspects of the notion of prediction as implemented in *Calm Down*.

3.1 Prediction

Prediction takes place when the writer signals or implies that s/he is committing her/himself to perform a subsequent discourse act of a certain kind. According to Tadros (1985:8), "prediction involves a commitment at one point in the text to the occurrence of another subsequent linguistic event." On page 23 of Hauck's book, for example, we read in capital letters: "SOME HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES OF ANGER". This phrase

constitutes a prediction because in the context where it occurs it leads readers to anticipate, or to expect that the writer will next present and possibly explain a certain number of "consequences of anger." The absence of lexical realisation (Winter 1977, 1992), that is, of specification — in the predicted discourse act — of the inherent unspecificity of "some consequences" would render the text incoherent.

Besides anticipating what sort of information will follow in the text, prediction can also be perceived as fulfilling the metalinguistic function of 'directing' readers to create specific schemata (Meurer 1991) within which to process the information subsumed under the predictive structure. In other words, in addition to establishing what metadiscoursal category will follow in the text, prediction anticipates the content to be expected. This way predictive structures may help readers construct the scenarios (Sanford and Garrod 1981) within which the author intends them to interpret subsequent information in the text. Thus, to illustrate this point, in *Calm Down*, "Some harmful consequences of anger" not only anticipates a list of such consequences (the metadiscoursively signalled category of information to follow), but also 'tells' readers to instantiate a pertinent schema (or scenario) so that they will interpret the predicted consequences within the general framework of *harmful consequences of anger*. In the subsequent text, these are the consequences Hauck presents:

1. Anger almost always increases your frustration (p. 23)
2. Getting angry prevents you from solving problems (p. 24)
3. You set a poor example of mental health (p. 25)
4. Anger can make you physically ill (p. 27)
5. Anger is the greatest single cause for divorce (p.28)
6. Anger is responsible for some of the most depraved of all human behaviour: child abuse (p. 29)

Perhaps extending the argument a bit, we might say that prediction serves textual, ideational, and interpersonal (Halliday

1985) functions. This means that it helps writers and readers to organise the text into sub-sections (the textual function). At the same time prediction represents the way the writer sees or classifies 'reality' (the ideational function) and signals to readers (interpersonal function) which schemata they need to activate within which to make sense of the incoming text. In *Calm Down* the discussion following the prediction instantiated by "some harmful consequences of anger" continues through the next 7 pages. Throughout those 7 pages the established prediction is fulfilled as readers go on processing each one of the specific sub-sections (as textually specified) under the general schema of "harmful consequences." Illustration of these points is provided in the next sections.

3.2 Predictive and predicted pairs

In dealing with prediction it is necessary to introduce the notion of pair. Similarly to the linguistic behaviour of **adjacency pairs** (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974) in conversational structures — where a first pair member (e.g., *How are you?*) demands a second pair member (*Fine, thanks*) — predictive members set up the expectation that one or more predicted members will follow in the text. In other words, a first pair member sequentially implies the occurrence of a second pair member, the second pair member achieving relevance within the context of the first. The similarity, however, is only partial because the communication established is one-sided: the author does all the "talk" himself. The interaction between pair members can be represented by Figure 3.1 where **V** stands for predictive and **D** for predicted.



Figure 3.1 - The structure of prediction (based on Tadros 1985)

As suggested in Figure 3.1, the occurrence of a V member — together with the fulfilment of the prediction by the occurrence of a D member — establishes an interaction within the text itself. The interaction between the two textual elements fulfils the tacit agreement between the writer and the reader as brought forth by the presence of the V member. Thus, besides establishing interaction between reader and writer as a result of its interpersonal function, the phenomenon of prediction establishes interaction within the text itself as a consequence of its textual function. Prediction, therefore, helps to organise the text, to trigger specific mental schemata, and to form bonds between readers and writers.

3.3 Categories of prediction

Six types of prediction — **enumeration**, **advance labelling**, **reporting**, **recapitulation**, **hypotheticality**, and **question** — have been shown to operate in the language of economics (Tadros 1985). In *Calm Down*, I have discovered a seventh category, namely, **explicit contradiction**. In the rest of this chapter I look into the occurrence of each one of these categories in Hauck's text. At the end of the chapter I briefly discuss the notion of complex pattern by analysing one more excerpt from *Calm Down*. As will be apparent throughout the chapter, the writer himself "sets up predictions or constraints

precisely because in fulfilling them he will arrive at the point he wishes to make" (Hunston 1989:132). In this sense, then, prediction can be seen as the writer's strategy of 'setting things up' so that he can say what s/he wants.

3.3.1 Enumeration

1. In predictive enumeration the V member contains an enumerative element committing the author to provide a certain number of specific elements in the D member. One type of enumerative V member (there are other types as we will see below) is linguistically realised by the sequence of a numeral and an unspecific item. The numeral can be exact (*nine, two*) or inexact (*some, several*), as described by Tadros (1985). Unspecific items are lexical choices such as *myths*, *alternatives*, *consequences*, *ways*, which need to be made specific in the text in order to be made meaningful (Winter 1992). These items serve a metalinguistic purpose in that they refer to other stretches of text — differently from specific, open-ended system vocabulary items such as *book*, *cat*, and *brother*, which refer to entities outside the text. Here is an example of predictive enumeration in *Calm Down*:

V member:

> In fact, it [the case of Mrs Baker] destroys nine myths about anger, emotional disturbances, and psychotherapy (p. 12, my underlining).

Even though the *myths* have been identified as myths "about anger, emotional disturbances, and psychotherapy", they have not yet been lexically realised, i.e., we have not yet been told what these myths are. The adjacent D member specifying the myths fulfils the expectation established in the V member:

D members:

> Myth No. 1: People always learn from their past experience (p.12)
> Myth No. 2: Old habits always require long periods of time to change (p. 13)

> Myth No. 3: You cannot be undisturbed in a stressful environment (p. 14)
> Myth No. 4: Everyone has a breaking point (p. 15)
> Myth No. 5: Anger cannot be prevented, only suppressed (p. 16)
> Myth No. 6: Fight fire with fire (p. 17)
> Myth No. 7: Both partners must be seen in marital counselling (p. 18)
> Myth No. 8: The 'real reasons' behind a problem — the hidden causes from childhood — must be understood before personality changes can be made (p. 19)
> Myth No. 9: Angry people are mentally ill and need treatment (p. 20)

It is interesting to note the lexical reiteration of *Myth.* It plays an argumentative role by emphasising the illegitimacy of the notions discussed: they are not rational, they are "myths" to be redefined and reconceptualised by the readers. (Reconceptualisation is discussed in Chapter 4). Regarding the textual function of the enumeration pair above, notice that in the subsequent nine pages of *Calm Down* the author's discussion is distributed under the nine specific *Myth* headings listed above. Enumeration, therefore, constitutes a powerful strategy of information organisation.

Here is a second example of predictive enumeration, this time restricted to a microlevel environment:

V member:

> The way to handle accusations of any kind is to do what Dr Albert Ellis does. He advises us to look at <u>two alternatives</u> when we are accused of something (my underlining) .

D member:

> The first is, 'Is it true?' and the second is, 'Is it false?' (p. 105).

In this case, as the "two alternatives" are still not specific enough, the author goes on further elaborating on each one of them. The above examples of enumeration show that this type of prediction may organise text at quite different levels, ranging from local or microstructural pairs to global or macrostructural ones.

Before I present examples of other types of enumerative prediction, it is important to clarify that a necessary feature for membership as V member of predictive enumeration (for all the types) is that the unspecific lexical item occurring as head of the V member must signal new information, i.e., information that cannot be retrieved from the previously occurring co-text or that is not part of writers'/readers' shared knowledge. In other words, the specifics of the unspecific item (*consequences, steps, myth*) must be lexicalised prospectively, or cataphorically in the text. Let us examine the following example:

> Depression is brought about by your thinking (a) you are a worthless person because you did something bad, or (b) you ought to feel sorry for yourself because you are frustrated, or (c) you should pity someone else. These are the three ways you can get depressed over your not getting your way. (*Calm Down*, 39-40)

"Three ways" does fulfil the requirement of unspecificness. However, the specifics of this enumerative sequence have already been lexicalised retrospectively in the text. As it does not signal new information to come, it does not constitute an instance of predictive enumeration.

2. A second type of predictive enumeration involves unspecific lexical items (*consequences, issues*) preceded/ followed by the expression "the following", or followed by the expression "as follows". This is an example:

V member:

> Some of the more common issues with children and the logical consequences I have found work well are the following:

D members:

> Your child will not put off his desk lamp in the morning before going to school. Go in and dismantle the lamp, unplug it from the socket, and use the argument that you thought something must have been wrong with it since it wasn't put off. He'll know you

> don't mean that, but he will get the message that he'd better switch the light off or he'll have to assemble it in the evening.
> The same can be done for a radio left blaring in a child's room. Take the batteries out of the radio and lay it on the bed. The consequence of not turning it off is having to put the batteries back in when he comes home tired and wants to relax. The child argues about doing the washing up. Tell him he doesn't need to eat at your table if it's very important to him not to wash up. You don't care much either way what he does. The choice is his. Either do the washing up and enjoy decent food or get out of that boring job but scrounge for his meals in the refrigerator.
> The youngster will not put his seat belt on while the car is moving. Instead of shouting at him and possibly endangering both your lives, give him a choice again. The logical consequence of the belt's being unbuckled is that the car pulls off to the side of the road and stops. When the belt is buckled again, the car almost automatically and without a word from the driver merges into the traffic again. (p. 110-111).

3. A third type of predictive enumeration is textualised by means of "a plural subject followed by a verb which demands a complement followed by a colon" (Tadros (1985:15). The following example was found in *Calm Down*:

V member (underlined):

> A third, but by no means last, set of emotional reactions you could have are the hateful ones: anger, fury, revenge, and spitefulness. Once again, however, the things you would say to yourself to produce these feelings are quite different from those you have to think to produce depression or fear. Briefly, <u>they are</u>:

D members:

> (a) I must have my way and it is awful not to get everything I want, and (b) you are wicked for frustrating me and deserve to be punished. (p. 40).

4. In *Calm Down*, quite a number of instances of unspecific items occurring in a textual structure resembling type 2 above

were preceded by zero numeral , i.e., no explicit numeral. This type of prediction is **not** reported in the language of economics studied by Tadros (1985). Another example from *Calm Down*:

V member:

> At other times parents can punish their children for subconscious reasons:

D member:

> the baby represents the mother herself, and if the mother beats her baby she is symbolically beating herself for when she was a little girl and behaved badly. Or perhaps the baby represents her brother or sister of whom she was very jealous. By beating the child the brother or sister is being punished. (p. 29)

In this case, the author could have used the expression "the following" (as is the case with type 2 predictive enumeration above) right before "subconscious reasons". It seems, however, that the occurrence of "the following" would demand proof of a more precise state of knowledge on the part of the writer in relation to the "subconscious reasons" in the V member. This example thus suggests that the use of the expression "the following" preceding an unspecific item (such as *reasons* or *consequences*) constrains the D member similarly to the constraints produced by the use of exact numerals. (This point is further discussed in the next paragraph). On the other hand, the use of zero numerals seems to be more closely related to the use of inexact numerals: it reduces the responsibility of the author to provide exact specification of the unspecific item in the V member. Thus, in the above example the writer needs to mention only *some* "subconscious reasons", not an exact number of them. At the same time, the use of zero numerals may help establish a more informal atmosphere: saying "parents can punish their children for subconscious reasons" seems closer to a conversational style than saying "parents can punish their children

for subconscious reasons, as follows" or "for the following subconscious reasons."

Regarding the use of exact vs inexact numerals, Tadros (1985) insightfully comments that the use of exact numerals creates more responsibility for the writer than the use of inexact numerals. She writes:

> An exact numeral reflects the writer's state of knowledge — it is precise — and commits him to produce the number predicted, whereas an inexact numeral reduces the writer's responsibility, although he is still committed to enumeration. Any attempt to withdraw from the commitment has to be signalled to the reader, and this unintentionally reinforces the commitment. A writer who says 'Barter has a number of serious drawbacks' and then adds 'For example, it makes exchange dependent on what is called "a double coincidence of wants"' has indicated to the reader that he is negotiating withdrawal from the commitment to enumerate, and instead is resorting to exemplification; but that in itself reinforces the fact that he is aware of his commitment to enumerate. By contrast, a writer who declares his precise state of knowledge by using an exact numeral will not withdraw from his responsibility. He will not say 'Barter has three serious drawbacks' and then add 'For instance, it makes exchange dependent on...' since he is committed to sharing his exact knowledge with the reader (p. 18).

In *Calm Down*, besides the example already given of the nine myths (and several other examples in the book), the point made by Tadros can be further illustrated by the *six steps* constituting "the complete sequence of getting angry" (pp. 38-48). The implication behind the use of this exact numeral, which in this case is strengthened by the expression *the complete sequence*, is that the author possesses complete and reliable information about what constitutes this sequence. What the author will tell the reader in the D member of this predictive pair is given the status of "state of knowledge" about the sequence of processes involved in getting angry. Thus, the sense of preciseness built into the exact numeral contributes to the writer's authority (see chapter

4) and trustworthiness. This, in turn, foregrounds the interpersonal function of prediction. Textual, interpersonal, and ideational functions thus come together: the textual function specifies the organisation of the information as subsumed under six steps, the ideational function specifies the actual meaning of each one of the steps, while the interpersonal function allows for the establishment of a reliable persona for the author. (How the writer establishes a counselling persona is discussed in Chapter 4).

I turn next to the **D member** of enumerative prediction. As already illustrated by the examples given above, the D member provides the specifics for the prediction established in the V member. In *Calm Down*, similarly to the patterns reported for economics by Tadros (1985), D members of predictive enumeration are signalled by means of the following features:

1. Numbering (of different kinds):

a) see the enumeration of "Myth" in the example discussed previously
b) one, two (p. 27-28)
c) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 (p. 23-29)
d) step one, step two, step three, step four, step five, step six (p. 38-48)
e) the first, this next thought (p. 123)

2. Layout, such as use of capitals. (In the next examples I am quoting the V member as well in order to provide a context for the D members):

(V member:

> ... you want to be aware of several problems you are likely to run into which could hamper your progress.)

D member (where each aspect listed contains a built-in problem):

DON'T GET DISCOURAGED (p. 118)
DISCIPLINE YOURSELF (p. 121)

YOU DON'T NEED TO MAKE MATTERS WORSE (p. 122)
ANGER AGAINST YOURSELF (p. 124)
SIMPLE BUT NOT EASY (p. 125)

3. Listing:

V member:

There are three reasons why people act badly for which they cannot be blamed:)

(D member):

stupidity, ignorance, and disturbance (p. 44)

4. Grammatical parallelism (e.g.: subject + verb in the past tense):

(V member:

She shouted at her family every day for the most inconsequential matters:)

(D member):

the light was on in the cupboard; the light was off in the hall; Johnny didn't make his bed before leaving for school that morning; June took too long to come into the kitchen for her breakfast (p. 114)

Predictive enumeration is extensively used in *Calm Down* and in self-help counselling in general. At the interpersonal level, it serves as a persuasive mechanism. This is achieved in two ways. On the one hand, through exact enumeration the author implicitly suggests that he has precise knowledge of what he is talking about: there are, for instance, exactly "six steps in getting angry"; "nine myths about anger, emotional disturbances and psychotherapy"; "anger boils down to two irrational beliefs"; "three reasons why people act badly", etc. On the other hand, by helping to establish the author's figure of authority, the use of exact enumeration helps to assure readers that it is safe to trust

the author because (one is given the impression that) the author is conveying ideational content about which he has substantial knowledge.

As regards the textual function, enumeration subdivides the text into reasonably short sections, taking into account the readers' attention span. This is very clear, for example, in the *nine myths*, which cover pages 12 through 22 in Hauck's book; *some harmful consequences of anger*, which are discussed from page 23 through 30; and *the* ***complete*** (my emphasis) *sequence of getting angry*, pages 38 through 48. These textualisations suggest that the writer is doing his best to create clearly signalled sections and subsections in order to offer readers an easy and friendly path through the several stages of his argumentation.

3.3.2 Advance labelling

In this category of prediction the writer labels a certain kind of linguistic act , such as "define progress", "talk about why it is better to avoid anger", and "show how..." and thus commits her/himself to perform the act expressed by the labelling (Tadros 1985). Similarly to the V member of predictive enumeration, the V member of advance labelling must signal new information to come. In addition, it must contain a discourse act label, such as the examples already mentioned (*define, show*), the discourse act committing the writer her/himself, not somebody else, to perform the act labelled. The following example from *Calm Down* illustrates the category:

V member:

> To help you avoid being too harsh with yourself, however, let me define for you what progress means.

Here the writer is specifically signalling that he will next present a definition. The D member fulfils the discourse act anticipated:

D member:

> If you change the intensity, frequency, and duration of your angry episodes, you're making progress. That means that if you get angry once a month rather than once a week (frequency), you've made progress. If you only raise your voice when you used to strike with your fist (intensity), that's progress. And finally, if your anger, even if it is severe, only lasts an hour now but once lasted all day (duration), that's progress (p. 126).

In this case, the boundaries of the D member are easy to see. The definition takes the form of a series of *ifs* each one of them being explicitly presented as an example of what the author means by *progress*. However, D members of advance labelling are not always textualised so straightforwardly. Here is an example:

V member:

> Before we <u>get into the specific techniques of controlling anger</u>, I think it would be wise first to <u>talk a little about why it is better to control anger</u> (p. 22).

What we have here is in fact two V members prospecting two different discourse acts. Notice the use of subordination to invert the order of presentation of these two V members. In V(a), which *follows* V(b), the writer promises "to talk a little about why it is better to control anger" and in V(b) to "get into specific techniques of controlling anger." Unlike the previous example of advance labelling, neither one of the predicted D members follows immediately. Thus, D(b) — the actual presentation of *specific techniques of controlling anger* — occurs throughout the remaining of the book, after the occurrence of the D member of V(a). Its boundaries are thus fuzzy. As for D(a), before its textualisation the author presents a basis (Winter 1986), or reason for "talk[ing] about why it is better to control anger", namely:

> Until you see what I mean by anger and what it can do to you, the motivation to avoid all anger will not be there.

