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Abstract:
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Abstract: This thesis aims to propose a non-essentialist and non-naturalistic alternative of reflection that can be offered as a foundation hypothesis to ethical and political reflections, from the concept of singularity. To do so, I use as theoretical instrument the Trope Theory, and I base my conceptual elaboration from the Prototype Theory to criticize a conception of a mono-referential human, based on the logic of Classical Theory of Concepts in which one takes for presupposition the fact that there's a closed set of necessary and sufficient features to define who (or what) belongs to each particular concept. Proposing, instead, a multi-referential perception that grasps the human as condition and not as nature, I try to emphasize that in philosophical discourse, from antiquity and largely up to contemporaneity, a description of the human being is presupposed as a basis for the distribution of rights and duties. The problem identified is that the descriptions refer to a specific human type, and somehow it authorize violence by excluding those who don't correspond to what I consider the paradigmatic type: male, white, fully skilled physically and mentally and heterosexual. The work is structured to discuss the paradigmatic human type description in each one of the highlighted features: as belonging to a specific race, trying to deny both positive and negative notions of identity brought into the discourse about racial differentiation problems; as fully skilled physically and mentally trying to discuss the description of fully cooperative members of society not as a biological fact, but as a problem of social determination, based on exclusive assumptions that turn deficiency into inability; as determined by a supposed essence that allows infer gender preferences since biological sex. The suggestion is that it?s feasible to think of multiple ways of achievement and auto-instauration regardless of how the body is presented. Finally, I offer an alternative interpretation of some Arendtian texts arguing about the banality of evil and the empty of thought, pointing to the possibility of thinking about moral evil and political injustice as a problem that pervades much of the western story and that is still felt by all those who are not classified into specific categories (grounded in partial and determinant descriptions) and therefore become invisible (not possessed of moral agency and effective political representation). Thus, I propose, from Arendt that determinant judgments, those that indicate the ?normal? way of thinking (subsuming the particular to the comforting universal), should be replaced by a broader possibility of judging, i.e., by reflexive judgments, and thus one can take into account the various possibilities of being, of make up yourself. The fundamental goal is to be able to establish a principle of beneficence in which diversity is not perceived as a problem, and that each one is taken a priori as equally worthy of moral consideration and as a holder of rights, regardless of how little is similar to majority.
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