The actual "talk" about why it is better to control anger only starts with the next sentence, which ends Hauck's first chapter:

D (a) member:

> I regard all anger as neurotic if it hurts you or others needlessly.

and continues at the beginning of chapter 2:

> ... it hurts when I get angry. I may get a headache, a stomach spasm, a foul mood which ruins my appetite, and so on. So I don't want an emotional reaction that does that to me.
> What I want most out of life is happiness, pleasure, and contentment, not pain or displeasure. Remaining calm and patient about my frustrations will guarantee me the greatest peace of mind. Getting angry over not getting my way will often not remove the frustration and will distress me on top of it. Neither you nor I can be deeply or chronically furious without paying the price for it, that is, being pained (p. 23).

The author then further elaborates on (i.e., "talks about") the topic, this time organising the text under the predictive enumeration phrase "SOME HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES OF ANGER", which we have seen previously. Obviously the author can only write about the topic, not actually "talk about" about it. The use of "talk about" may be seen as a metaphoric device to enhance interpersonal effects, e.g., the establishment of an informal atmosphere. As a feature associated with oral communication informality contributes to create the impression of actual conversation with the readers (Fowler 1991).

In other parts of the book advance labelling also has a far reaching, not precisely determined, textual scope as is the case in the example of "the techniques of controlling anger" previously mentioned. For instance:

V member:

> Remember always that most of the frustrations from which you suffer are really not all that awful, and the few that are bad can be

> handled with much more calm and acceptance than you generally think possible. The rest of this book will attempt to show you how this can be done (p. 75)..

The D member in this case is the remaining 53 pages of the book. Obviously, within such a long D member the author will embed other sets of predictive pairs. A prediction like this will therefore necessarily overlap with other patterns of textualisation, thus providing the linguistic environment for the occurrence of **complex patterning**, as we will see later.

Tadros (1985) reports on a type of labelling that demands non-linear texts, such as figures, charts, or diagrams. This type does not occur in *Calm Down* as the book contains linear texts exclusively. Other self-help books, however, do use multi-semiotic devices

3.3.3 Reporting

This category of prediction differs from enumeration and advance labelling in that the author detaches her/himself from the truth of what s/he reports in the V member (Tadros 1985). In Sinclair's (1986) words, the author does not *aver* the truth of the propositions reported. As the name of the category implies, the author *reports* somebody else's statement or opinion in order to, in the D member, express what s/he thinks about what s/he has reported. From Sinclair's perspective, the author comes back to *averral*, i.e., takes responsibility for what is being said. In Winter's (1982, 1986, 1994) notion of **basic text structure**, a reporting pair would constitute what he calls a **hypothetical-real** structure. The reported structure (V member) is hypothetical in the sense that it does not tell us what the writer thinks regarding the truth or falsity of the reported propositions. It thus stands as a hypothesis, either to be confirmed or denied. The prediction set up in the V member then is that of evaluating somebody else's (reported) view(s) or assumption(s). While the writer withdraws from averring (Sinclair 1986) the information s/he conveys in the

V member, s/he commits her/himself to make an evaluative statement in the D member about that information. It is implicit in the above discussion that for a reporting structure to constitute a V member of a predictive pair the writer must abstain, in that member, from explicitly evaluating what s/he is reporting. Evaluation is the business of the D member. When evaluation occurs in the reporting structure itself, no necessary prediction is established that further evaluation will occur (though this surely depends on what that evaluation is).

Reporting can be accomplished either by using direct speech, indirect speech, or expressions such as "according to". Here is an example from *Calm Down* with indirect speech, as realised by three reporting structures (underlined) followed by four that-clauses:

V member:

> (I recently received a review of my book *Depression* from my publisher.) The reviewer had mentioned **that** I had oversimplified the matter of controlling depression. He thereby implied **that** I did not know what I was talking about and that I had missed the complexity of the subject.
> A month before, I heard a similar remark by a client who was seeing me for depression who also doubted **that** I knew what I was talking about because it sounded oversimplified.
> (p. 125 - my underlining and bold form).

The writer clearly detaches himself from the truth of the content of the information reported. This is achieved by attributing the propositional content to the "reviewer" and to "a client" by means of the indirect speech structures underlined in the example. The conventionally predicted evaluation occurs right afterwards, namely:

D member:

> In time he learned that what I had to say about controlling depression really was quite simple, but that using that knowledge was another

> story entirely. The same is true for this material on anger. When I suggest that you always make yourself angry by thinking you have to have your way and that is all there is to this matter of anger, I also confess it sounds oversimplified. Yet that is basically all that anger is. (p. 125)

Here the author makes a concession to "the client" by partially agreeing with her/him that the issue does seem to have been made to look too simple. However, by the end of the quotation there is no doubt that the author has rejected the views reported in the V member. The D member is a rebuttal of the client's remarks, and by extension a rebuttal of the reviewer's criticism as well.

Reporting is used in its direct speech form with reasonable frequency in the narratives in *Calm Down*. Reported direct speech enables the author to simulate 'real' conversations between himself and the characters in the narratives. Besides, it enables the author to control the course of the simulated conversations. Once he reports what a character is supposed to have said, the stage is set for evaluation, either positive or negative, of the character's point of view . This constitutes a powerful strategy of information presentation and point of view manipulation because the writer can steer the character's 'utterance' for his own ends. Take an excerpt from one of the narratives I have examined in Chapter 2. In the first stretch of direct speech (transcribed below, for convenience) the author reports what Bill supposedly said to him as a counsellor. Bill tells the author how he (Bill) now perceives he could have acted in relation to his brother:

> '... By not making a big thing of his accusations I simply couldn't have reacted too emotionally in any way at all, could I? In other words, it would have been no different from his saying hello to me. If I make a big thing out of that, then I run the risk of being disturbed. If not, then I'm going to be undisturbed. Right?'

And the author responds, positively evaluating the character's statements:

> 'Right.' (*Calm Down*, p. 59-60)

On the other hand, earlier in the same narrative, the author evaluates negatively a stretch of direct speech by the same character:

> 'But it is not right,' Bill insisted. 'I've been fair with Henry in every request he's ever made to me. But when he made this demand I felt he was taking me for a ride.'
> 'No, that's not why you're angry, Bill,' I stated. 'Nothing you've said so far sounds neurotic or unreasonable, and to become angry you've got to say angry things to yourself.'

Strategically, therefore, Hauck use reporting text structures to move step by step towards the point he wants to make: the way the character verbalises his feelings and the way the author evaluates the character's verbalisations reinforce the author's view. Activating different voices of different characters, Hauck is utilising polyphony (Bakhtin, in Cook 1992). The effect is the emphasis on a leitmotif occurring throughout the book, namely, that we become angry by saying angry things to ourselves, and that if we change the way we think about specific events we can change our emotion.

3.3.4 Recapitulation

Within this category of prediction the author recapitulates information that s/he has presented earlier in the text. According to Tadros (1985), in order to recapitulate authors make use of the following linguistic features: (a) labelling of a discourse act, using a past tense morpheme in the labelling verb; (b) reference to what the author her/himself, not somebody else, has done previously in the text. This way, unlike V members of enumeration and advance labelling, which relate prospectively to new, incoming information, the V member of recapitulation foregrounds old

information in order, then, to expand — in the D member — on some aspect of the recapitulated information. The function of recapitulation is to create a context for the author to add further information as related to information already presented in the text. Still unlike reporting, where the author mentions views or statements other than her/his own, in recapitulation the author refers to her/his own previous textualisation(s). The position in the text is also important in determining whether a given stretch of language constitutes recapitulation or not. As explained by Tadros (1985:38), recapitulation does not "occur in a paragraph that terminates a chapter or a section since its function in those cases will be that of summary (i.e., a short reproduction)." In addition, recapitulation does not "terminate a paragraph, for in that case its function will be that of comment (i.e., reminder of relevance)." Here is an example of recapitulation in Hauck's text:

V member:

> <u>I pointed out previously</u> that all anger is technically righteous because you have to believe you're one hundred percent correct or you wouldn't get angry in the first place.

This clearly constitutes recapitulation since it fits all the criteria established above: (1) labelling of a discourse act (*pointed out*); (2) information attributed to the writer (*I*); (3) old information referred to (*that all anger* ...); (4) does not occur in a terminating paragraph. Further information, as expected, is immediately added to it:

D member:

> Anger always says, 'l don't deserve this kind of treatment, so therefore it must stop this instant'. You can believe this about things or about people, it makes little difference. There is one difference, however, and that is that you become more incensed if you think the unfair treatment could have been avoided than if it was almost inevitable. For example, ...(p. 62)

It seems that Hauck's recapitulation is intended not only as a strategic way of keeping information "from floating", as Tadros states is the case with the language of economics, but also as a device to add emphasis to specific viewpoints. In the previous example, the emphasis is on how one "talks" to oneself, what one believes and thinks and thus induces her/himself to either become angry or not to become angry. Below is another example. In this case the D member is introduced by "but", which according to Winter (1986, 1994), indicates that some sort of surprise is being foregrounded. Together, the V and the D members of this pair emphasise that even if we (the readers) are very calm, we might still want to react to nasty behaviour, (which, the author implies, we should not).

V member

> As I've said, the calmer you are, the sooner he will probably *Calm Down*.

D member:

> But you want to watch out for the bait he will throw your way in the hope you will bite. That bait will be the one well-chosen remark the other man will offer because he thinks you can't refuse to react to it.(p. 97)

3.3.5 Hypotheticality

In this category of prediction the V member stands for a hypothetical situation. The hypothetical situation, as the term suggests, is a conjecture the writer creates which may or may not be compatible with usual, common sense realities (see Chapter 2 for a discussion of reality). For instance, a hypothetical construction such as "suppose you were now dead" is not compatible with our common sense world for the obvious reason that in such a case one would not be able to suppose anything. The important point is that because of its hypotheticality, this V

member establishes the expectation that in the incoming D member the author will either make a generalisation or will argue for a given point of view regarding the hypothetical situation. Notice that the prospection established by hypotheticality is a matter of convention or perhaps tendency, that is, we expect a generalisation to follow a hypothetical situation. However, there is no specific linguistic element that explicitly signals the writer's commitment to produce the generalisation or to argue for a given point. In fact this is also true of reporting and recapitulation. Here is an example of hypotheticality:

V member:

> Imagine yourself having an invisible control panel, or rather imagine your husband, parents, or children having one invisibly connected to you. Then imagine what a person could do to you if he knew which buttons to push.

Once the reader has activated a mental scenario for this imaginary 'world', s/he is equipped with the appropriate context within which to process the generalisation offered by the writer:

D member (generalisation):

> Your children are usually past masters at this business of pushing the right buttons to either melt your heart or drive you up the wall. This is invariably true in the case of a power struggle.

Frequently, generalisations are followed by details, i.e., further specification of what the writer means by the generalisation regarding the hypothetical situation. In the above example, the author adds the following details:

Details:

> In this situation the child insists he is more powerful than you, while you insist you are more powerful than he. He therefore watches subconsciously for what is important in your life and when he wants to annoy you, and make you angry he pushes one of those buttons to which you will react. If he knows it's important to

> you that he goes to college and he must get good marks to go, he will push the button marked 'Stupid' and do badly at school. If he knows you will be worried if he stays out late and he wants to get back at you for making him wash up the night before, he will push the button marked 'Forgetfulness'. Then he can always say he forgot what time it was or what time he should have been home, and so on. (p. 97-98)

Like the other categories of prediction we have seen so far, the hypotheticality pair serves an argumentative purpose. Observe the next example below to see how the author uses a hypothetical V member as an intermediary step in an argumentative sequence where he makes the point that "anger is a condition that often commands much respect and it would be a shame not to take advantage of this fact" (*Calm Down* p.33). Within this main point, however, and in accordance with the main thrust of the book, the author wants to make clear that we can *act* angrily "and still live peacefully inside" (ibid). How? This is the author's explanation: "By *making believe* you're furious and ready to explode", but still being "forgiving and understanding inside" (ibid). Next he states that he "can think of several situations where acting angrily rather than feeling angry actually makes sense" (ibid).At this point he makes use of hypotheticality. Notice the use of *suppose* as a marker of hypotheticality:

V member:

> Suppose you're in a hurry but the kids are dawdling. You're in the car with the engine running, you're already a bit late, and the family doesn't seem to appreciate this. Calmly telling them to move along may well fall on deaf ears, so the only sensible thing to do is yell. 'Hurry up, you kids, or I'll go to the film alone. I hate to be kept waiting.'

D member:

> This and a few other growls can easily make the kids move in ways they simply won't if they don't think the issue is urgent. It can all

> be done deliberately, with inner calm, while looking like a bear on the outside. All you have to do is remind yourself that it's not going to kill anyone if you are late for the film, kids will be kids and occasionally need hustling, and a little pressure once in a while really won't hurt them.

In other examples, such as on pages 63 and 76 (*Calm Down*), we find a question following the V member of hypotheticality and preceding its D member. It seems that the embedded question functions as one more way of simulating direct contact with readers and thus foregrounding the interpersonal level. I look into questions next.

3.3.6 Question

Most of the time the fulfilment of the prediction set up by a question is realised by means of an answer or explanation. The question constitutes the V member, the answer the D member. In *Calm Down*, apart from their textual function as information organisers, questions, as already suggested, serve the interpersonal function of creating an informal, conversational atmosphere. It is as if the author were purposefully mixing the oral and the written modes to create the atmosphere of "informality and intimacy of face-to-face discourse" (Fowler 1991:63).

Very frequently, questions appear in three different forms throughout the text: **heading questions**, r**egular question-answer pairs** and **rhetorical questions**. A rhetorical question "is a question which does not expect an answer, since it really asserts something that is known to the addressee, and cannot be denied. It is thus the equivalent of a statement" (Wales 1989:408-409). As rhetorical questions are not predictive in the sense investigated here, I will not discuss them further. Suffice it to say that similarly to question-answer pairs they are used as persuasive devices to appeal to readers' knowledge, reasons, and emotions.

The title of chapter 2 in Hauck's *Calm Down* is a first example of a heading question:

V member:

Should all anger be avoided?

The answer is provided without any delay:

V member:

Ninety percent of the time I'd say yes. (p. 23)

It is interesting to notice that Tadros' (1985) research in the language of economics reveals that when questions occur as heading, as is the case with the example above, "there is a discussion intervening" between the question and the answer, and the "demands [of the heading question] are never satisfied immediately" (p. 51). As I will show in another example below, intervening discussions also take place between heading questions and their answers in the language of counselling. Quite clearly, however, this is not always the case, as demonstrated in the example quoted above. In that case the behaviour of the heading question is different from the behaviour of these questions in the language of economics. In a sense, heading questions occurring in *Calm Down* have some resemblance to the same type of questions occurring in advertising where it is common to ask a question as a title and to answer it immediately in the body text. In other cases, such as in texts within academic genres, a dissertation for instance, heading questions (the title of a chapter, e.g.) in the form of a question followed by an immediate answer is unusual.

Here now is an example from *Calm Down* where a heading question behaves similarly to **heading** questions in the language of economics:

V member:

IS RIGHTEOUS ANGER AN EXCEPTION? (p. 49, capitals in the original)

Instead of providing a straightforward D member, the author opts for a generalisation followed by two examples, as follows:

> {Generalisation}: Most of you will agree that getting angry because you didn't get what you wanted is foolish if what you wanted is petty and insignificant. {Example 1}: If you want to go swimming tomorrow and it rains, practically anyone in the world would say you were being an ignoramus to get cross with the weather. {Example 2}: Practically everyone would think you were immature and very impulsive if you smashed your dishes or furniture just to show another person how angry you were.

What I have interpreted as example 2 above, may also be interpreted as a consequence of example 1. The point, however, is to show that there is no immediate answer to the heading question in this case. In addition, before answering the question posed, the author rephrases it, matching it contrastively with the generalisation and the examples presented. This is the rephrasing:

> But what about those cases when you feel you have a serious reason to get angry? If you see a man beating a dog, don't you have the right to get furious with him and prevent the dog from being killed? Or if a bully is picking on your child, shouldn't you become furious and allow your righteous wrath to put him in his place?

Only now does the author present us with a D member, explicitly fulfilling the prediction established in the heading question:

V member:

> As I see it, the answer is 'No'. (pp. 48-49)

As we will see later, structures like the above example constitute **complex patterns**. In this particular case the V-D pair is **discontinuous**, i.e., the D member is delayed by the insertion of information different from the answer to the question. The function of the intervening information in this instance seems to be to provide detail and emphasis: the author makes clearer

what the heading question means and builds up further expectations around the prospected answer.

So far we have seen heading questions in two different environments: one where the question is answered immediately and the other where the answer is delayed. *Calm Down* also shows heading questions in a third environment, namely, followed by other questions. Similarly to the intervening text in the previous example, the intervening questions here elaborate on the meaning of the heading question. This is an example:

V member:

> IS ANGER EVER CONNECTED WITH EVENTS FROM CHILDHOOD?
>
> In other words, is anger always the result of a person's insisting on having his own way? Isn't there ever a time when people are angry for unconscious reasons which started in childhood?

V member:

> Of course there is. (p. 50)

As the last two examples above illustrate, sometimes a set of questions is followed by a straightforward, laconic answer. This is also true for what I am calling **regular** question-answer pairs, the second type of questions in this data. For instance:

V member:

> Do weak females have real protection against violent husbands?

D member:

> Of course they do! (p. 34)

The most immediate function of such answers is to make the author's stance absolutely clear. Also, such answers suggest that the author sees that stance as an unquestionable truth. In addition, as indicated by the last three examples, these sort of

answers demand further explanation. This way they implicitly 'invite' readers to go on and find out why the author holds the position expressed in the brief answer. Furthermore, this structure is quite clearly used to promote a conversational atmosphere. As it is common sense that we prefer to talk to people we trust, the conversational, informal and straightforward answer plays a role, though indirectly, in building the author's trustworthiness. Altogether these several pragmatic characteristics invest the question-answer pair with a strategic persuasive force.

Further evidence for this point: as some of the examples above also suggest, questions are used by the author to anticipate what the reader her/himself might ask. As Sinclair (1987:1) points out, "it can be claimed that a writer must be even more able to work interactively [with readers] than a speaker, because the writer has to imagine the readers' behaviour while the speaker is face to face with it. Also a writer has to allow for a considerable range of readership." Being privileged to formulate both questions and answers the author ensures complete control of the text. It is not a matter of simply giving advice to the readers but of actually trying to control what the readers will be thinking while they read the book.

3.3.7 Contradiction

As observed at the beginning of this Chapter, contradiction as a predictive category has not been reported in Tadros, nor in any other text analysis, to my knowledge. This category thus constitutes a finding of the present investigation into the language of self-help counselling. A contradiction is an utterance where the author purposefully states that something is and is not the case at one and the same time. The occurrence of such a contradictory stretch of text establishes an expectation that the author will provide an immediate D member elucidating the contradiction. This is an example from *Calm Down*:

V member

> From what I have been saying you're likely to get the impression that all anger is bad, that no one should ever speak up with indignation, and that you must always be in perfect control of your feelings or else you're neurotic. You're right and you're wrong.

Logically speaking, one cannot be "right *and* wrong" at the same time. The author solves the puzzle by offering a long explanation of the difference between *anger* and *firmness*, and between *assertiveness* and *hostility*. This provides an account of being *right and wrong* in relation to the statement preceding the contradiction. Here's the explanation:

D member:

> Confusion comes from misunderstanding anger and firmness.
>
> When you're angry you want to make someone stop doing something he's doing (such as picking on you), or begin doing something for which he is responsible (such as helping with the washing up instead of watching television). In addition, however, you are prepared to hurt that person if he doesn't go along with you.
>
> Firmness, on the other hand, has to do with getting people to start or stop certain behaviour without having the desire to hurt them if they don't agree with you. This means that all anger is neurotic because it either hurts you or someone else needlessly. I understand, of course, that many of our minor angry reactions, though neurotic by my definition, are not serious and need not be guarded against in most cases. Throughout this book I am most concerned with those angry conditions which hurt you a great deal or hurt others a great deal. But from a theoretical point of view I want to be sure we understand each other when I insist that all resentments, all angers, all hostilities are neurotic unless they arise from self-defence. I don't mean all kinds of defence either, just physical self-defence. If someone is cursing you up one side and down the other, there is no need for you to defend yourself since that's a psychological attack and won't hurt you. If someone wants to use your face for a punch bag, however, you'd be a fool if you didn't defend yourself. Notice, I did not say that you should first get

angry and then defend yourself. It is perfectly possible (with training) to react fairly calmly to people's frustrations first and then beat hell out of them if you need to. From a practical point of view we all know that anger and hostility often pay off handsomely whether they're neurotic reactions or not. Soldiers often fight better when boiling mad, the underworld controls its territory through violence, and the fellow who doesn't mind swinging his fists at the slightest hint of an insult probably doesn't get insulted very often. True, he may have an occasional migraine headache or high blood pressure (neurotic conditions which he has created as a result of his anger), but he probably doesn't care. He gets respect, feels safe, and may not mind having to pay for these benefits with a headache or heart pain. But just imagine how much better he would be if he could be firm and not angry.

In short, what the healthy person cultivates is the habit of being assertive, not hostile. Assertiveness means to stand up for your rights in a nonviolent way if possible. Hostility means to stand up for yourself and to be angry. The former is a wonderful habit to get into if you can do it. But if you can't for the time being, it may still do you more good to be hostile and angry than to be weak and passive and take all sorts of abuse from others. Take the case of Bob and his very submissive wife...(*Calm Down*, p. 30-31)

Contradiction is not frequent and there is only one more occurrence in *Calm Down* (p. 115, first paragraph). Both examples, as is the case with the previous categories of prediction, foreground the interpersonal function: as the reader comes across the purposeful contradiction the expectation is triggered that an explanation for the apparent enigma will be provided. At the same time, predictive contradiction also instantiates the textual function which can be seen as the lexicalisation of a **formal schema** (Meurer 1991): in order to be perceived as coherent — and coherence includes the notion of completeness — the V member demands the presence of the D member, the second pair part which fulfils the expectation established in the first pair part. As for the ideational function, it is realised by the very solution to the paradox contained in the contradictory V member.

3.4 Complex patterns

On page 38 of *Calm Down*, following the heading THE COMPLETE SEQUENCE OF GETTING ANGRY, Hauck writes:

> From beginning to end there are either five or **six steps** in getting angry. If you end the sequence with merely feeling angry and wanting to kill someone, you will stop at step five and not go to the sixth. If you end up punishing rather than penalizing someone, you've gone all the way to **the sixth and final step**. For the sake of clarity the whole process of getting angry, resentful, mad, or furious will be explained below, but always bear in mind that **these six steps** are easily condensed into only two steps: (1) I want my way, and (2) I must therefore have it (emphasis added).

Each one of the six steps is then introduced as a heading (in the layout below) and discussed through the subsequent 11 pages of the book. These are the headings:

> Step one: '*I want something*.'
>
> Step two: '*I didn't get what I wanted and am frustrated.*'
>
> Step three: '*It is awful and terrible not to get what I want*.'
>
> Step four: '*You shouldn't frustrate me! I must have my way*.'
>
> Step five: '*You're bad for frustrating me*.'
>
> Step six: '*Bad people ought to be punished*.'

The sequence clearly constitutes an enumeration V-D pair. In spite of the six co-hyponymic components of the D member, the whole stretch still forms a single pair. It can be represented by Figure 3.2.



Figure 3.2 - A single predictive pair

In this sub-section I analyse the general organisational structure of part of "Step three" of the above enumeration in order to illustrate complex patterning. Let us look at the text:

> Step three: *'It is awful and terrible not to get what you want.'*
>
> If you define your frustration as a catastrophe, you've had it. At this point, depending on what you tell yourself about your frustration, you can develop several different kinds of neuroses. If you believe a certain set of ideas, you could easily become depressed instead of angry. Depression is brought about by your thinking (a) you are a worthless person because you did something bad, or (b) you ought to feel sorry for yourself because you are frustrated, or (c) you should pity someone else. These are the three ways you can get depressed over your not getting your way.
>
> But you can also become very fearful instead. However, the thoughts you must believe to become anxious at this step are quite different from those you must believe if you are to become depressed. To become afraid you must (a) believe persons and events can literally upset you, and (b) think constantly about anything that might prove difficult or dangerous. Phobias, anxieties, and other forms of fear such as shyness, timidity, and withdrawal come from these two neurotic beliefs.
>
> A third, but by no means last, set of emotional reactions you could have are the hateful ones: anger, fury, revenge, and spiteful-

> ness. Once again, however, the things you would say to yourself to produce these feelings are quite different from those you have to think to produce depression or fear. Briefly, they are: (a) I must have my way and it is awful not to get everything I want, and (b) you are wicked for frustrating me and deserve to be punished. It may have escaped you that I have been describing emotional disturbances not by frustrating events, but by the statements we make to ourselves about these frustrations. The latest psychological findings are showing us that we become upset by thinking in upsetting ways, not by encountering frustrating situations. In other words, depressing thoughts bring on depressed feelings, scary thoughts make you feel afraid, and thinking angry and punishing thoughts brings on angry and vengeful feelings. (pp. 39-40)

As shown in Figure 3.2, "Step three" above is part of a D member. To form a complex pattern, "Step three" unfolds into a further V-D pair. Observe the first paragraph of "Step three": the author states that "if you define your frustration as a catastrophe, you've had it." Within this context, i.e., seen oneself as having had a catastrophe, the author affirms that "depending on what you tell yourself about your frustration, you can develop several different kinds of neuroses." *Several different kinds of neuroses* sets up new prospection and thus constitutes a new V member: the inexact numeral *several* followed by the unspecific item *different kinds of neuroses*, commits the writer to produce a D member specifying a number of "neuroses" unless he explicitly signals his withdrawal from this commitment. What we have here is an example of the category of complex patterns that Tadros (1985) calls **embedding**: a second V-D pair is embedded in one of the members of a previous V-D pair. The textual relation previously represented by Figure 3.2 is now expanded to include the new pair, as shown in Figure 3.3.



Figure 3.3 - Complex pattern: embedding

As we analyse the "Step three" excerpt above we find that the D member of the "several kinds of neuroses" is composed of three elements. The first kind of neurosis is becoming "depressed instead of angry" (1st paragraph), the second is becoming "fearful" (2nd paragraph), and the third is having "hateful reactions" (3rd paragraph). Given the nature of the inexact numeral *several*, the sequence of three kinds is an option on the part of the writer. I am using a question mark in Figure 3.3 to represent the semantic freedom the author had to opt for a longer (or shorter) list: he might have chosen to present us with any other number of items that would fit the semantics of "several kinds of neuroses".

If we further analyse the same stretch of text, we see that embedding does not stop with the above description. First, each one of the "three different kinds of neuroses" are specified in the text. Thus the author states that depression, the first kind, is brought about by

> "your thinking (a) you are a worthless person because you did something bad, or (b) you ought to feel sorry for yourself because you are frustrated, or (c) you should pity someone else;

fear, the second kind, is brought about by

> (a) believ[ing that] persons and events can literally upset you, and (b) think[ing] constantly about anything that might prove difficult or dangerous;

and hateful reactions, the third kind, by the

> things you would say to yourself to produce these feelings: (a) I must have my way and it is awful not to get everything I want, and (b) you are wicked for frustrating me and deserve to be punished, [which] are quite different from those you have to think to produce depression or fear.

The addition of these specifics to each one of the "different kinds of neuroses" can be represented by Figure 3.4.



Figure 3.4 - Complex pattern of text organisation

The specifics for the above types of "neuroses" could be described in terms of clause relations of **matching incompatibility** (Winter 1977, 1986; Hoey 1983; Meurer 1996; Meurer and Motta-Roth 1997)). That is, in terms of the textualisation of the differences between the three types. I will not, however, elaborate on this perspective here. I want to continue showing how "Step three" unfolds still further into a complex pattern of text organisation. Thus, what we see next in the text, i.e., following the author's mention of the three kinds of "neuroses", is the recapitulation of information the author has already presented. He says:

V member

> It may have escaped you that I have been describing emotional disturbances not by frustrating events, but by the statements we make to ourselves about these frustrations.

With this recapitulation, the author recalls a point that is emphasised throughout the book: the above "emotional disturbances" (according to his definition) are not caused by frustrations that happen to us but by the way we *think* about them, or by what we *tell ourselves* about them. As we have seen earlier, recapitulation predicts further information about the reinstated topic. In the present case, the added information is not actually new but emphasises once again that we are the ones who upset ourselves:

D member:

> The latest psychological findings are showing us that we become upset by thinking in upsetting ways, not by encountering frustrating situations. In other words, depressing thoughts bring on depressed feelings, scary thoughts make you feel afraid, and thinking angry and punishing thoughts brings on angry and vengeful feelings.

By now we have added a new pair member to our previous graphic representation. Our complex pattern is now represented by Figure 3.5.



Figure 3.5 - Further illustration of complex patterning

3.5 Summary of Chapter 3

Writers can choose from a variety of different linguistic strategies to convey meaning and to signal relationships between different groups of sentences in their texts. Among possible **parameters of textualisation** (Meurer and Motta-Roth 1997) that writers make use of are basic clause relations and basic text structures (Winter 1977, 1886), metalanguage (Winter 1992, Crismore 1989), retrospection (Francis 1986, 1994), prediction (Winter 1977, Tadros 1985, 1994), etc. In the present chapter I have focused on the occurrence of a number of different ways exploited by Hauck to mark and fulfil the **prediction** or

prospection of information in *Calm Down*. More specifically, I have illustrated the textualisation, and briefly discussed functions of the predictive categories of **enumeration**, **advance labelling**, **reporting**, **recapitulation**, **hypotheticality**, **question**, and **contradiction**. In addition, within the framework of prediction, I have provided illustration of the **complex pattern of embedding**.

A stretch of text within a text, such as a predictive pair within Hauck's book, as shown above, can be seen as "an artefact within another artefact" (Sinclair 1987). Each pair has its own structure and function and each pair allows for the partitioning and structuring of stretches of information within the book. Such textualisation strategies are crucial in developing the several ideational components throughout the book, in foregrounding the interpersonal function of the text, and in making text processing manageable.

CHAPTER 4

PROBLEMATISATION AND RECONCEPTUALISATION

> Texts are typically the sites of contestation between conflicting perspectives, and linguistic processes constitute the mechanisms for the resolution of these conflicts.
>
> (Lee 1992:136)

4.0 Introduction

One of the most important features of the ideational and interpersonal metafunctions of texts is that they constantly impose some classification upon given stretches of the world. Texts are constructed out of language and, as Lee (1992:16) puts it, language "is a classificatory instrument." Even minimal texts such as *Stop* as a road sign, and *Hi there* as a greeting carry some clear and obvious classificatory power. *Stop* classifies the specific part of the road where the sign is to be heeded as a place where the driver should come to a complete halt, as opposed to all other possibilities of driving a vehicle, such as just carrying on carefully, or slowing down, or whatever. As somebody greets someone else by saying *Hi there*, s/he is implicitly classifying her/himself as somebody who, for some reason, wants to acknowledge the presence of the other person, to be friendly, to start a conversation, etc.

In *Calm Down* Hauck implicitly and explicitly classifies himself as the counsellor, the person who knows, the expert whose advice should be taken seriously, as done by Mrs Baker, and Ruth, and all the other characters in the narratives in the book. He implicitly and explicitly classifies his argument as better

than that of Mrs Baker, and by extension, better than the reader's. And most of the time he sounds convincing. The question is, how does he achieve this? What linguistic strategies constitute the mechanisms that he uses to present anger as a problem and to develop his teachings?

In this chapter I discuss (1) the strategies used by Dr Hauck to present **the problem** he wants to deal with in the book, (2) his strategies to create a counselling persona, and (3) his strategies to lead readers to a reconceptualisation of previous assumptions, or views about anger. (In Chapter 5 we will see that problem, persona, and to a certain extent reconceptualisation are all obligatory components of the genre to which self-help books such as *Calm Down* belong, hence the interest in their linguistic realisation.) I will mention in passing strategies used in academic texts, as described by Barton (1992) and Hunston (1993c, 1994) as a point of comparison. Comparing aspects of these two types of text is warranted in the sense that, though we are dealing with different discourses, we are describing a similar problem: while authors of academic texts many times try to oppose the claims, assumptions, or views of other authors, authors of self-help counselling books try to dismantle the assumptions, or views of their own readers. One cannot, however, push the similarity too far because, for one reason, while counselling authors address their own readers directly, and thus constantly foreground the interpersonal function of the text, academic authors address the issue under debate rather than opposed authors. But one cannot push differences too far either because both academic and self-help texts attempt to construct reality in the face of opposing views of reality.

4.1 Problematisation

As defined previously (Chapter 1), problematisation has to do with "showing that a prevailing assumption, idea, view, or

situation needs re-examination, re-conceptualisation or re-evaluation of some kind" (Barton 1992:2). Swales (1990) uses the metaphor of "creating a niche" to refer to the strategies authors use to establish the point, problem, aspect, situation or whatever they will be dealing with in their texts. Barton (ibid.) puts it this way: "in American academic discourse, as observed by Swales and others, problematisation takes place in order to provide a ground for the more specific purpose, thesis, point, or argument of an essay." How does Hauck establish the niche to deal with the subject matter he wants to focus on in *Calm Down*?

Problematisation in *Calm Down* is lexicalised in three main steps, as follows. Firstly, by means of the title and subtitle of the book: *Calm Down - How to cope with frustration and anger*. The only way "calm down" may be interpreted is as an imperative form. It implies that the author is telling readers to stop what they are doing and 'listen to' him. It also implies that the author assumes that readers interested in the book are having a problem, the solution of which is encapsulated in the subtitle: how to cope with frustration and anger. This implicit assumption on its own is invested with a persuasive effect. The message is: the problem exists, the solution is here, buy the book. As Lee (1992:12) affirms, "it is often much more persuasive to assume that one's audience holds a particular view than to attempt to persuade them into it by explicit argument." The "how-to" rhetorical strategy of problematisation explicit in the subtitle *How to cope with frustration and anger* is often used by other authors of self-help books as well[3]. Indeed, these books are referred to, though sometimes pejoratively, as how-to books. "How-to" signals solutions to the problem readers are assumed to have. (See Hoey (1983) and Jordan (1984) for signalling of solutions to problems).

Second, there is the preface to the book. Here the problematisation is grounded on an **evidential** of contrast (Chafe 1986, Barton 1992). According to Chafe, **evidentials** are

"expressions of attitude towards knowledge" (p. 271). Evidentials can be realised by "modals such as must, or should; adverbs like possibly, normally, and undoubtedly; prepositional phrases like of course and in fact; and predications such as I believe that and X claims that" (Barton 1992: 1). Barton argues that "the use of evidentials by experienced academic writers is related to the key aspects of the rhetorical structure of an academic essay" (p. 2). One of these structures — the problematisation section — is marked by evidentials of contrast. Here is an example from Barton (ibid. p. 3):

> During the past several years there has been broad public discussion of instances of plagiarism that the King Papers Project discovered in Martin Luther King Jr.'s doctoral dissertation. Unfortunately, the discussion has obscured the broader aims and accomplishments of the project.

The evidential *unfortunately* serves the problematisation function by metadiscoursively foregrounding the match for contrast, or incompatibility (Winter 1986, 1994) between the previous situation — broad public discussion of instances of plagiarism discovered in M. L. King Jr.'s dissertation — and the fact that this discovery has obscured the broader aims and accomplishments of the [King Papers Project]". The author's attitude toward previous knowledge as signalled by *unfortunately* sets the stage for the argumentation to be developed in the text. In Swales' (1990) metaphor, it creates the niche for the information, discussion, argumentation, etc. that the author wants to develop. Besides *unfortunately*, the most common evidentials of problematisation in academic essays, according to Barton, are *but*, *however*, and *yet*.

In Hauck's preface to *Calm Down*, *unfortunately* plays a similar function to that of the same item in the previous example. Here is the (entire) preface:

> Anger is not only a very uncomfortable emotional state, it is also potentially a very dangerous one. We all know what this means,

> because one or more times during our lives we have all been pushed to a point where we could have become violent or in many cases actually did become so. Prisons are filled with violent men, marriages are broken because hatred developed between two people who once loved each other dearly, and the crime rate in society has risen because millions of us have responded to frustrations with increased bitterness and anger.
> It is time that we understood this emotion. It is time that we consider other ways of responding to frustrations. It is not necessary to become bitter, spiteful, or resentful simply because we are not getting our way. Unfortunately an understanding of the psychology of anger is lacking in the general public, and it is for this reason that I wrote this book. Becoming an unangry person is not so difficult if one is first shown how to achieve an unangry state. The discussions of case material and of techniques that follow in these pages will give the reader all that he needs to know to master his self-righteous indignation. You can, if you apply yourself vigorously enough, learn to overcome anger for the rest of your life for all practical purposes. You will also learn how to be a firm and self-assertive person who does not let others walk over him, but who manages to do this in a civil and polite way. If this has been your desire and you have found it impossible to achieve, then read on and apply the principles you are about to discover. (p. 7)

The first paragraph above presents anger as a problem. The beginning of the second paragraph suggests what the solution would be: to understand "this emotion" and to "consider other ways of responding to frustration". As with the example I have quoted from Barton, *unfortunately* stands as the pivot evidential of Hauck's attitude towards the lack of understanding of the psychology of anger in the general public, i.e., this is a deplorable situation and it needs to be improved or changed.

Hunston (1993c) shows that in academic papers, authors tend to establish their niche by offering to provide new perspectives either for perceived lack of knowledge or for incorrect knowledge. In the case of Hauck's preface, *unfortunately* signals authorial attitude towards a certain lack of knowledge: understanding of the psychology of anger is lacking

in the general public. The use of the evidential of contrast is crucial in the creation of the niche here: it explicitly establishes the need for the book. Accordingly, Hauck can now affirm in the preface: and it is for this reason that I wrote this book.

Thirdly, the rhetorical strategy of problematisation materialises in the way Hauck uses the first narrative, the story of Mrs Baker. By starting the book with a portrayal of someone who faces frustration and anger, but who completely changes her way of seeing things, the author provides evidence that the problem is ‘real’ but he knows the ‘technology’ to solve it. Mrs Baker’s case is a fact of life. (Notice that the idea of fact of life is also evident in the first paragraph of the preface, quoted above). As a ‘real’ case, Mrs Baker’s story drives the reader directly into the framework (see Chapter 2, above) within which the author will have plenty of grounds to expand on the subject matter at hand.

Having prepared the stage for the more specific argument to follow, how does Hauck create a counselling persona? Specifically, what sort of linguistic mechanisms does he use in order to present himself as a trustworthy counsellor, a persona with acceptable credentials or authority to mediate a new cognitive perspective on frustration and anger? I look into this in the next section.

4.2 Establishing the counselling persona

In the previous section I showed that evidentials of contrast are devices of central importance in the rhetorical strategy of problematisation. According to Barton (1992:4), in academic essays a second type of evidentials — evidentials of belief — “function in the establishment and maintenance of an academic persona”. Evidentials of belief are expressed by verbs such as *think* and *believe* occurring in predications such as *I think that*, *I believe that*. As Barton puts it, the use of these evidentials “is

a delicate operation for academic authors, one which requires offering support for the authority of a persona without crossing the line into bragging" (ibid.). Barton points out that the way many authors of academic essays get around the problem of offering support for the authority of a persona is "by presenting their credential" when they introduce their first evidential of belief , as in the following examples:

> - From the perspective of a developmental psychologist, I believe that ...
> - After teaching courses on intergroup relations for several years, I believe strongly that ...
> - Having served on numerous accrediting teams, I can testify that ..." (ibid.)

We can see that in these examples the authors present their academic credentials "as a preface" (ibid.) to the evidential of belief. As Barton explains, "together, these devices thus emphasise both individuality (I) as well as a community-derived authority (a Ph.D. position of developmental psychologist, an experienced university teacher, a member of accrediting teams); it is the combination of this authority and individuality that legitimates the authors' perspective, that is, [their] authority, individual, and analytic persona" (ibid.).

In *Calm Down* there is no first explicit evidential of belief as in Barton's examples. Instead, credentials backing Hauck's authority as a counselling persona are spread throughout the book under several different guises. Credentials as a professional, for example, are explicitly presented in the first page of the book in the form of an abridged résumé, as follows:

> CALM DOWN
>
> Dr. PAUL HAUCK, PhD, is a full-time clinical psychologist in Rock Island, Illinois, USA. He is a fellow of the American Psychological Association, and has lectured widely on various aspects of

> psychology. He has written many articles for professional journals, and is the author of the following books — *Calm Down*, *Jealousy*, *How to Stand up for Yourself*, *How to Do What You Want to Do*, *Why Be Afraid?*, *How to Love and Be Loved*, *Making Marriage Work*, *Depression*, *How to Be Your Own Best Friend*, and *Hold Your Head Up High* — all published by Sheldon Press.

The counselling persona as constructed throughout Hauck's own text, however, comes 'alive' in much more indirect ways than in the above introduction. His credentials are hidden throughout the variety of textual strategies used to specify his teachings. An investigation of such strategies, however, can better be carried out within a framework of evaluation analysis rather than in terms of evidentials. Though there are similarities between the two frameworks, at this point I leave evidentials aside and move into a discussion of evaluation.

Hunston (1993a:98) points out that Stubbs (1986) calls for "a description of language use that will take into account the attitude or evaluation that is encoded in every utterance." The term evaluation has been adopted in a number of strands of discourse analysis to encapsulate the general notion that in addition to information every utterance carries a certain "orientation towards or an opinion about that information" (ibid.). (It is in this sense that evaluation and evidentials share similar meaning, as I suggested above). For Hunston (1993a, 1993b, 1993c, 1994), evaluation is "operated along three different parameters": status or degree of certainty (certain-uncertain), value (good-bad), and relevance (important-unimportant). For the purposes of the present section, I will explore the notion of status evaluation only. Basically, status evaluation has to do with how certain or uncertain the author believes a given proposition is regarding the type of knowledge or information it represents. Hunston (1993c:120) defines it this way: "The status assigned to a proposition indicates where it is located in terms of the process of knowledge construction, for example, whether it is an observation, an

experimental result, an interpretation or a conclusion." Within this perspective, fact, for instance, has a higher degree of certainty and thus higher status as compared to opinion; and finding and result have a higher status as compared to interpretation and belief. Thus, if a writer refers to a given state of affairs as being a fact and to another as being an opinion, belief or assumption, the state of affairs referred to as a fact is being "pushed up" (Hunston) the status scale, that is, the author implicitly evaluates that piece of information as having a higher degree of certainty and, therefore, higher status.

Status evaluation is built into Hauck's argumentation and contributes to the indirect presentation and maintenance of his credentials in at least three different ways. As will be seen throughout the analysis, the three strategies used to present and maintain the author's credentials relate to Hunston's (1989) idea that status is modified by the source of the proposition. An important distinction in academic texts, for example, is between people and results as source, e.g., 'Jones suggests' and 'the results suggest.' In texts such as *Calm Down* the credentials of the speakers comprise the most important distinction of status.

The first strategy used to present Hauck's credentials is the direct reference he makes to his experience as a practicing therapist. Experience brings knowledge, and knowledge stands high in the hierarchy of certainty. For example, on the second page of the book, as he mentions Mrs Bakers' arguments with him, he affirms: "But it was she who was mistaken, not I.", and he provides the basis for this statement immediately by saying:

> I had been through this debate with hundreds of people before, I knew almost word for word what their arguments would consist of, and I also knew they thought I was ridiculous for suggesting some of the views I did.(Calm Down, p. 10)

In this stretch of text, the author indirectly maintains that his knowledge is based on direct observation (debate with hundreds

of people). As a product of direct observation, Hauck's understanding of the problem is in this way implicitly attributed higher status than is Mrs. Baker's. Rhetorically, the verbs used here convey and reinforce the idea that the author knows (I knew ..., I also knew ...), while his (hundreds of) patients, like Mrs Baker think (they thought ...). References to the author's own experience occur in other places in the book, e.g.:

> What happened to Mrs Baker has happened to hundreds of other clients once they were shown how to think differently. (p. 21)

In this example, once again, experience allows higher status to be ascribed to the proposition stated by the author as opposed to the activity the "clients" are supposed to engage in, namely, the author has shown the clients how to think differently, while clients just think, and not rarely, mistakenly, as Mrs Bakers is reported to do.

A second strategy used by Hauck to establish his credentials as a counsellor materialises through the use of narratives, which in his preface he refers to as "case material." Hunston's research (1993a) shows that, in science, direct observation implies a high degree of certainty. She argues that in the case of scientific researchers, for example, "the status of their utterances becomes less certain" as the researchers "travel farther along the road from direct observation to theoretical conclusion" (p. 99). This is to say that findings or results from direct observation have a higher status than interpretations, or discussions or conclusions based on the findings. This is so because the direct observation somehow "speaks for itself", and it is thus supposed to be closer to 'reality' than an interpretation or a discussion of what has been observed.

The reported narratives in *Calm Down* derive 'naturally' from the author's direct observation. They are supposed to be selected cases among the hundreds of patients that have consulted with the author. As such, narratives stand high in the status scale

because they represent true facts. They offer the certainty associated with direct observation: they are undeniable. As world 3 realities they directly reflect world 1 and world 2 realities (see Chapter 2). Experience of a large quantity of such cases thus enhances the credentials of the author. Altogether, the cases further substantiate the higher status of the meanings encapsulated in the verbs *know* and *think*, as discussed previously: the author "knows" while the clients only "think".

A third strategy of credential specification is the reference the author makes to institutionalised sources of knowledge, two important ones being "the latest psychological findings" and Dr Albert Ellis' "rational-emotive therapy." Reference to the findings — a nominalisation of status — occurs four times in the book, as follows:

> Mrs Baker was no different from you, the reader, will be as you discover some of the latest psychological findings. (p. 10)

> In the following pages you will be informed of the latest psychological findings on the subjects of anger, resentment, fury, and hate, and how to control and rid yourself of all of them. (p. 21)

> The latest psychological findings are showing us that we become upset by thinking in upsetting ways, not by encountering frustrating situations. (p. 40)

> The latest findings from psychology clearly show us that being frustrated and being disturbed are not one and the same. (p. 55)

Reference to Ellis occurs later in the book, and Hauck acknowledges that he has drawn substantially on this author. The first time Hauck mentions Ellis (p. 54), he refers to him as an authority in the field of therapeutic counselling. On page 95 Ellis is mentioned as "the founder of rational-emotive therapy, whose philosophies underlie this book." In fact, Ellis is a recognised name in cognitive-behaviour therapy, specifically associated with rational-emotive therapy. Thorpe and Olson (1990), for example,

state that Ellis (together with four other names, which do not matter here) is an "important figure in cognitive-behaviour therapy whose work on theory and techniques has enriched the field" (p. 75). Ellis' main work is published in the book *Reason And Emotion In Therapy* (1962, New York: Lyle Stuart) which, according to Thorpe and Olson, "has its roots in philosophy rather than in psychoanalysis" (p. 76).

Quite clearly the general references mentioned above are intended by Hauck to reveal his community or institutionally-derived authority and thus to reassure the readers that he does have the credentials to give advice about the subject matter at hand. The strategic use of general, unspecific references to hundreds of clients, latest psychological findings, and the founder of rational-emotive therapy in the textual environment where they occur adds a seemingly scientific tone to the text and by so doing gives — especially to the less experienced reader — the impression of added certainty about the conveyed information. By drawing from supposedly recognised — though indefinite — sources of knowledge the author gathers support to give advice. Based on such a persona he can encourage readers to take his advice seriously, similarly to Mrs Baker, as reported in the very first sentence of the book:

> It was during the third session with Mrs Baker that she finally took my advice seriously and decided I might have something worthwhile to offer her, though it sounded mad.

Status of advice is therefore modified by the persona of the possessive. Lexical constructions such as *my advice* in the context of this example acquire higher status not because of their intrinsic meaning but because of the persona the writer has developed and maintains throughout the text by means of rhetorical strategies such as the ones I have discussed. On the one hand, rhetorical strategies help create the persona. On the other hand, the persona guarantees that linguistic devices in the text will have a certain

status and a certain meaning. This circularity is part of the nature of texts themselves and of the processes we use to make sense of them.

4.3 Reconceptualisation

Frequently in *Calm Down* we witness a debate or a conflict between the author and both the narrative characters and readers of the book. The essence of the dispute centers on the sequence of situations represented by Figure 1.2, (Chapter 1, p. 8), reproduced here as Figure 4.1, for convenience.



Figure 4.1 - Representation of the general process of getting angry.

The author's argument, as already presented at the end of Chapter 1, is that it is not some event (A) that causes anger (C), but it is one's beliefs, what one thinks or tells her/himself about A (represented by B in the same Figure) that leads to anger. The central thesis, therefore, is that one causes her/himself to be angry rather than what the narrative characters and readers tend to believe, i.e., that C is a direct consequence of A. According to Thorpe and Olson (1990:77-78), this is actually Dr Albert Ellis' thesis: Ellis would urge his clients to reject the idea that A causes C and to realise that what causes C is B, not A. Thorpe and Olson write the following interesting summary of Ellis' ideas, relating them to philosophy:

> Ellis (1962) developed rational-emotive therapy (RET) quite independently of behavior therapy. ... RET was regarded an insight therapy before Meichenbaum's work gave it more prominence among behavior therapists. Ellis had been trained in psychodynamic therapy initially, but he became dissatisfied with its poor practical results. His work on RET sprang from his earlier interest in philosophy, particularly the work of the Stoics (early Greek and Roman philosophers like Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius). They had put forward the view that people can more or less put up with any adversity without undue sorrow. The technique? Acknowledge, they argued, that it is not events that disturb people. It is, instead, their view of those events that makes for misery or unhappiness (or, for that matter, pleasure or joy). Ellis' therapy aims at persuading clients to dispute the unhelpful views that make them anxious, depressed, or angry. (Thorpe and Olson, 1990:77)

Hauck's *Calm Down* in turn is intended to teach readers how to restructure their beliefs, reconceptualising B in such a way as to be able to avoid driving themselves into the "uncomfortable and potentially dangerous emotional state" of anger.

In this section I examine some of the main linguistic strategies Hauck uses to argue for his claims as opposed to the ones he either implicitly or explicitly attributes to characters in the narratives or to potential readers of the book. I am specially interested in exploring how the author of *Calm Down* textualises his sociocognitive viewpoints as having higher status and as being more valuable than the conflicting viewpoints he implicitly and explicitly attributes to his narrated characters and potential readers. In other words, what strategies does the author use to mediate his perspectives on anger as opposed to characters' and readers' perspectives? In order to facilitate my references to author's and readers'/characters' claims, I use Hunston's (1993c) terms **Opposed Claim** to indicate the claims attributed to, or assumed by the writer to be held by narrative characters and potential readers of the book, and **Proposed Claim** to refer

to the claims of the author himself. For this analysis I draw further on Hunston's approach to evaluation. I use her notion of status evaluation as in the previous section and also her notion of evaluation of value.

4.3.1 Status

1. A pervasive strategy used by Hauck to support his approach to coping with anger, and thus influence the reader to side with him, is to grant higher status to Proposed Claims (i.e., his claims) and lower status to Opposed Claims (i.e., narrative character's claims). To grant higher status, as defined in section 2 above, means to evaluate a claim as having a higher degree of certainty as a a piece of information or a particular instance of knowledge. Let us analyse the following example within the framework of status evaluation:

> [S1]This is the tone our previous sessions had taken: [S2]I trying to show her that she was getting herself angry over behaviour her husband simply could not control and she always arguing with me that I just didn't understand her situation and that if I did I wouldn't talk like that.
> [S3]But it was she who was mistaken, not I. [S4]I had been through this debate with hundreds of people before, I knew almost word for word what their arguments would consist of, and I also knew they thought I was ridiculous for suggesting some of the views I did. (*Calm Down*, p. 10)

The higher status of the author's perspective is revealed both explicitly and implicitly. Explicitly, the author states that the client is mistaken (S3), and he thus makes absolutely clear where he stands. The implicit strategies, are more sophisticated. If we consider the first sentence of the quotation above, we can see that the author implicitly portrays a slightly unbalanced situation: as a counsellor, he *shows* something to be the case to the client (Mrs Baker), while the client *argues* that the counsellor does not understand her problem. It is an unbalanced situation in the sense

that the counsellor's and the client's activity are given different weight: show is more positive than argue. An evidence for this is that while the author could say 'I was arguing that...', he would be unlikely to say that 'Mrs Baker was trying to show me that...'

Different status is also implicit in the way the author uses different mental state verbs to report his verbal activity as opposed to the client's. Specifically, the author argues with the client not in terms of what he *thinks*, as the client does, but in terms of what he *knows*, as derived from experience with hundreds of cases. Two paragraphs later the author assigns further higher status to his side of the argument by stating that his perspective derives from institutionalised knowledge provided by *the latest psychological findings* (which I have quoted in section 4.2). What is implied is that the author's stance is based on experience and established knowledge. As such, the author's claims stand for more than just Hauck's own thinking as an individual, while the Opposed Claims are shown to be based on an individual's opinion and feeling. As the opinion and feeling of an individual, the Opposed Claims can thus be more easily rejected than the Proposed Claims. Rejecting the Proposed Claims is tantamount not only to rejecting Hauck's statements but also to rejecting the implied findings (and the philosophies he refers to later in the text, as I mentioned in section 2 above). As Hunston 1989:36 puts it, by tying to a theory the knowledge he expresses, a writer creates a situation such that the unacceptance of the stated knowledge would imply challenging the theory itself in which his thoughts are based.

If we recall Popper (1967), we realise that the conflict between the author and the client in this example and, at many points in the book, is a conflict between world 2 and world 3 entities (see Chapter 2 for details). World 2 in this situation is the client's (and reader's by extension) state of mind, her current understanding of the subject, what she thinks and feels about it. This is a process that exists only in so far as it goes on in Mrs

Bakers' mind. It is thus a temporary phenomenon. Hauck's viewpoint, on the other hand, is based on knowledge as a product of the human mind, a world 3 reality. And, in general, knowledge is seen as superior in terms of status because it does not exist simply as a process in the author's mind but is available in books, in libraries. It is permanent and can be used by whomever may have access to it and is able to make sense of it.

Interestingly, Popper (1967) observes that English lacks a term to distinguish between knowledge as a world 3 entity i.e., knowledge that is available in texts and in libraries, as opposed to knowledge as a world 2 entity, i.e., and knowledge as a state of mind. In spite of the unavailability of a specific term, there is a general consensus that knowledge as a world 3 entity (though this specific terminology has not to my knowledge been used in discourse analysis) has greater impact and reliability, and hence higher status, than knowledge as a world 2 entity. We know, for example, that technology would not be possible without world 3 knowledge. (See for example Ong 1982). Of course, knowledge as a world 2 entity may eventually defy knowledge as a world 3 entity. But when this happens, and for it to have any significance, in general world 2 knowledge will already have been given a written representation, and will thus have been transformed into a world 3 entity as well. In fact, it is quite obvious to me that, in the modern world, authority — in the sense of being recognised as having something to offer in terms of knowledge in a given area — can hardly ever be constituted other than by the consumption and production of world 3 knowledge. All this is supposed to further substantiate the argument that Hauck's claims as I have discussed so far are given higher status than the claims he attributes to his narrative characters and readers for the simple reason that his knowledge is supposedly based on world 3 knowledge. This plays an important role in the reconceptualisation the author tries to develop in the book.

Within the general framework of attributing higher status to his viewpoints as a reconceptualisation strategy, one textual structure Hauck uses frequently in the book is that of denial-correction (Winter 1982). The excerpt I analyse next to show this pattern at work appears under the heading “Myth No. 5: Anger cannot be prevented, only suppressed”, and it constitutes the entire sub-section under that heading. I have underlined all the expressions of denial in it. Everything not underlined is either a correction of the adjacent denial, the basis (reason, motivation) for the correction or a generalisation derived from the denial-correction structure.

> Myth No. 5: Anger cannot be prevented, only suppressed
>
> My client learned very much to her surprise she could actually avoid getting angry in the first place if she talked to herself correctly. She was not merely hiding her anger and pretending she wasn’t angry, she really thought her way out of being angry at all. Since it is we who talk ourselves into being angry, it is up to us to talk ourselves out of being angry.
> No matter what the issue is, it is still possible to forgive your frustrater. I’m not now referring only to the normal and harmless reaction of raising your voice, arguing for your rights, feeling peeved, or even wanting to hit someone on the nose. These can be healthy and brief emotional reactions which cause no lasting damage to anyone.
> The anger I am primarily referring to in this book is the kind that gets you into trouble, that eats your guts out, makes you act cruelly to others, or makes a complaining, whining baby out of you. These are the sick and dangerous emotions we must worry about, not the shouting matches or the occasional acts of firmness we must show our children. Technically these are angry emotions too and can be controlled and prevented in the same way as violent feelings can be prevented. It is simply not as urgent, however, to keep our voices down as it is to keep our hatreds down. And there is a distinction here. Raising your voice in an argument doesn’t have to mean you hate the person you’re arguing with. In fact, you frequently argue only with those you love, such as your parents,

> spouse, or children. If you didn't care for them, you'd show that by indifference, not by arguing.
> Let us therefore not control all expressions of firmness or we will become colourless zombies. But the desire to kill, to seek a cruel revenge, to put someone down and want him to be hurt physically or emotionally - these can be thrown out completely, wiped out entirely until you can truly say you are not angry deep down.(*Calm Down*, pp. 16-17)

The first denial in this excerpt is that "anger cannot be prevented", the corresponding correction being that anger can "only be suppressed." As explicitly signalled, this denial-correction pair is classified as a *myth*, another nominalisation of status. And as a myth, which in this context is by definition "an untrue idea or explanation" (*Collins COBUILD English Language Dictionary*), this statement can only be interpreted as equivalent to an erroneous belief. The very way the statement is textualised, therefore, leaves no doubt the author is evaluating it as having extremely low status: it is not an instance of reliable knowledge, it is simply a myth that must be refuted.

Within the context where it occurs this denial-correction heading is, therefore, a rebuttal of a popular view. In the remainder of the above quotation the author provides the basis or reason for defending the opposite view, i.e., that anger can be prevented, not suppressed. The fact that he tries to make his point by means of an uninterrupted sequence of at least ten denial-correction structures must in itself have some meaning. I will return to this point later on.

The first reason for the author's rebuttal of the myth under discussion is presented in the first sentence in the body of the quotation: "My client learned very much to her surprise she could actually avoid getting angry in the first place if she talked to herself correctly." We know this sentence functions as a basis in this case because it could have been preceded by a signalling clause (Winter 1977), i.e., a clause specifying the relation between this

sentence and the heading. In case a signalling clause had been used, the text might look like this:

> Myth No. 5: Anger cannot be prevented, only suppressed. This is not really true because my client learned very much to her surprise she could actually avoid getting angry in the first place if she talked to herself correctly.

This basis, however, does not rule out the opposed popular assumption specified in "Myth No. 5" that Hauck's client might have "only suppressed" her anger rather than actually "prevented" it. The author, therefore, needs to produce a further denial to dismiss this assumption, showing that this is not the case. A denial thus follows in the above quotation. I repeat it here, for convenience:

> {Denial} She was not merely hiding her anger and pretending she wasn't angry, {Correction} she really thought her way out of being angry at all. {Generalisation} Since it is we who talk ourselves into being angry, it is up to us to talk ourselves out of being angry.

The interpersonal function of this denial can be explained in terms of the taxonomy developed by Pagano (1992, 1994). Analysing the use of negatives in written text, Pagano observes that one of the reasons for authors to use negatives is to deny an idea which they assume their readers may "entertain in connection with some aspect of the topic been dealt with" (1992:132). Pagano calls this use of negation denial of background information. This classification fits the type of denial we have in the above excerpt: Hauck denies the readers' possible assumption that the client mentioned might not actually have suppressed anger. In order to emphasise 'the correct view' the author adds a correcting statement specifying that the client has really thought her way out of being angry. Taking further advantage of this textual environment the author finishes the paragraph with a generalisation giving one more rendition of the leitmotif of the book, i.e., we are the ones who talk ourselves into being angry and it is up to us to talk

ourselves out of being angry. This way, the denial/correction/ generalisation structure becomes an important strategy of reconceptualisation. What the author assumes readers to believe is classified as a myth. The myth is then denied, the 'wrong' assumptions are corrected and followed by a generalisation with the illocutionary force of a concluding remark.

Let us look into the next denial. In his internal dialogue with his readers, the author next shows himself to have assumed that readers might still counter argue that this specific client succeeded only because her case was not serious enough. Had the client been involved in a more severe situation it would have been impossible for her to suppress anger. What comes next in the above quotation is a denial of this assumption, again followed by a correction:

> No matter what the issue is, it is still possible to forgive your frustrater.

This is followed by still another denial-correction (+denial) sequence to make clear what the author means:

> {Denial} I'm not now referring only to the normal and harmless reaction of raising your voice, arguing for your rights, feeling peeved, or even wanting to hit someone on the nose. {Correction} These can be healthy and brief emotional reactions {Denial} which cause no lasting damage to anyone.

Here, at the same time as the author clarifies his point he adds the information that he sees angry behaviour such as raising one's voice, etc., as healthy emotional reactions given that these are not prolonged reactions.

A longer correction then follows the last denial (reactions like raising one's voice cause no lasting damage), where the author explains what sort of anger he considers damaging. Throughout this paragraph the author contrasts harmless angry emotions with sick and dangerous ones:

> {Correction} The anger I am primarily referring to in this book is the kind that gets you into trouble, that eats your guts out, makes you act cruelly to others, or makes a complaining, whining baby out of you. These are the sick and dangerous emotions we must worry about, {Denial} not the shouting matches or the occasional acts of firmness we must show our children. {Generalisation} Technically these are angry emotions too and can be controlled and prevented in the same way as violent feelings can be prevented. {Denial} It is simply not as urgent, however, to keep our voices down as it is to keep our hatreds down. {Generalisation}And there is a distinction here. {Denial} Raising your voice in an argument doesn't have to mean you hate the person you're arguing with. {Correction} In fact, you frequently argue only with those you love, such as your parents, spouse, or children. {Hypothetical denial} If you didn't care for them, {Correction} you'd show that by indifference, {Denial} not by arguing.

All of these denials are quite clearly **denials of background information** (Pagano 1992, 1994): they deny what the author assumes readers may think as a result of their own background knowledge. The denial occurring in the last paragraph of "Myth No. 5" quotation, however, is of a different type:

> Let us therefore not control all expressions of firmness or we will become colourless zombies. But the desire to kill, to seek a cruel revenge, to put someone down and want him to be hurt physically or emotionally - these can be thrown out completely, wiped out entirely until you can truly say you are not angry deep down.

In this case the author denies a possible inference readers might arrive at based on information conveyed in the text itself. Pagano (1992, 1994) calls this type of interpersonal strategy **denial of text processed information**. In this specific instance it functions as a general conclusion to the sub-section, reassuring the reader that the author does not favour an all pervasive control of anger. At the same time the denial prevents readers from arriving at an opposite (inappropriate) conclusion based only on the heading of the subsection, on the first paragraph and the first sentence of the second paragraph. Deriving a conclusion

based on this stretch of the text would make the author's argument unrealistic and would thus lower the status it may have gained so far.

As a way to end this discussion of the denial-correction pattern I want to associate the above quotation ("Myth No. 5") with Longacre's (1983) notions of peak and turbulence. Basically, the peak is related to the climax of a narrative. Longacre says: "one thing is certain, the peak of a discourse [I would prefer text here] is non-routine. It may, in fact, be thought of as a zone of turbulence in regard to the general flow of a discourse. It is, therefore, not surprising that at discourse peaks markers of the mainline may be phased out, be used less frequently — or be used much more frequently than in other parts of the discourse" (p. xvii). Longacre also talks about what he calls action peaks and didactic (or thematic) peaks. An action peak is a "surface structure episode that correlates with the climax" of narrative, while a didactic peak "is a special elaboration of some episode which precedes or follows the action peak" (p. 24).

In the body of "Myth No. 5", turbulence is marked by the emphatic repetition of the denial-correction structure. Clearly, it constitutes a didactic peak. As a special elaboration of the episode of Mrs Baker — whose peak in turn might be her giving evidence that the author's method has changed her life — it contains crucial information correcting the "untrue idea or explanation" built into Myth No. 5's heading. It contains crucial information about what the author means by controlling one's anger and about the sort of anger the book as a whole deals with. As I have observed previously, therefore, the repetition of this textual pattern in itself does have a meaning.

Still another strategy Hauck uses in his text to raise the status of his Proposed Claims and thus persuade readers of the validity of such claims is appeal to consensus. Appeal to consensus is "a specific appeal to an implicit, shared consensus of opinion" between writer and the general public (Hunston 1993c:126).

The basic idea is that the author assumes that everybody 'sees' something in a given way and that each individual reader would, therefore, share the same view. According to Hunston (ibid.), "grammatical items used to appeal to consensus include rhetorical questions (see Chapter 3, section 3.6), adverbs such as certainly, no doubt, surely, and the representation of the source of knowledge claims as generally assumed knowledge." Here is an example of the last type (this excerpt has been used previously for a different purpose in my discussion of heading questions):

> *Most of you* will agree that getting angry because you didn't get what you wanted is foolish if what you wanted is petty and insignificant. If you want to go swimming tomorrow and it rains, practically anyone in the world would say you were being an ignoramus to get cross with the weather. Practically *everyone* would think you were immature and very impulsive if you smashed your dishes or furniture just to show another person how angry you were. (*Calm Down*, p. 48-49, my emphasis)

Appeals to consensus like these tend to have higher status than possible readers' counter-arguments for the simple reason that if everyone is assumed to share the same opinion then there is a better chance that the consensual view is closer to truth than any opposing view. Of course, if one looks at history, there are plenty of examples to show that consensus does not mean a statement or an argument is true all the time. Thus, though appeals to consensus do often have high status and persuasive force, they are not immune to fallacy.

4.3.2 Value

As we have seen previously, evaluation of status relates to authors' either explicitly or implicitly demonstrated degree of certainty in relation to propositions as instances of knowledge and information. A more common type of evaluation has to do with judging things as 'good' or 'bad'. This is the type of evaluation Hunston (1989, 1993b, 1993c, 1994) calls evaluation

of value. In this case, besides the information conveyed, a given proposition will also carry evaluation that can be assessed "along a 'good-bad' scale and may be said to bestow quality" (Hunston 1993b:62). An important feature of value evaluation, as Hunston (1994) puts it, is that "the terms of reference for the judgement may be essentially personal, such as when readers decide they find a particular novelist 'boring', or they may occur within an institutionalised framework, such as when teachers decide whether a particular text-book is suitable for a particular group of students" (p. 191). Even when evaluation is "essentially personal" it will still be possible to trace institutional frames 'behind' it. Institutionally framed evaluation, and personally framed evaluation by extension will always reflect the value-system(s) of the institution(s) within which the text is created. In academic writing, for example, "the value-system is largely concerned with what constitutes knowledge" (Hunston 1994:210). In self-help books like Hauck's study of anger, the institutional value-system is largely concerned with some aspect of cognition as related to individuals' control of a certain type of behaviour, or pursuit of a certain goal, the ultimate one being happiness, or general well-being.

Before showing specific examples of evaluation of value and their relationship to reconceptualisation, I want to further differentiate between this type of evaluation and evaluation of status. Status, as Hunston (1994:195) points out, "is attached to each clause — each clause must have one status or another, so that the whole text is evaluative in this sense." Thus, if I say *it is raining*, or *it may be raining*, or *it will certainly rain*, or *they say it is raining*, each one of these statements has a different status because each one implies a different degree of certainty and commitment in relation to the truth of the proposition expressed.[4] In written texts, we know what the status of a proposition is by means of the "different activity" the writer is

performing (e.g., the writer states, interprets, reports), by "the ascribed source of the proposition" (i.e., the writer's own or somebody else's — see the notion of averral, for example, section 3.3.3), and "by modifications such as modal verbs, report verbs and metalinguistic labelling" (Hunston 1994:194-5).

On its own, however, none of the sample clauses in the above paragraph is evaluative in terms of 'goodness' or 'badness.' But if one said (in British English) *it is bloody raining again!*, the statement in itself, besides the status *this is true*, also carries the speaker's assessment of value: rain is not welcome, it is a potentially bad thing. On the other hand, all the variations of the previous proposition — *it is raining* — may in fact be evaluative, depending on the context. For instance, rain is good in a situation following a five year-long drought in the Northeast of Brazil, but it is bad in a summer day at the beach in Florianópolis. Thus, evaluation of value may be achieved either by explicitly attributing a certain quality (good or bad) to some entity or by the surrounding context. As Hunston (1994:197) explains "the expression of evaluation of value may not be confined to a single sentence but may occur as an accumulation of items over several sentences." In *Calm Down* this process unfolds throughout the whole book.

Three more aspects need to be mentioned in relation to value. First, high status items are often 'good' in themselves (e.g., knowledge is good, ignorance is bad). Value is "inextricably linked" to status (Hunston 1994:197). For instance, besides ascribing high status to his advice by relating it to *the latest psychological findings*, by so doing Hauck also assigns value to it, that is, the author is, supposedly, providing good advice. Second, what will count as evaluation of value "depends on what is being evaluated, and in particular, its status" (ibid). For example, a hypothesis is evaluated on different grounds from a myth. In *Calm Down* Hauck's voice as well as the voice of characters

who share his points of view are given higher value. Finally, evaluation of value "depends on the goals of the community within which the text has been produced. Anything that refers to these goals is evaluative, even if it does not contain what is commonly thought as evaluative language" (Hunston 1994:197). In this sense all teachings in *Calm Down* directed towards controlling anger are in principle supposed by the author to be good because they encourage the instantiation of important human goals: e.g., smooth social interaction and the individual's well-being and success.

That anger is bad and that overcoming anger is good is reiterated throughout Hauck's book. As already shown in some of the quotations above (section 3.1), controlling anger, however, can also be bad if it is taken to an extreme. (It is common sense that extremes are usually bad). Also, as already shown in the denial-correction sample (section 3.1, again), the author elaborates on anger management by distinguishing between firmness (good in the scale of value) and angry behaviour (bad). I will next look into some of Hauck's use of value evaluation in *Calm Down* thus illustrating the two ends of the value scale: anger assessed by the author as bad, and overcoming anger assessed by the author as good.

The first and explicit assessment of value in *Calm Down*, and in this case that anger is a bad thing and the book is a good one, is found in the publisher's blurb on the back cover. It says:

> Calm Down
>
> How do you react to situations that don't run according to plan? How do you cope with people who won't do things your way? Do you let life's frustrations build up inside you until you explode with anger and rage?
>
> If so, your reactions may backfire and make you ill, prevent you from dealing effectively with the problem, and make you unhappy. This book will help you to control anger — and to handle life's

> frustrations — by showing you how to understand your feelings and reaction to them. Once you understand what you are doing to yourself, you can change direction. You don't need to be bitter, spiteful, or resentful because you are not getting your own way.
>
> Dr Hauck approaches the problem of anger and frustration with the same level-headed reasoning used in his best-selling book *Depression*.
>
> '... excellent ... Dr Hauck talks so much sense.'
>
> *VIRGINIA IRONSIDE, PROBLEM PAGE EDITOR OF WOMAN*

As shown in the above quotation, the basis for evaluating anger (in fact, *exploding with anger and rage*) as bad is that angry reactions may impede the achievement of a number of quintessential human goals, namely, "angry reactions may backfire and make you ill, prevent you from dealing effectively with the problem, and make you unhappy". The book in turn is evaluated as good because it will, supposedly, help solve this problem by showing you how to understand your feelings and reaction to them. Notice that the need for cognitive restructuring, or reconceptualisation is implicit in the denial statement "You don't need to be bitter, spiteful, or resentful because you are not getting your own way". Reconceptualisation — a revision of assumptions and a change of direction on the part of readers — is to be achieved by understanding "what you are doing to yourself". And, supposedly again, this can be done by reading the book. Furthermore, the book is supposed to be good because its author makes use of "the same level-headed reasoning used in his best-selling book *Depression*". The book is thus designed to help readers efficiently and effectively. To top it all, the Problem Page Editor of the weekly women's magazine *Woman* has stated that the book is "excellent"! The publisher's blurb, thus, encapsulates the solution for a problem by exploiting different value functions of evaluation. The need for reconceptualisation is built into the solution itself.

That anger is bad is illustrated and discussed from different perspectives, such as in relation to hostility, aggression, violence, alcoholism, illness, making things worse, lack of confidence, self hate, blame, divorce, seeing things as catastrophic, abusing children, fear, dictatorship, suicide, prison, inability to solve problems, unhappiness, spitefulness, etc. The need for readers to "change direction", i.e., "*Calm Down*" and do something healthier for themselves, is implicit in these evaluative discussions throughout the book. Let us, for example, see one of the author's comments on self-hate, one of the consequences of anger. (I have already referred to the correlation between anger and disease — see Chapter 2, and Note 2).

> Hate others and you'll want to punish them. Hate yourself and you'll punish yourself. You can punish yourself by literally beating your body or whipping yourself. Or you might burn yourself with cigarettes, cut yourself with knives or razors, marry a layabout, or deliberately but unconsciously convince yourself you can't do a job and then allow yourself to fail by default. In general you can be a loser in life because how else could you punish yourself better than that? This would all be unnecessary if you were not angry with yourself. (p. 124)

Negative evaluation here is accomplished by the lexical collocations "hate yourself", "punish yourself" (twice), "beating your body", "whipping yourself", "burn yourself", and by the self inflicted penalties of marrying "a layabout", failing "by default", all of which result from anger. Some other examples of negative value the author explicitly attributes to anger elsewhere in the book are: "a very uncomfortable emotional state" (p. 7); "anger almost always increases your frustration" (p. 23, 122); "getting angry prevents one from solving problems" (p. 24); "anger is one of those emotions that are especially infectious (...this is why a mob is such a dangerous social group)" (p.26); "Anger can make us physically ill" (p. 27); "I can't think of a single human emotion that is more dangerous to each of us than anger" (p.

27); "childish behaviour" (p. 28); "anger is responsible for some of the most depraved of all human behaviour: child abuse" (p. 29); "to get angry for any cause requires that you become a dictator" (p. 73).

That anger is bad and that "overcoming" anger is good is also implied by "the benefits" one is supposed to derive from not being angry or from being an unangry person, to use Hauck's own term. For example:

> The benefits of overcoming anger are twofold, therefore - you will be a nicer companion to others and you will be a nicer companion to yourself. (p. 125)

At many points in the book evaluation is achieved more subtly as part of the built-in meaning of certain linguistic items not regularly considered evaluative. Take as an example the use of verb *realise*. Hunston (1993c:124) observes that "verbs of cognition" such as *realise*, *be aware*, and *understand* can reveal writers' attitudes. She says about these verbs: "When grammatically positive, information is given about the attitude of the writer. When grammatically negative, a difference between writer and subject of the verb is implied." In *Calm Down*, as the author wants to drive readers to restructure 'wrong' assumptions regarding the subject matter under discussion, every time readers (or characters in the narratives) realise something, they are seen as siding with the author. Given the author's persona and the status of his claims, siding with him is seen, within the book, as psychologically and socially advantageous and, therefore, good. Not siding with the author is seen as the opposite. Observe this stretch of text, for example. (I am providing extra-context to make the excerpt more meaningful).

> The mother who is trying to make her child earn good marks isn't a dictator for trying. It is when she makes a mountain out of a molehill and insists that the child will earn good marks: that's the stuff dictators are made of. They demand their own way and believe that those who disobey them are bad, should be severely dealt with.

> If the mother could look at this problem more sanely, she'd realize (a) it would be splendid if her daughter were to become a first-class student; (b) about the only way she will gain that end is to study much harder than she has; (c) therefore she, the mother, had better stimulate the girl towards studying harder and if necessary penalize her for slacking; and (d) if penalizing her doesn't work she should not feel the girl is bad but accept calmly what she can't change.
> Were she to do this, her daughter would not become spiteful and use poor marks as a way of punishing her Hitler-like mother.
> However, if the mother takes the other road - that of the dictator- she will follow the irrational process: (a) getting poor marks is unbearable; (b) she will have to make the girl work harder to get top marks; (c) if the girl does not succeed, scold her, slap her, let her know how bad she is for defying her mother, and insist angrily that she must do as her mother says; and finally (d) keep this up until the girl sees how right her mother is and gives in.
> It doesn't take a genius to see how the second procedure will not succeed. Yet millions of well-meaning parents turn into dictators every day in the belief that... (*Calm Down*, p. 68-69)

It seems that to realise something is, in itself, always good, not to realise is bad. Thus, the mother above is more likely to succeed when she realises a number of things as listed by the author. But when the mother "takes the other road" (4th paragraph) she is implicitly negatively evaluated due to the fact that she does not realise that she is being a dictator, that she is not appropriately helping the child, etc.

The form *realise* occurs 11 times in the book. Every time *realise* is grammatically affirmative (10 out of the 11 occurrences) it does carry a positive evaluation. Here are some more examples, brief ones this time:

> I fully realize that anger is a condition that often commands much respect and it would be a shame not to take advantage of this fact.(*Calm Down*, p. 33)

> In short, we have come to realize that frustration and disturbance are two entirely different states and that one does not need to follow the other, although it often does. (p. 56)

> At first she thought I was an idiot for suggesting she was totally wrong on each of these counts, but as we debated the issues and as she persisted in coming back for more sessions and more clarification she too could begin to realize she didn't run the world and that her sister had a right to her views. (p. 120)

In relation to *realise* in each of these examples we may add the evaluation "and this is good." If we have a question, as in the next example, we can only say "and this is good" if the answer is positive. It is "not good" if the answer is negative:

> Do you realize how difficult it is to continue being angry with someone who is being as nice as pie while you're screaming at him? (p. 42)

And the same applies to grammatically negative *realise*

> So we can't excuse him on the ground that he didn't realize you'd be upset about having your son taken away. (p. 54)

The evaluative element implicit in this cognitive verb fits the overall goal Hauck has set for his book. The author wants to steer readers into restructuring the way they perceive the process of getting angry. The quintessential step for any reconceptualisation is a cognitive one. As perhaps a prototypical cognitive process, *realise* is evaluated positively because it can signal the beginning, the first step in the reconceptualisation process. This is why the act of *realising* something is good. The act of *not realising* in turn is bad because it blocks the very inception of cognitive processes that lead to reconceptualisation.

Within the notion of reconceptualisation, and independently of status or value judgement, it is interesting to recall that "cognition is the collection of mental processes and activities used in perceiving, remembering, thinking, and understanding, as well as the act of using those processes" (Ashcraft 1994:12). Hauck clearly links behaviour with cognition. And, as seen above, cognitive reorientation is the foundation of reconceptualisation. Paying attention to specific lexical items

such as *realise* may reveal important meaning relations in self-help books because cognitive reorientation includes processes such as the one indicated by *realise*.

4.4 Summary of Chapter 4

In this chapter I have described and discussed some of the textualisation strategies that the author of *Calm Down* uses to present (1) anger as **the problem** to be handled in the book, (2) his credentials as a **counselling persona**, and (3) his claims to lead readers to **reconceptualise**, or cognitively restructure certain beliefs about the process of getting angry. Regarding the problem, I discussed the author's use of title and subtitle, his use of an **evidential of contrast** in the preface to the book, and the use he makes of narrative. Regarding the establishment of a counselling persona, I made brief reference to **evidentials of belief** and introduced the notion of **status evaluation**, according to Hunston. Within the framework of status evaluation, I showed how the author presents his credentials by referring to his own experience as a therapist, to the reported "case material", and to institutionalised sources of knowledge. Concerning cognitive restructuring, or reconceptualisation, I discussed some of Hauck's strategies on the basis of Hunston's notions of both status evaluation and **value evaluation**. Within status evaluation, I illustrated how the author of *Calm Down* explicitly and implicitly gives higher weight to his claims and thus adds persuasive force to his argument, how he uses the **denial-correction** text structure to reject readers' assumptions, and how he uses **appeal to consensus** also as a persuasive strategy. In relation to the denial-correction sequence I also briefly discussed Longacre's notions of **peak** and **turbulence**. Finally, within the evaluation of value, I further elaborated on the difference between status and value, discussing and illustrating how value evaluation is used as a reconceptualisation tool.

I started this chapter by referring to language as a classificatory system. It should be noted that the chapter was not intended to give an account of every argument, nor of the overall validity of the argument the author uses. What I did, and this was the purpose of the chapter, was to look into some of the strategies used by one specific self-help author to classify himself and his argument in a certain way. It seems that by the way this author presents anger as problem, the way he presents himself as a counselling persona, and the way he attributes both high status and value to his side of the argument represent strategies also used by other self-help counselling authors. Such strategies end up influencing readers, partially at least, to reorganise, or to restructure their beliefs. Through linguistic means, therefore, these authors lead other individuals into new classifications of specific aspects of the world.

CHAPTER 5
COUNSELLING AS A GENRE

> Characteristics of individual discourses can be neither described, predicted, nor analysed without resort to a classification of discourse types.
>
> (Longacre 1983:1)

5.0 Introduction

Current theorising on genre is far from achieving consensus in discourse/text analysis. In spite of the fact that the notion of genre is an important one with regards to communicative functions and linguistic realisations associated with specific text types, the study of genre-related questions has only very recently attracted the attention of linguists. Swales (1990) in his book *Genre Analysis* refers to the situation, rather pessimistically, the following way: "Aside from scholars such as Martin, Rothery, and Couture, linguistics as a whole has tended to find genre indigestible" (p. 41). (I will briefly discuss Martin's views in section 5.2). Swales then goes on to explain the situation as follows:

> The difficulty seems to derive from the fact that *register* is a well-established and central concept in linguistics, while *genre* is a recent appendage found to be necessary as a result of important studies of text structure. Although *genre* is now seen as valuably fundamental to the realization of goals, and thus acts as a determinant of linguistic choices, there has been an understandable unwillingness to demote *register* to a secondary position, an unwillingness strengthened, one the one hand, by large-scale investments in analysis of language varieties (for lexicographic among other purposes) and underpinned, on the other, by relatively little interest in seeing how texts are perceived, categorized and used by members of a community.
>
> Despite these equivocations, linguistic contributions to the evolv-

> ing study of genre lie in the emphasis given to: (a) genres as types of goal-directed communicative events; (b) genres as having schematic structures; and most strikingly (c) genres as disassociated from registers or styles.(Swales 1990:41-42)

In the present chapter I explore some of the aspects of the textualisation of *Calm Down* as a goal-oriented communicative event and some of the aspects of its schematic, or generic structure. I do not venture into the disentangling of possible systematic relationships between genre and register. However, from the general discussion of Martin that I present below, it will be clear that Swales is not totally right when he affirms that, "strikingly" genres have been "disassociated from registers". Martin's original intention seems to have been to consider genre and register as belonging to different levels, forming 'independent' semiotic systems, but still closely related, the same way as register is closely related to language.

In what follows, first I look into genre and register within Halliday's and Martin's approaches (sections 5.1 and 5.2). In passing, I also refer to Couture (1986), and Bhatia (1993). My discussion in these two sections aims at providing only a glimpse of selected genre-related theoretical views. Next I move into the analysis of P. Hauck's *Calm Down* as a genre. Bringing into the discussion notions of genre used by Hasan (1989), Swales (1990), and Longacre (1983, 1992), I steer clear of the model proposed by Martin. The main reason not to try to integrate Martin's model in my analysis is that, as Martin himself observes: "The characterisation of contextual variables such as field, tenor, mode and genre as a semiotic resource [see definitions below] remains at a nascent stage, which makes it difficult to argue about levels of context — the degree of explicitness and formalisation required to argue convincingly about levels has not yet been attained" (1992:501).

5.1 Halliday

As I have pointed out in Chapter 1, Halliday (1978:133) uses the expression *generic structure* to refer to "the form that a text has as a property of its genre." Though Halliday does not specifically develop the notions of genre and generic structure, his theory of register, under which he subsumes genre and generic structure, has important consequences for the development of linguistic approaches to genre analysis. For Halliday, registers are the specific patternings that language takes according to field, tenor, and mode, that is, according to what social activity is going on (field), who is involved (tenor), and what means of communication is being used (mode). More specifically, field "refers to the ongoing activity and the particular purposes that the use of language is serving within the context of that activity; tenor refers to the interrelations among the participants (social status and role relationships); and mode covers the channel" and the role language itself plays in organising texts (ibid., p. 32). As Halliday puts it, field, tenor, and mode, are the three variables, which "taken together, determine the range within which meanings are selected and the forms which are used for their expression. In other words, they determine the 'register'" (ibid.).

For readers who may not be familiar with Halliday's work, I ought to emphasise that field, tenor and mode are features of the context of situation, while the meaning components of the text itself are its ideational, interpersonal, and textual metafunctions. The notion of context of situation was explored in linguistics by Firth (1957), borrowed from Malinowski (1923), and adopted by Halliday, who related it to the ideational, interpersonal, and textual metafunctions. Relationships between field, tenor, and mode always have an immediate impact on the decisions writers (and speakers) make when constructing the actual text. In the text itself, the field is realised by the ideational metafunction, the tenor by the interpersonal metafunction, and

the mode by the textual function of the semantic system. In relation to *Calm Down*, for example, the field, the activity going on, is counselling, and more specifically, the construction of adequate argumentation and hortatory content (see section 5.4 for the notion of hortatory) proposing a number of notions and strategies to influence readers' perception and conduct in relation to anger; tenor is the specific type of relationship established between the author as a counsellor and the characters in the narratives, as well as between the author and the potential users of his teachings (see, for instance, my discussion of persona, in Chapter 4 above, section 4.2); and mode relates to the channel used — in this case written — and to the specific type of textualisation, in this case a book, and not a poem, or an essay, or a sermon, etc. (I have specifically referred to aspects of the textual and interpersonal metafunctions of *Calm Down* in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, especially in section 4.3.1). The ideational metafunction has to do with content itself, the experience of the world the author is passing on to readers (I referred to it at the end of Chapter 1).

There is a consensus among quite large a number of linguists today that Halliday's (1985/1994) systematic association of field, tenor, and mode — the components, or variables of the context of situation — with the ideational, interpersonal, and textual functional components of the semantic system is an important breakthrough in linguistics. As I also observed in Chapter 1, the aim of Halliday's theory of register is "to attempt to uncover the general principles which govern [language] variation [according to the situation], so that we can begin to understand what situational factors determine what linguistic features" (p. 32). Though Halliday's view of register is partially within the scope of how a number of genre analysts propose to analyse texts nowadays, it shuns specific generic perspectives. Martin tries to solve this problem.

5.2 Martin

Martin's (1984:24) notion of register differs from Halliday's in two main respects: (1) For Martin, register is a "semiotic system in its own right", as opposed to "an interlevel (called context) relating language to the real world"; (2) His notion of register incorporates Gregory's (1967, apud Martin 1984) idea that (the register variable) tenor "be split into personal tenor (concerned with status and formality) and functional tenor (having to do with purpose)" (Martin 1984:24). These differences, i.e., register as another system, and the register variable tenor as split into personal and functional tenor, have the following consequences, according to Martin:

(a) Related to register as another semiotic system:

(1) Within this perspective, it should be possible to specify the choices open to speakers as far as field, tenor and mode are concerned. This, Martin explains, means that it should be possible to specify the set of institutionalised activities in which we participate; the range of roles of the participants; and the nature of channels used. (2) It should be possible to describe how different register choices, once selected, are realised. E.g.: what are the implications in terms of actual text construction if the field of discourse is linguistics instead of sociology, tennis instead of cricket, self-access counselling as opposed to scientific debate?

(b) Related to the register variable tenor as split into personal and functional tenor:

1. Martin criticises Halliday for subsuming purpose through his definitions of field, tenor, and mode. Recall, for example, Halliday's definition of field which I quoted above: field "refers to the ongoing activity and the particular purposes that the use of language is serving within the context of that activity." Another example can be cited from Hasan, who works within a framework similar to Halliday's. Hasan (1989) defines field as

being "concerned with the nature of the social activity" and as involving "both the kind of acts being carried out and their goal(s)". Hasan, therefore, also subsumes purpose under field. Martin believes the conflation of purpose presents two problems: (a) "it makes the correlation between register categories and functional components of grammar less clear." For example, "what parts of grammar realise what register choices?"; (b) "it fails to give a satisfactory account of the goal oriented beginning-middle-end of most texts" (Martin 1984:24). While it is somewhat easier to see what Martin means by problem (b), it is not clear what the implications of problem (a) are. This would certainly need further clarification.

The way Martin proposes to overcome these problems is by recognising a third semiotic system, namely, genre. For Martin, genre is seen as corresponding to Malinowski's (1923, apud Martin 1984) context of culture, while register corresponds to Malinowski's context of situation. In this perspective a culture would be characterised as the set of all the genres within a given social context. Genres are seen by Martin as realised through registers, and registers through language (Figure 5.1). Within this framework, genre is defined as follows:

> a genre is a staged, goal oriented, purposeful activity in which speakers engage as members of our culture, such as the staged activities of making a dentist's appointment, buying vegetables, telling a story, writing an essay, applying for a job, writing a letter to the editor, inviting someone for dinner, and so on. (Martin 1984:24)



Figure 5.1 - Genre and register as semiotic system (Martin 1984)

Martin (1985, apud Swales 1990:40) clarifies that the two main reasons for establishing genre as an independent system for accomplishing social purposes are the following: (1) Genres dictate, i.e., allow or forbid, particular combinations of the register variables field, tenor, and mode in a particular society. For instance, the genres lecture, and academic debate about scrubbing the floor do not exist (yet!!) in our culture, and talking about one's sexual preferences (if this may be called a genre) is odd and offensive if the field and tenor are, respectively, conversation at a first encounter. (2) Establishing genre as an independent system for linguistically achieving social purposes encourages the analysis of text structure, i.e., the conventional ways texts are organised as mechanisms of social interaction in different contexts of situation. To illustrate the point, analysis of conversation structure, for instance, has shown that there is a tendency for speakers in western urban societies to use pre-sequences (Coulthard 1985:71-72) before issuing invitations. Pre-sequences are demanded by norms of politeness (Brown and Levinson 1978) to allow for face-saving opting outs in case the invited person is not willing to, or cannot accept the invitation.

Even though the tri-stratal division as represented in Figure 5.1 is not easy to implement in terms of actual analysis, a number

of scholars argue that it is necessary to maintain it. Couture, for instance (1986, apud Swales 1990:41), clarifies the point with the following explanation: the division into register and genre is necessary because register "imposes constraints at the linguistic levels of vocabulary and syntax", while genre imposes "constraints at the level of discourse structure." (In section 5.4 below I will look into the discourse structure, or the obligatory elements that classify *Calm Down* as a hortatory genre.) Couture adds that "unlike registers, genres can only be realised in completed texts", which is an important differentiation. Examples of genres are research reports, weather forecasts, business reports, self-help books; and examples of registers are the language of scientific reporting, language of newspaper reporting, and bureaucratic language.

Genres, therefore, have names. Other examples are sermon, joke, business letter offering new products, book review, abstract, etc. In addition, genres are associated with specific purposes or functions within social practices, purpose being one of the defining characteristics of genre. Every genre in turn can vary in terms of the register it employs. For instance, if a sermon — simultaneously broadcast to several parts of the world — is given by the pope at a crowded St. Peter's square on the 25th of December, the register in which it is rendered will be quite different from the register of a sermon (same genre) given at a wedding ceremony by the local priest to a group of church-goers who happen to be close friends of the priest's. A number of genres have well established conventional forms, though of course variation is always possible. Registers, on the other hand, are possibly more easily accountable for because variation can be explained in terms of different field, tenor and mode (tenor in the case of the above example), and because of the close link with the grammatical systems. So they are linguistically analysable. Genres, which look more straightforward, are actually difficult to analyse non-subjectively.

Bhatia (1993) endorses the idea that it is necessary to distinguish between register (or language varieties) and genre. He points out that a great deal of text analysis done in the 70's and early 80's failed to do so. For instance, Bhatia suggests, if the register was scientific English, many text analysts would consider a science research article, for example, as legitimate a sample of that register as an extract from a chemistry lab report. Bhatia explains that not distinguishing genre from register, as illustrated, creates two problems. "Firstly, it potentially misrepresents not only the communicative purposes of the two genres [science research article/chemistry lab report], but also the relationship between the participants taking part in the linguistic activity, thus obscuring the very communicative nature as well as the distinct characteristics of the two genres. Secondly, by implication it gives a grossly misleading impression that a research article in science is likely to be very different from a research article in sociology, linguistics or psychology, for example, [of which we have no evidence, and which may not be the case]" (Bhatia 1993:17). It seems to be generally true that "analysis of varieties or registers on their own reveal very little about the true nature of genres and about the way social purposes are accomplished in and through them in settings in which they are used" (ibid., p. 18). Some of these perspectives will become more visible when I take up the analysis of *Calm Down* in section 5.3 and specially 5.4 below.

Despite the appeal of the overall framework of genre and register as separate systems, one important difficulty remains. Once purpose is placed within the realm of genre, as proposed by Martin, should it be totally detached from register? This seems at least counterintuitive since the use of language always has some purpose, and as such there is purpose both in genre choices and in register choices. Furthermore, how does one go about establishing relationships between genres and registers? If

Martin's problem "a" I referred to above is that Halliday's conflating purpose in register variables (field, for example) "makes the correlation between register categories and functional components of grammar less clear", how exactly does the separation of genre from register help solve this problem? It seems that despite the apparent intention to relate the level of register to genre and vice-versa, as suggested by Figure 5.1, it remains an intention to be operationalised and implemented, as I have already suggested by quoting Martin at the end of the introduction to the present chapter.

5.3 Genre and purpose

In this section and in the next one I analyse *Calm Down* as a genre. As already stated above, purpose is one of the defining characteristics of genre. Recall Martin's definition:

> a genre is a staged, **goal oriented**, **purposeful activity** in which speakers engage as members of our culture'... (Martin 1984:24, emphasis added).

For Swales as well, purpose is crucial in genre definition. These are his four main criteria to characterise a genre:

> 1. A genre is a class of communicative events, [i.e., events where] language plays both a significant and indispensable role.
>
> 2. **The principal criterion** that turns a collection of communicative events into a genre is some shared set of **communicative purposes** (p. 46, emphasis added).
>
> 3. Genres vary in prototypicality.
>
> 4. The rational behind a genre establishes constraints on allowable contributions in terms of their content, positioning and form. (Swales 1990:45-52)

As suggested in my discussion of Longacre's (1983) concepts of notional and surface structures at the beginning of

Chapter 2, for him, too, purpose is crucial in genre identification. Following Longacre, I have previously classified *Calm Down* as a behavioural discourse (Chapter 2). That classification was based on agent orientation, contingent succession, and the overall purpose of the book. That classification still holds. However, to be more precise, *Calm Down* can be further characterised as a subtype of behavioural discourse, namely, hortatory discourse (Longacre 1983, 1992). According to Longacre,

> Hortatory discourse aims at [notice purpose as a starting point] influencing conduct, that is, getting the receivers of the text to do something they are not currently doing, to discontinue something they are doing, to continue doing something they are already doing, to expend greater effort in an activity embarked on, to modify the nature of their efforts, and so on. (Longacre 1992:109)

Calm Down can be classified as a hortatory genre because it neatly matches Longacre's definition in several ways. First, *Calm Down* is hortatory in that its overall goal, as pointed out previously, is to influence conduct. As already pointed out as well, this goal — besides being developed at different points throughout Hauck's book (see Chapter 4 above) — is encapsulated in the subtitle *How to cope with frustration and anger*. Second, the book is designed to get the receivers to discontinue something they are doing. This is suggested by the title itself: *Calm Down*, which implies a message such as "stop hurting yourself and pay attention to what I am going to tell you." Third, receivers who are already making progress are urged by the author of *Calm Down* to continue watching for their progress. Notice in the quote below the use of the imperative (typical of hortatory discourse). (Part of this same excerpt was used in section 3.3.2 to illustrate advance labelling).

> Don't be misled into thinking that the task of controlling yourself will ever be easy just because it is simple. You will doubtless at times find yourself forgetting everything you learned and still explode or rationalize yourself into a state of fury. This will happen

> many times, I can assure you. Many of you will even wonder if you will ever conquer this problem. To help you avoid being too harsh with yourself, however, let me define for you what progress means. If you change the intensity, frequency, and duration of your angry episodes, you're making progress. That means that if you get angry once a month rather than once a week (frequency), you've made progress. If you only raise your voice when you used to strike with your fist (intensity), that's progress. And finally, if your anger, even if it is severe, only lasts an hour now but once lasted all day (duration), that's progress. If you keep on making progress like that, however slight, the day will come when you will look back over a period of months when you haven't had a really bad row at all. (*Calm Down*, p. 125- 126).

Fourth, receivers who may find more difficulty in changing their behaviour are urged to put more effort into the enterprise:

> Some of you will find that control and elimination of anger will come remarkably easily merely from the first reading of this book. You're the lucky ones. Others will find their habit of reacting impulsively and bitterly so strong they will repeat their angry scenes over and over again. This is the more usual case. Be sure not to blame yourself for your early failures (or any failures, for that matter) and get right back to analysing what you did incorrectly.
>
> If you stop and think over what you were saying to yourself after each incidence of anger, you will usually find that you said a number of things. Some of these thoughts will be sensible and healthy, while some will be irrational and neurotic. It is the latter thoughts that you will want to detect so that you can talk yourself out of believing that rubbish. When you then attack those irrational beliefs to the point where you do not believe them any longer, your anger will have to lift like fog. (*Calm Down*, p. 118).

At the same time that Hauck tries to influence conduct, he uses persuasive strategies, as I have argued in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. *Calm Down* is thus not only hortatory but also persuasive. Now, given the fact that hortatory and persuasive are different types of discourse, we face an apparent classificatory problem. As Longacre (1992:109) explains it, "unlike hortatory discourse,

whose goal is to influence conduct, persuasive discourse is primarily aimed at influencing beliefs and values." The question then is how do we solve this difficulty? Is *Calm Down* not actually a persuasive discourse? Or can it be hortatory and persuasive at the same time? The apparent impasse can be accounted for by drawing once again on Longacre (1992). He states: "persuasive and hortatory discourse can co-exist in one text, especially when the same text embeds persuasive discourse as a means of supplying motivation in the hortatory schema."

Supplying motivation in the hortatory schema is exactly the function of persuasive discourse in *Calm Down*. As I have shown in my analysis of narratives (Chapter 2), of prediction (Chapter 3), and of status and value evaluation (Chapter 4), Hauck makes use of persuasive strategies with the ultimate aim of achieving hortatory purposes, that is, of influencing readers' conduct. What we have here, then, is not an impasse but a common discourse feature: one main notional structure (hortatory) embeds another one (persuasive) as an ancillary notional structure to achieve a given purpose. What is crucial in such textualisations, I am emphasising, is that the main purpose of the discourse is always a determinant of the dominant notional structure. Paraphrasing Swales (1990), purpose turns texts into genres. But genres in turn can encapsulate other genres. I will return to this point later on in the next section.

5.4 Generic structure

As implied by the definitions of genre quoted above from both Martin (1984:24) and Swales (1990:49-52), genres are also made of parts, components, or elements. Looking at Martin's definition once again, we read:

> a genre is a staged, goal oriented, purposeful activity in which speakers engage as members of our culture'...

And Swales says:

> - Genres vary in prototypicality.
>
> - The rationale behind a genre establishes constraints on allowable contributions in terms of their content, positioning and form.

Recall that one of the reasons for Martin (and his associates in Australia) to propose that genre be considered an individual semiotic system, though feeding on register and language, is that due attention can then be given to the textual structure, or organisation of specific text types. It is this attention that will help writers to produce texts, and text analysts to find out and describe what sort of staged activities specific genres are; what sort of prototypicality characterises specific genres; what sort of positioning and form is preferred for specific genres.

Hasan (1984, 1989) has developed a useful framework to account for generic structure. For her, a genre is a relatively stable category of text, characterised by specific formal properties as determined by its generic structure potentials (GSP). In addition, genres fulfil specific social functions, and are contextually appropriate as determined by specific contextual configurations (CC). The GSP of a genre is characterised by obligatory elements and optional elements, and their conventional ordering. Elements are stages which have "some consequence in the progression of a text." The CC is a specific set of variables that realises field, tenor, and mode, and it is the variables of the CC that "motivate the occurrence of [specific elements] of text structure" (Hasan 1989:97). We see, then, that Hasan, like Halliday, conflates genre and register, because, as stated above, field, tenor and mode are the contextual variables that determine register, or the language variety used in a given circumstance. In a way this is very similar to Martin's proposal, the difference though being that Martin gives register and genre the status of individual semiotic systems. It seems that while for Hasan the specific "values" of the contextual

situation (a certain CC) are the catalysts, let us say, of specific genres, for Martin genres dictate register variation (see Martin 1992:505). Independently of the similarities or differences, I shall focus on obligatory elements to discuss the generic structure of *Calm Down*, and shall not be concerned with the differences just mentioned.

From Hasan's perspective, the presence in a text of all the obligatory elements characteristic of the genre which the text belongs to is necessary for that text to be perceived as a complete unit. As completeness is one of the requirements of textual coherence, the absence in a text of any one of the obligatory generic elements will affect its coherence. Having said this, what are the obligatory elements of a hortatory text? Does *Calm Down*, a sample of hortatory discourse, contain these elements? Let us look into these questions.

Once again I draw on Longacre, who classifies hortatory texts the following way:

> A hortatory text, that is, a text whose purpose is to modify the conduct of the receivers of the text has four typical moves [or elements, to use Hasan's term]: (1) establishment of the authority/credibility of the text producer; (2) presentation of a problem/situation; (3) issuing one or more commands, which can be mitigated to suggestions of varying urgency; and (4) resort to motivation (essentially threats with prediction of undesirable results, and promises along with predictions of desirable results). In this schema, (3) is minimal and basic, i.e., hortatory discourse cannot be such without commands/suggestions [(*Calm Down*!!)] and it may consist wholely of commands/suggestions. Characteristically such a discourse is brusque and brief. But even in such a minimal hortatory text, the presence of (2) is implied (or present in the context of situation), i.e., there is necessarily some problem/situation [(angry behaviour)] which evokes the command elements. Most hortatory discourse also includes (4), motivation — unless the power of the speaker/writer over the addressee is incontestable. All this in turn implies (1) even if not overtly stated. (Longacre 1992:110-111).

If we recall the sub-headings of Chapter 4, it will help us see that Hauck's counselling manual fits Longacre's characterisation perfectly. Each one of the four constitutive generic components mentioned by Longacre is well elaborated in *Calm Down*. As I have shown in Chapter 4, generic element No. 1 (authority/credibility) is realised by the establishment of the author's counselling persona as seen through the presentation of his credentials (section 4.2); generic element No. 2 (problem) is realised by problematisation strategies (section 4.1); generic element No. 3 (commands) is issued by means of imperative forms, the main one being the very title of the book, many others being distributed throughout the text — (I have commented on this aspect only in passing); finally, generic element No. 4 (motivation) is realised by means of the different uses the author makes of, among other things, narratives and evaluation of both status and value thus trying to lead readers towards reconceptualisation (Chapter 2, and section 4.3).

Longacre, in the last quotation above, comments that generic structure element No. 3 ("issuing of one or more commands") is minimal and basic. In Hasan's (1989) taxonomy, **obligatory** would be the term used. As Longacre points out, a hortatory text made of a single command would constitute a brief, and possibly, brusque text. As Longacre also comments, even in a text made by just one hortatory command, element No. 2, the problem or situation would be implied. In addition, even in minimal hortatory commands, generic structure elements No.1 (authority) and No. 4 (motivation) would also be implied. A hortatory book, however, is obviously not a minimal text, and the four generic elements — authority, problem, commands, motivation — are obligatory ones.

It is interesting to notice that many times a specific surface structure may relate to, or realise more than one of the obligatory elements, simultaneously. For instance, by reporting that Mrs

Baker finally took his advice seriously, Hauck (p. 9) not only offers motivation for the readers, like Mrs Baker, to modify their conduct, but he also, indirectly as I have shown previously, establishes his authority and, in addition, implies that Mrs Baker had a problem to solve. Most of the time, however, it should be true that one of the obligatory generic elements is being foregrounded in the text. In the case of the reporting proposition about Mrs Baker it is the expectation that the author will specify what the motivation (element No. 4 of the generic structure) was for this client to take his advice seriously.

As everything in the text is calculated, everything has a purpose, and links to everything else in the text, the writer has a monumentally complex monitoring business to manage as s/he plods through words, clauses, clause relations, etc., to create text. (See Meurer 1996 for the notion of monitoring). In a long text such as a book what makes the writing task even more complex is the option that the writer has to embed different surface structures (see Chapter 2, section 2.0) under main, or dominant notional structures. As suggested in Chapter 2, narrative is one such surface structure in *Calm Down*. In addition, as I have mentioned in the previous section (5.3), within the hortatory structure of *Calm Down* Hauck also embeds persuasive discourse. What we have here then is a compound discourse (Longacre 1983:14), that is, a discourse which embeds different surface and notional structures.

5.4.1 Compound structure

Before looking further into the embedding of persuasive material in *Calm Down*, i.e., *Calm Down* as a compound discourse, I will make a short digression in order to provide an illustration of a single notional structure text. I do this by looking into a sample of an abstract:

> [1]This paper sets out to examine two findings reported in the literature: one, that during the one-word stage a child's word productions are highly phonetically variable, and two, that the one-word stage is qualitatively distinct from subsequent phonological development. [2]The complete set of word forms produced by a child at the one-word stage were collected and analysed both cross-sectionally (month by month) and longitudinally (looking for changes over time). [3]It was found that the data showed very little variability, and that phonological development during the period studied was qualitatively continuous with subsequent development. [4]It is suggested that the phonological principled development of this child's first words is related to his late onset of speech. (Bhatia 1993:79)

Each one of the four sentences (indicated by the superscripts) neatly corresponds to one specific obligatory element of the generic structure of an abstract for a research paper. As Bhatia (1993:30) explains, "just as each genre has a communicative purpose that it tends to serve, similarly, each move also serves a typical communicative intention which is always subservient to the overall communicative purpose of the genre." The overall aim of an abstract is to provide "a description or factual summary" (ibid., p. 78) of an article or a report, giving readers an exact and concise overview of that article, or report (see also Santos 1996 for an analysis of abstracts). As for moves, or elements, abstracts typically contain four of them altogether: the first one specifies the purpose of the article (stretch No. 1 in the above sample); the second summarises the methodology (stretch No. 2); the third gives a general overview of results (stretch No. 3); and the fourth presents a general conclusion (stretch No. 4). The analysis may then go on to deeper levels of delicacy, such as use of tense in each move, theme/rheme, etc. The point I want to make here, however, is that text elements in a book cannot possibly be so orderly distributed as is the case with this abstract.

In a book, by necessity, at least some of the obligatory generic elements will be reiterated and intermingled. Thus, as I

have shown in Chapter 4, the establishment and maintenance of the persona occurs at different points throughout *Calm Down*. This is also true for the issuing of commands and the presentation of motivation for narrative characters and readers to accept the commands. Furthermore, motivation is additionally complicated by the embedding of persuasive notional structures.

Recall that persuasive discourse aims at influencing people's beliefs and values, while hortatory discourse aims at influencing conduct. Differing from hortatory discourse regarding overall intent, persuasive discourse differs in terms of obligatory generic elements, as well. But, as persuasive discourse is also a subtype of behavioural notional structure it also shares similarities with hortatory discourse. Thus, persuasive texts also need to contain a problem element, and an element presenting the authority 'behind' the persuasive text. But difference starts with the authority element: authority in persuasive discourse, as observed by Longacre (1992:111) "is perhaps not as prominent as in hortatory discourse." For persuasion, what is in principle more important is argumentative substance, though of course authority has its weight. Further difference between the two genres is that while commands are issued in hortatory texts, in persuasive texts solutions/answers are presented, and appeals are made for readers to adopt given viewpoints. Summarising, persuasive discourse can be characterised as typically containing: "(1) problem/question; (2) proposed solution/answer; (3) supporting argumentation (logic, experimentation, authority); (4) appeal (often very subtle) to give credence, or to adopt certain values" (Longacre 1992)[5].

As both hortatory and persuasive discourses contain the obligatory generic elements *problem* and *authority*, one might question the previous classification of persuasive discourse as being embedded in the hortatory notional structure of *Calm Down*. Instead of looking at it as embedding, one might propose

to conflate the two notional structures into one. In this case, the self-help counselling genre, as represented by *Calm Down*, would be characterised by the four elements as previously specified plus the argumentation and appeal elements of the persuasive notional structure. This would mean that self-help counselling books would then be characterised as containing the following six elements, or moves: (1) establishment of the authority/credibility of the text producer; (2) presentation of a problem/situation; (3) issuing one or more commands; (4) resort to motivation; (5) argumentation; (6) appeal. Even though it is possible to distinguish between the 'new' and 'old' elements, for example, motivation (e.g., telling readers that anger causes health problems — (section 2.1) and argumentation (providing evidence of angry behaviour as 'bad' and nonangry behaviour as 'good' — section 4.3.2), it seems to me that the analysis would become less clear were the two notional structures to be conflated in one. For example, we would possibly lose the overall perspective that the persuasive material basically serves to support the overall hortatory intent of the genre. It should also be observed, however, that this issue is not an established one at all.

"Genre is an intertextual concept" (Wales 1989:259). In this sense, texts depend on other texts both in terms of content and conventional schematic structures. From the intertextual perspective, genres need to conform to conventions of particular traditions. Persuasive and hortatory discourses, if we agree with Longacre's classification, form different textual traditions. This being so, it seems preferable to me to keep persuasive and hortatory discourses as different genres, and thus to consider *Calm Down* as encapsulating one genre into the other, as described above.

5.5 Considerations about register

Though it has remained implicit, a great deal of the text analysis carried out in this book relates to aspects of register as

it is manifested in self-help counselling. Recall, for example, my discussion of *heading questions* (section 3.6), which may behave quite differently in the language of counselling if compared to the language of economics, for instance. Remember also my discussion of *turbulence* (section 4.3.1). These may be illustrations of how the register variables field (what is going on, the topic being dealt with) and the tenor (relationship between author and readers) influence mode, (the actual textualisation). Though it is not my intention to go any deeper into register theory in this book, by way of conclusion to this chapter, I want to briefly comment on one more register feature peculiar to hortatory discourse specially as deployed in self-help books such as *Calm Down*.

As I have already mentioned earlier (sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2), at several points in Hauck's narrated study cases he makes use of dialogue. This can be seen, for example, in the narratives about Mrs Bakers and about the two brothers fighting over money to take care of their mother (Chapter 1). Notice that such features are not found in the register of scientific and academic genres. An explanation for the occurrence of dialogue in counselling genres may be as follows. According to Longacre (1983:10-13), hortatory discourse is possibly the least vivid, or the least lively type among all other discourses. Longacre believes that vividness achieves maximum force in drama. If it is the case that hortatory texts tend to be seen as not very vivid forms of discourse, it is then quite natural for authors like Hauck to use more lively registers or to embed more vivid genres, like narrative (the next most vivid after drama), in order to make their hortatory structure more appealing to readers.

Hortatory texts are probably universal. As Longacre (1983:10) affirms: "we can scarcely conceive of a culture where somebody does not give advice to somebody else orally or urge on him a change of conduct. The very idea of social control seems

to imply this." But it is also true that, most often, people do not like to be preached at. We know from our own experience that direct advice is not always welcome. Consider, for instance, how children and teenagers tend to react to parents' advice! This being so, the embedding of conversational registers and of more vivid genres in hortatory notional structures can be seen as strategic mechanisms intended to help hortatory texts hold attention.

Through such strategic mechanisms a less *vivid* form of discourse ends up being "shifted into" a more vivid surface form (Longacre 1983:13). Within this framework, it is possible to note Hauck's use of very informal registers. See, for example, the following expressions in the (same) two brothers' narrative quoted in Chapter 2: "I felt he was taking me for a ride; what a nutcase my brother is; squeeze blood out of a stone; I don't know what's come over him". Examples like these further illustrate the interaction of the context of situation with the actual textualisation representative of a specific genre. By using very informal language the author is manipulating tenor, trying to establish closer contact with potential readers. Examples like these are perhaps good points where to start an analysis of the relationships between language, register and genre.

5.6 Summary of Chapter 5

I started this Chapter by looking at the notion of *register* according to Halliday (1978) and I discussed the components of the context of situation — field, tenor, and mode — as determiners of register. Also I specified where the notion of *genre* lies within Halliday's approach. Next I contrasted Martin's (1984) view of genre and register with Halliday's perspective and described how Martin (1984) views genre and register as two separate, but related, semiotic systems. I also referred to Couture (1986) and Bhatia (1993) as supporters of Martin's

tripartite system (i.e., genre, register, language). I then looked into the import of **purpose** in defining genre, and into the generic structure of *Calm Down*. Following Longacre (1983, 1992), I classified Hauck's self-help counselling manual as a genre belonging to **hortatory** notional structures. Furthermore, I classified *Calm Down* as embedding a **persuasive** notional structure. I presented the obligatory elements of hortatory and persuasive texts, relating them to the overall notional structure of *Calm Down*. Finally, I made some brief remarks about register and the notion of **vividness** as manifested in *Calm Down*.

As I pointed out in the introduction to the present chapter, the analysis of genre within the realm of linguistics is in its infancy. Several questions, especially methodological ones, remain unanswered. Most crucially, there is a need to establish how one can proceed to reveal systematic relationships between the three boxes as represented in Figure 5.1, i.e., between genres, registers and language.

There are other complexities that I have not ventured into in this chapter, nor in the book as a whole, but which are also crucial in genre analysis and which remain to be implemented. One of these, for example, and to conclude, is how to specify the boundaries of obligatory (and optional!) elements of specific genres. In a recent article on this topic, Paltridge (1994) suggests that, in determining the boundaries of generic structure elements, text analysis should look for cognitive boundaries as opposed to linguistic boundaries. It is a valid suggestion because it is a "cognitive sense rather than a linguistic sense that guides our perception of textual division" (Paltridge 1994:295). But of course perception of textual division is linguistic as well. Nevertheless, the suggestion, together with a built-in critique, is also valid inasmuch as genre analysts — though they are trying to theorise about genre as social action — have somehow forgotten that, being realised by language, genres are also a cognitive phenomenon.

CHAPTER 6
FINAL REMARKS

> Words can start people marching in the streets — and can stir others to stoning the marchers.
>
> Hayakawa1965, p. vii

My analysis in this book has looked into aspects of P. Hauck's *Calm Down* as text and as social practice (Fairclough 1993). When analysing it as text, I examined, among other things, the book's form and meaning relations regarding: textual patterns of prediction and their interrelation with adjacent textual surfaces (Chapter 3); an embedded pattern of prediction (Chapter 3, section 3.4); rhetorical underlining by means of repetition of a certain textual patterns, which I referred to by Longacre's notion of turbulence (Chapter 4, section 4.3.1); the grouping of specific notional structures characterised as specific genres (Chapter 5); the embedding of notional structures to form a compound discourse (Chapter 5).

Regarding social practice, my analysis has only covered aspects of *Calm Down* as a mode of action. According to Fairclough analysis of a text as social practice implies looking into it as more than just a mode of action. In his own words, "viewing language use as social practice implies, first, that it is a mode of action (Austin 1962; Levinson 1983) and, secondly, that it is always a socially and historically situated mode of action, in a dialectical relationship with other facets of 'the social' (its 'social context') — it is socially shaped, but it is also socially shaping, or constitutive" (1993:134). With respect to aspects of *Calm Down* as a mode of action, I have discussed, among other things: the several uses to which Hauck puts narrative, none of them strictly narrative (Chapter 2); strategies the author uses to

establish the problem; strategies to give credentials to himself as a counselling persona; and strategies of reconceptualisation by means of status and value evaluation (Chapter 4).

I have not, however, said much about Hauck's book in relation to the second perspective of discourse as social practice; i.e., its social and historical situation and how it relates to its social context. In order to do some justice to this aspect of language as social practice let me briefly comment on it.

Let us recall that I started this book by referring to **reflexivity** as a characteristic of contemporary society. I will draw on Cambridge sociologist Anthony Giddens (1991) to further explain this notion and relate it to *Calm Down* as a self-help advice book. As pointed out by Giddens, we live in a social world characterised by a series of structural changes in society (consider, for example, the increasing number of divorced couples and single parents today; the rise of feminism, and new masculinity). We live in a world characterised by a series of developments (the West is no longer so dominant, for example) related to changes in economy and in communications that have made the world simultaneously more complex and more globalised. We live in a world characterised by changes in industrialism so that electronic technology, for example, is much more important than it was before. We live in a social world of multiple authorities where it is no longer clear, for example, that science has the authority it once had; or parents have the authority over their children they once had; a world of a multitude of expert systems (specific knowledge of all kinds: theoretical or practical) where individuals become highly specialised, but at the same time highly dependent on other expert systems, (as it is extremely complex to become an expert even in just one system).

These changes produce a highly fragmented, often chaotic and unpredictable world where individuals frequently feel the need to stop and reflect upon themselves, to think about their own

identity, what is going on with and around themselves, their life projects, relationships, crisis, etc. In order to do this individuals seek help within different expert systems. They often look for new management, counselling, therapy. Within this context self-help books on all kinds of subjects, including marriage, stress, emotions, healing, and positive thinking constitute one more type of expert help. Mentioning the self-help manual *Second Chances* (by Judith Wallerstein and Sandra Blakeslee, London: Bantam, 1989) as an illustration among other titles mentioned in passing, Giddens refers to it as "one small contribution to a vast and more or less continuous outpouring of writings, technical and more popular, on the subject of marriage and intimate relationships" (1991:14). *Calm Down* can be similarly described as one among an equally vast outpouring of writings on emotion, stress, and self-control.

Such writings, as Giddens (1991:14) points out, "are part of the reflexivity of modernity: they serve routinely to **organise**, and **alter** (my bold), the aspects of social life they report on or analyse." (Recall my discussion of reconceptualisation, and Note 2 for the indirect relevance of some such reconceptualisations). This way such writings are, as Fairclough affirms, "socially shaped", i.e., they arise because of certain social circumstances, and "socially shaping, or constitutive", i.e., through reflexivity they help people see 'reality' in a given way, and possibly change conduct as well. In the contemporary world, as Giddens further states, "each of us lives a biography reflexively organised in terms of flows of social and psychological information about possible ways of life" (ibid). We are constantly reflexively building our own life narratives, as pointed out earlier.

Calm Down, independently of its quality, which it was not my purpose to investigate, is part of the reflexive 'arsenal' that contemporary individuals may draw on as they reflect upon themselves, their own conduct, seeking answers to everyday life

questions. To quote Giddens (1991:14) once again, "modernity is a post-traditional order, in which the question, "How shall I live?" has to be answered in day-to-day decisions about *how to behave* (my emphasis), what to wear and what to eat — and many other things — as well as interpreted within the temporal unfolding of self-identity." As part of this 'arsenal', to recall the terminology I have borrowed from Popper to relate narratives to reality (Chapter 2), Hauck's book is one more world 3 reality created within specific social circumstances which has the potential to affect world 2 entities, and eventually influence people's (world 1 entities) actual conduct.

Self-help texts like the one analysed in this book exist because of the fragmented, often chaotic and unpredictable character of our reflexively constructed contemporary world. They also exist because human beings have the need for a kind of self-care ethics. Reflexivity and the search for self-care will continue: either through books like this or through other texts or other genres that may be deeper, more (or less) technical, or philosophical, or inspired, or poetic, or whatever. Perhaps, what really matters is that whatever is written or whatever we write, whatever texts we read or analyse, whatever way we conduct ourselves, we never lose sight of our essence as human beings in search of a better self and a better world. This will help us avoid excess and defect as suggested long ago by the great text writer and text analyst Aristotle when referring to *virtue*:

> ... virtue must have the quality of aiming at the intermediate. I mean moral virtue; for it is this that is concerned with passions and actions, and in these there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. For instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and *anger* [my emphasis] and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not well (sic); but to feel them at the right time, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue. Aristotle (*The Nicomachean Ethics*, p. 38)

NOTES

1 It should be observed, however, that a totally different perspective is represented by the recent developments in corpus linguistics. The work coordinated by John Sinclair making use of the nearly 300-million-word COBUILD corpus at the University of Birmingham has "genuinely shifted the focus" of linguistic analysis (Stubbs 1993:27) to long texts. As noted by Stubbs and Gerbig (1993:65) "much corpus work is concerned with characteristics of the language as a whole (e.g. for lexicography) and not of individual texts."

2. The evidence is overwhelming that "there is a correlation between anger and hypertension, heart attack, and arterial disease" (T. James, personal communication). I thank James for having kindly provided me with the following references on the subject:

-Booltwood MD Taylor CB Burke MB Grogin H Giacomini J. 'Anger report predicts coronary artery vasomotor response to mental stress in atherosclerotic segments.' In: American Journal of Cardiology (1993 Dec 15) 72(18):1361-5.

-Whorwell PJ Houghton LA Taylor EE Maxton DG. 'Physiological effects of emotion: assessment via hypnosis [see comments].' In: Lancet (1992 Jul 11) 340(8811):69-72.

-Burns JW Friedman R Katkin ES. 'Anger expression, hostility, anxiety, and patterns of cardiac reactivity to stress.' In: Behavioral Medicine (1992 Summer) 18(2)71-8.

-NacDougal JM Dembroski TM Dimsdale JE Hackett TP. 'Components of type A, hostility, and anger-in: further rela-

tionships to angiographic findings.' In: Health Psychology (1985) 4(2):137-52.

-Kneip RC Delamater AM Ismond T Milford C Salvia L Schwartz D. 'Self- and spouse ratings of anger and hostility as predictors of coronary heart disease.' Health Psychology (1993 Jul) 12(4)301-7.

-Siegman AW. 'Cardiovascular consequences of expressing, experiencing and repressing anger.' In: Journal of Behavioral Medicine (1993 Dec) 16(6):539-69.

-Diamond EL. 'The role of anger and hostility in essential hypertension and coronary heart disease.' In: Psychological Bulletin (1982 Sep) 92(2):410-33.

-Greenglass ER Julkunen J Cook-Medley. 'Hostility, anger, and the Type A behavior pattern in Finland. In: Psychological Reports' (1991 Jun) 68(3 Pt 2):1059-66.

-Goldstein HS Edelberg R Meier CF Davis L. 'Relationship of resting blood pressure and heart rate to experienced anger and expressed anger.' In: Psychosomatic Medicine (1988 Jul-Aug) 50(4):321-9.

-Dembroski TM MacDougall JM Williams RB Haney TL Blumenthal JA. 'Components of Type A, hostility, and anger-in: relationship to angiographic findings.' In: Psychosomatic Medicine (1985 May-Jun) 47(3):219-33.

3 Just as an illustration, here are four more titles: 1) M. K. Woodall. 1990. *How To Think On Your Feet*. London: Thorsons/HarperCollinsPublishers. 2) D Carnegie. 1970/1991. *How To Enjoy Your Life And Your Job*. London: Ce-

dar. 3) C. Turner. 1994. *Born To Succeed: How To Release Your Unlimited Potential*. Shaftesbury, Dorset: Element. 4) - E. N. Phillips and D. S. Pugh. 1987/(1994 revised ed.). *How To Get A PhD: A Handbook For Students And Their Supervisors*. Buckingham/Philadelphia: Open University Press.

4 The analysis of propositions like these ones can also be carried out in terms of the notion of modality, i.e., "the speaker's judgement of the probabilities, or the obligations, involved in what he is saying" (Halliday 1985/1994:75). As Halliday explains, a proposition "may become arguable by being presented as likely or unlikely, desirable or undesirable — in other words, its relevance specified in modal terms" (ibid.). Looking at speakers' judgements as different types of evaluation as proposed by Hunston, however, seemed to be more enlightening for the type of analysis carried out here. Notice that Hunston does use the notion of modality, but as one of the devices realising status evaluation. One reason to use Hunston's approach, then, is that it is more encompassing than modality.

5 Longacre observes that expository discourse is similar to persuasive discourse, but it lacks persuasive element number 4 (appeal). Regarding problem solution, Hoey (1983) exploits these patterns as they often unfold within a situation-evaluation basic text structure (Winter 1982). Both Winter and Hoey, however, focus on the textual pattern itself, not specifically worrying about genre-related perspectives.

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Aspects of Language in Self-help Counselling is the forth volume in the *Advanced Research in English Series* (ARES), which publishes research conducted by faculty members and doctoral students of the Post-Graduate Programme in English (Language, Applied Linguistics and Literary Studies) at the Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC), in Florianópolis, Brazil.

Drawing on an array of linguistic approaches to text and on philosophical principles, Meurer investigates the language of self-help counselling from four main perspectives: the functions of narrative, textual organisation, problematisation and reconceptualisation, and self-help books as a genre. He shows that self-help books constitute a compound genre characterised by strategic use of the hortatory and persuasive rhetorical modes and that these books are part of the reflexivity apparatus utilised by individuals in late modernity.

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